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ABSTRACT
This dissertation explores three youth digital social movements, which have taken
place throughout the twenty-first century: the Invisible Children movement of Uganda,
the Bring Back Our Girls movement of Nigeria, and the Never Again movement of the
United States. Using rhetorical analysis of each movement, I explore the relationship
each has with youth, digital, social movement, and activism. Specifically, I seek to
answer the following research questions: (1) with youth in the forefront of each
movement, how have the movements utilized affective rhetoric to promote and gain
support, and (2) how have youth digital social movements evolved throughout the
twenty-first century?
I argue that key components of youth digital social activism include the ability to
get movement followers to connect on an emotional level with the cause of the movement
in order to get them to move offline and act outside of the digital realm and providing
specific, detailed steps for movement followers to avoid getting stuck in the online vortex
that can lead to a version of slacktivism. Ultimately, this research provides insight for
future social activists and movement leaders to learn from and adapt accordingly, and
important areas for future scholars to focus their attention.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

This generation is changing the rules. The traditional routes of communication,
influence, and authority have been reversed, and our connectedness has turned the
power pyramid upside down.1
— Invisible Children “The Fourth Estate”
Young people are not new to the social movement landscape, but as times have
changed, so too have the ways in which youth engage in social activism. The utilization
of new digital means has shaped the way young people hear about, discuss, and engage in
social activism. This dissertation explores three social movements that have connections
to youth, the changing digital landscape that each has emerged within, and the
relationship that each has to activism as a whole. The three cases in this study include the
Invisible Children Movement in Uganda, the Bring Back Our Girls movement in Nigeria,
and the Never Again movement in the United States. In this dissertation, I explore the
concepts of youth, digital, social movement, and activism to track the evolution of youth
digital social movements over time and to explore the affective rhetoric surrounding
youth as a mainstay of each of these movements.
The combination of youth and social movement activism is not new. Across the
globe, and for centuries, young people have been activists and protestors of injustice. The
documented history dates back to at least 1229, when the entire student body at the
University of Paris went on strike after students were unjustly punished, and some killed,
by outside enforcement while the University was supposed to be independent from local
authority. More recently, during the twentieth century, youth have continued to take up
social movement activism across the world. 2 For example, during South African
Apartheid in 1944, a group of young ‘radicals’ created the African National Council
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Youth League as they became frustrated by the decline of the African National Council
under its conservative leadership. 3 In the United States in 1963, around 800 AfricanAmerican school children skipped school and marched from the 16th Street Baptist
Church in Alabama to City Hall during the Birmingham Children’s Crusade, demanding
an end to the segregation of blacks and whites.4 Later, youth protests against the Vietnam
War in the 1970s brought about an era of protest music that united and galvanized the
culture behind the anti-war movement.5 In 1989 at China’s Tiananmen Square, students
took to the streets of Beijing riding bikes, with banners, speeches, and songs to rally
support for the pro-democracy movement and economic liberalization.6 In 2010, during
what many have referred to as the Arab Spring, youth used social media to organize
revolutions across the Middle East in large numbers and with incredible speed. 7 In 2016,
the International Indigenous Youth Council protested at the Standing Rock Indian
Reservation against the Dakota Access Pipeline in an attempt to protect the Cannonball
and Missouri Rivers.8 While this list is not exhaustive, it does highlight the role youth
have played across time and across the globe when it comes to social movement activism.
Today, youth continue to be a part of movements seeking justice. Young people
are being active and demanding that their voices be heard from Spain to Egypt to Hong
Kong to the United States.9 In 2018, Harvard Ed. Magazine stated that the United States
is currently seeing the “most forceful surge of youth activism since the 1960s.” 10 While
this highlights an important time in the United States to study youth social movements,
this phenomenon is not contained to the United States alone. Across the world in varying
cultures, contexts, economic conditions, and political spheres, activism has continued to
take place in the first two decades of the twenty-first century.11
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An integral aspect of today’s social movements is the role of digital technologies.
While the use of digital means is not the same across the globe, in the three cases being
explored in this study, the digital aspect of these youth social movements is an important
one. This dissertation will explore their similarities and differences and will study of the
evolution of how social movements have changed over the years. In the following
chapters, I break down the impacts of digital technologies on each of the social
movements as it relates to each movement’s context, location, target demographics, and
ends and means.
Social movements in the twenty-first century have new opportunities and
constraints with the use of technology by movement leaders and participants. Exploring
these opportunities and constraints presents new reasons and ways to study youth social
movements today. The evolution of digital social movements by youth over the years will
help provide insights into how future social movements might navigate the continually
changing digital landscape.

Studying Youth Digital Social Movements in the Twenty-First Century
The purpose of this study is to explore how leaders of different youth social
movements have used affect rhetoric and digital technology over the last fifteen years
through analysis of the Invisible Children movement in Uganda, 12 the Bring Back Our
Girls movement in Nigeria, 13 and the Never Again movement in the United States. 14
Throughout this research, I highlight the similarities and differences across these
movements in order to provide insight into the evolution of youth digital social
movements over time and gain insight for the future study and practice of social
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movements. Importantly, the purpose of this study is not to identify “best practices” or
“good/bad” social movements, as the subjectivity of those value claims is wrapped up in
the variables of each social movement due to their location, economics, political
institutions, and potential restrictions on technology, but rather, this study looks at what
has been done over time and the impact of various rhetorical moves.
This study looks at three specific social movements that each have connections to
youth, digital, social movements, and activism in the twenty-first century. The first case
in this dissertation focuses on the Invisible Children movement that was started in 2004
and is still active today. The Invisible Children movement is an important social
movement to study because of the movement’s relationship to youth, their use of
technology at the turn of the century, and how both of these contributed to what the
movement and outside observers have deemed “activism” for their cause.
The second case in this dissertation is Bring Back Our Girls. Bring Back Our
Girls is a social movement that began after the abduction of over 200 Chibok girls from
their dormitories by Boko Haram in Nigeria. The Bring Back Our Girls movement is
positioned uniquely in this dissertation, in part, due to the movement’s relationship to the
large, worldwide hashtag campaign that helped spread the movement’s message outside
of the local area in which the abductions took place and how participants engaged in the
various stages of activism.
The third case in this research is the Never Again movement. The Never Again
movement came about after the February 14, 2018, school shooting at Marjory Stoneman
Douglas (MSD) high school in Parkland, Florida, in the United States. Among these case
studies, the Never Again movement provides the most current look at a youth social
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movement and the relationship between social movements today and the digital
landscape that helps promote, expand, and enact their activism.
Much of the previous youth-led activism throughout history has been started by
college-aged students,15 but the three cases being studied in this project all involved highschool aged students and younger children in many aspects of their causes. Across the
cases, youth have been involved in various aspects of these social movements, including
youth being the victims of the violence that started the movement, youth being the
leaders of the movement, and youth being a major part of the demographic for
engagement with the movement. I argue that because the three cases in this study are
social movements that involve individuals younger than traditional adult social
movement activism, they are important cases worth studying at a time when youth
activism is rising.16 Exploring activism that is done by, and engages, young people is
relevant not only because of its growing popularity, but also for the future as a way to
learn where, why, and how these youth social movements come about, grow, and
accomplish (or do not accomplish) their goals.
In addition, this dissertation examines the impact of the digital realm on social
movements over the last fifteen years, as well as how the variables surrounding social
movements impact their relationship to the use of digital means. Ultimately, this study
explores how contemporary social movements use digital technology across the globe
with a younger cohort in similar and different ways to promote their causes further and
how these variables all impact how each movement defines activism.
Today’s youth pose an important dynamic to study when it comes to social
movements and activism. On the one hand, adults sometimes see youth as naïve and
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uninterested in politics. However, as Lynn Clark and Regina Marchi highlight, it is not
that youth are uninterested in politics, but rather that adults today define citizenship, and
how people engage with politics, differently than youth today. 17 Whereas the past
understanding of citizenship included activities such as voting, following the laws, and
paying taxes, citizen participation today is more along the lines of participating in
protests, boycotts, and civil court cases with a concern for others.18 Thus, older
generations may not recognize the political work that younger generations are doing as
activism and might discount the cohort as a whole as not being interested in politics at all.
It is important to study the youth perspective because of what they bring to the
conversation about politics, social justice, rights, and freedoms. Specifically, Maureen
Johnson highlights the importance of looking at younger generations and their
perspectives on issues because they are seeing issues for the first time and bring new and
passionate perspectives on issues that older generations have been fighting for over many
years.19 Youth activists recognize injustice and fight for change with a passion to create a
just world to live in.
Building upon these perspectives, Marshall Ganz, a senior lecturer at the Harvard
Kennedy School discusses the important aspects that youth bring to solving the problems
of the world. First, Ganz argues that youth have a critical eye of the world, meaning that
they are able to see the problems in the world more clearly; they look at injustices around
the world and ask why they exist and how those injustices can be solved. Second, Ganz
says that youth have a clear view of the world’s needs and pains. Because they have a
critical look of the world, youth are able to see the struggles that others face and the
needs that those struggles produce. Finally, Ganz states that they bring hopeful hearts that

6

show the world’s promises and possibilities. Again, because the younger demographic
has not been in the world as long, they have not seen these problems last for decades,
they have not seen as many attempts to solve problems fail, and because of that, they still
have hope that they can make changes and believe that problems will get better. 20 From
this perspective, youth provide insights into problems and come at those problems with a
sense of hope that make their voices important to consider when exploring and
attempting to find solutions.
The Invisible Children, the Bring Back Our Girls, and Never Again movements
they each have connections to youth through their leadership and membership, but also
because they all came about because youth had been explicitly targeted with violence. All
three of these cases also use technology and non-traditional forms of garnering attention
on a global scale. Finally, these three movements have a variety of demographics when it
comes to leaders and participants in their activism. The Invisible Children movement was
created and led by three recent college graduate young adult males; the Bring Back Our
Girls movement and the fight for education for girls around the world gained Malala
Yousafzai, a young Pakistani female, as a prominent worldwide spokesperson; and
finally, the Never Again movement was created by and has been led by high school
students of varying ethnic diversity within their leadership. The three cases have enough
in common to be examined side-by-side, but they each vary enough in their specifics
enough that they cover a wide range of youth social activism that has/is utilizing digital
technology.
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Defining Key Terms
This project explores the interplay among four key terms: “youth,” “social
movement,” “digital,” and “activism.” Although each of these terms is complicated, it is
important to develop a working definition for each term that will inform the project as a
whole. Below, I explore each term, relying on previous research, to develop a working
definition for this specific research.

Defining Youth: A Complex Task for a Complex Group
Defining “youth” is surprisingly complex. The complexities arise from an
understanding of what makes an individual a “youth” or what makes someone an “adult,”
and if being in one category automatically excludes an individual from the other
category. Additionally, attempting to understand the concept of “youth” or “young adult”
becomes even more difficult when considering how these terms are defined on a
worldwide scale. With these difficulties in mind, I explore a definition of “youth” that
best suits this research below.
In establishing a definition for youth, there are a few important considerations.
The first would is the legal understanding of what makes one an adult, which is not
consistent around the globe. In much of the world, the age of majority (that is, the
threshold whereby the law considers a person an adult) is 18-years-old.21 One possible
benefit of using the age of majority as a standard is that it can clearly define from a legal
standpoint where the concept of “youth” lies. Many countries, such as the United States
(aside from Alabama, Mississippi, Nebraska, and Puerto Rico), 22 Egypt,23 Nigeria,24
Mexico,25 and Uganda,26 all observe the 18-year-old age of majority. However, there are
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several countries where the age of majority ranges from 9-17 years old, including: Iran,27
Saudi Arabia,28 Indonesia,29 Yemen,30 Cuba,31 Cambodia,32 Vietnam,33 and North
Korea.34 But, while the three countries being studied in this project, Nigeria, Uganda, and
(the majority of) the United States all have an age of majority of 18, because of the
diversity across the globe, and even within some countries such as the United States and
Canada,35 bounding the high-end of the “youth” demographic at 18 poses a problem.
Because of this fluidity in what is considered the age of majority, it is not a simple
solution to the problem of how to bound “youth” for this project.
In the absence of a global consensus, there are other frameworks for defining
“youth” besides the legal framework of age of majority. After gathering an understanding
of the use of “youth” in previous research, exploring the advantages and disadvantages of
each in relation to this project will ultimately lead to the final definition of youth for this
project. If the age of majority does not cover a wide enough range for this research, then
another way to establish a standard for this term is to take a look at how other researchers
have defined “youth” in a similar context. In previous research, scholars have varied
understandings and usages of what constitutes “youth.” For example, when studying
policy-making rhetoric and youth in the 2004 election, Allison Howard and Donna
Hoffman categorized youth as individuals ages 18 to 29.36 The bounding of youth
beginning at 18 here is, in part, determined by American voting policies wherein an
individual must be 18 years old to vote. Additionally, in studies conducted by the Pew
Research Center, on young people and political engagement, youth is also considered and
measured as individuals ages 18-29.37 Again, the low-end of the “youth” boundary is set,
in part, due to U.S. policies on voting, and while this dissertation does include a social
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movement that takes place in the United States, the other two social movements are
outside of the United States. Thus, using U.S. standards to bound the term “youth” is
problematic for this research as well. However, extending the age range through 29 adds
to this dissertation because it facilitates the study of youth across time, as social
movements go on for years. Extending the age of youth through 29, based on the political
grounding of youth for those under 30, is the best way to capture the dynamic nature of
youth in the context of youth social activism for this research.
Meanwhile, in a study that explored the web and youth emotions, the authors
categorized “youth” as individuals in the age range of 13-19 years old on the basis of
emotional development.38 This definition of youth as it relates to emotion is important for
this study because emotional appeals and affect are key rhetorical aspects I study in
relation to how these social movements communicate their cause with outside audiences.
Additionally, this research focuses on how youth utilize social media in their
social activism, so taking into consideration social media parameters also helps guide the
decision for where to bound the youngest parameter of “youth” for this research. For
most social media platforms (i.e. Facebook,39 Twitter,40 Instagram,41 Snapchat,42
Pinterest,43 Kik,44 QQ,45 and YouTube,46 with WeChat only allowing users this young
access to an account with parental consent 47), the minimum age requirement to create an
account and to use that platform is 13 years old A few outliers include WhatsApp (which
recently raised their minimum age requirement to 16 years old),48 Tumblr(for users in the
European Union, they must be 16, but 13 elsewhere),49 and Periscope (16 years old).50
While some children younger than 13 work-around the age restrictions of these sites, 13
is the standard age set across many major platforms. The social media minimum age
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standards, along with the minimum age of youth as it relates to emotion, provide a strong
bottom-line age for those considered “youth” as users younger than 13.
The rationale behind the 13-29 age-range constituting youth for this dissertation is
due to 13 years old being the youngest age permitted on the majority of social networking
platforms; a key aspect of this project. The extension of the age through 29 moves past
the complicated boundary of the age of majority to include those individuals throughout
their 20s. This includes the older aged activists that have not yet reached “adulthood” but
still contribute to the movements. The extension through 29 years old is important for this
research because many young activists may start in their teens or early twenties, but they
continue to contribute to the movement for years to follow.
When considering “youth” in this project, there are three ways in which the youth
aspect contributes to social movements. Each movement for this project must meet the
requirement of being youth-affected. This means the movement must have come about
due to an issue that has directly impacted youth. Next, the cases must involve youth in
their activism, which breaks down into either being led by youth (youth-led), or involve
the youth heavily in their target demographic for participation(youth-involved). Some of
the cases in this study are both youth-affected and youth-led, while others are youthaffected and youth-involved, and finally, some of the cases are all three; youth-led, youthaffected, and youth-involved.
Each case in this research came about because of its direct relationship to youth.
Invisible Children came about after three young men saw and learned about the abduction
of young boys who were forced to become child soldiers in northern Uganda. The Bring
Back Our Girls movement developed after over 200 young Chibok girls were abducted
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from their dormitories for attending school. Finally, the Never Again movement began
after Marjory Stoneman Douglas high school was attacked by an active shooter who
killed 14 teenagers. In addition to each of the three cases coming about after an act of
violence directed at youth, these movements all have youth backing the movement and
showing support for the cause. Young people have come together to either create or
contribute (or both) to each of these three movements.
Finally, I explore how social movement organizers and participants present the
idea and image of the youth in each of these social movements. This, too, is a complex
relationship in that each of the movements has direct connections to youth, but how they
communicate about and discuss youth varies. These movements portray youth in the
forefront of their movements in various ways, from being directly impacted by a crisis to
being movement leaders to empowering more youth to step up and step forward as
activists for their cause. The rhetoric used by each movement is significant to study as a
way to analyze the overall role and impact youth have had in these movements.

Digital Technologies in Twenty-First Century Social Movements
For those who are involved in the organization of a social movement or activism
in the twenty-first century, digital aspects also play an important role. Across the globe,
citizens are using technology to empower themselves both politically and socially
through the use of computers, mobile technology, and web-based devices.51 These
activists and citizen journalists are using digital technology to tell their stories, bypassing
gatekeepers of traditional media to reach wider audiences, which, as I later discuss, is the
first step in the activism ladder moving from interest to participation.
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In addition to the leaders of social movements using digital means, participants of
social movements also engage in digital activism as well. When it comes to consumption
of news and politics, the majority of the population still gets their news from traditional
forms of media, but news consumption for young adults is done more so through digital
means.52 This creates a shift from traditional news to more diverse sources for the youth
demographic. With youth gathering their news from more sources, they are exposed to
what individuals outside of mainstream media find important and newsworthy, thus
allowing them to set their own agendas as to what they stand behind and support. This
helps distribute power into the hands of citizens and provides them with a sense of
agency, both of which become important when developing social movements and helping
individuals make a difference. 53 This is especially important for youth because the
agency that they have to learn about the world is directly linked to the possibility for
them to change it.54
Within the digital sections of each chapter, I discuss the significance between
where a movement takes place and how they use digital technologies. Specifically, I
explore issues of access and infrastructure and how that impacts the spreadability of their
message. The discussion of digital access and the implications of the variance around the
globe is referred to as the digital divide.55 The digital divide is an important issue to
consider when discussing social movements with a global reach because of variations in
accessibility across the world, including within and across the three countries studied
here. When not everyone has the same availability or access to the same digital means, it
is important to discuss how those differences impact the various social movements and
their overall work.
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It is important to note, and explore, that with each case, there is positivity
surrounding digital rhetoric and the relationship with youth, social movements, and
activism, but there is also criticism with digital rhetoric which includes issues of echo
chambers and censorship. Echo chambers occur when an individual seeks out and is
surrounded by similar and reaffirming views on issues that individual already has.
Research demonstrates that people will more often search for opinions that are similar to
theirs than for differing opinions, which reinforces information they already support,
rather than content that challenges their ideals or represents different voices.56 This is
very often seen in digital rhetoric, specifically through social media platforms such as
Twitter and Facebook. While perhaps not to the extent that previous research has
estimated,57 this is nevertheless an important factor to consider when studying the three
social movements of this dissertation.
One of the major problems with echo chambers is that they can lead to instances
of confirmation bias, wherein an individual simply seeks out information that confirms
what they already think or believe and then ignore information that contradicts their
already held beliefs.58 This can also lead to group polarization where members of the
group become reluctant to bring up information that might contradict the group
consensus, inhibiting the group from considering all of the facts.59 If social movements
exist exclusively, or almost exclusively, on social media platforms, and the ideas of the
participants are the only ideas being brought up and circulated, this could prevent social
movements from creating impact or making changes. While the effectiveness of social
movements is not the main purpose of this dissertation, the impact echo chambers could
have on the rhetoric that is being used by the leaders and/or participants makes this an
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important aspect to consider when studying the digital rhetoric that takes place in youth
social movements.
In addition to echo chambers posing a concern for digital rhetoric when it comes
to youth, social movements, and activism, issues of censorship also pose a problem for
social movements that utilize the digital realm. Each case has its own unique relationship
with censorship and how that censorship impacts the movement locally and globally is
discussed in detail based on the various conditions of each movement.
When it comes to access to information, some countries, such as Tanzania, have
laws that secure access to information to their citizens. However, in their Cybercrime Act
of 2015, the Tanzanian police force is allowed to criminalize actions of individuals under
freedom of expression and access to information, which ultimately undermines and
threatens the access that Tanzanians have.60 In Uganda, current cyber laws threaten the
privacy of users as both mass and targeted surveillance is allowed, as well as search and
seizure of private electronic devices of individuals.61 These examples highlight that while
citizens might have rights to access and use cyber technology, they may still be restricted
by legal repercussions that inhibit how they might use said technology.
In addition to this type of surveillance and access control, other governments are
more explicit in their restrictions. For example, during the Egyptian Revolution, the
Egyptian government almost completely blocked access to the Internet for nearly two full
days.62 This is significant because it is during times of revolution or activism that access
to the Internet and digital media could be of vast importance to citizens across the globe.
Without that access, people are isolated from getting information and sharing their
information with others. Issues of access, be they technological access issues, or access
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issues in the way of censorship, are important aspects to consider when studying digital
rhetoric, but even more so when studying digital rhetoric across the globe as rights,
freedoms, and development will vary across nations.
While the United States and Nigeria do not have as big of concerns when it comes
to censorship, the Ugandan government has been making moves to curtail the freedom of
expression of its citizens online and censoring the web content available to them.63 This
has also led to citizens self-censoring the content they share online.64 This type of
censorship could impact how individuals participate in social movements, specifically
when it comes to the digital rhetoric of those movements. There is a common thread
through all three of the cases in that they all incorporate digital aspects into their specific
movements, however, they are all unique based on the time in which they came about, the
location of the movement, and the details that surround each of these unique attributes of
the social movement.

What Makes a Social Movement a Social Movement
Similar to the term “youth,” “social movement” is not an easy term to define.
Various scholars of social movements have defined “social movement” in many different
ways. In twentieth- and twenty-first century studies of social movements, researchers
have not established a consensus on a definition of what they classify as a social
movement.65 Beginning in the mid-1960s, scholars began studying and developing past
the idea of collective behavior for organizational and political unrest to an idea of
unrepresented groups, collective action, and social movements. 66 McCarthy and Zald
define a social movement as “a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which
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represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward
distribution of a society.”67 Charles Tilly states that social movements are more than a
group similar to a party, but rather social movements are a “sustained interaction between
a specific set of authorities and various spokespersons for a given challenge to those
authorities.”68 Tilly claims that social movements are a series of interactions between
those with power and those speaking on behalf of those lacking representation. 69 What
these definitions of social movements have in common is the notion of change, of
shifting from how the structure currently is to a redistribution of power to the way it
“should” or “ought” to be.
I emphasize this characteristic of social movements as a means to gauge the social
movements of this dissertation to highlight the shift social movements are attempting to
make. This is an important distinction because social movements are not simply activists
fighting for the status quo, and because of that, they tend to be disruptive, and often
challenge the standard ways of thinking. When acts of activism are critiqued amongst
society, they are often called out for being disruptive, but I want to make the point,
throughout this dissertation, that the disruption is part of what makes something a social
movement.
Another defining characteristic of a social movement is their, at the very least,
minimal organization.70 This means that social movements must have some semblance of
organization and cannot be a free-for-all within themselves. Movements that lack this
basic level of organization are not classified as social movements, but are rather
understood as fads, a riots, or unorganized protests.71 While there must be some level of
organization within a movement to be considered a social movement, they are never
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single-minded or completely cohesive.72 This is because, within the movements, factions
form and conflicts arise over leadership, how to spend funds, strategies, and ultimate
goals. This leads to multiple leaders and organizations within one movement.
In addition to leadership, a social movement must have a sizeable membership in
order to continue their existence and sustain themselves in the long-term. It is both the
size and scope of a movement that distinguishes a social movement from pressure groups,
lobbies, and campaigns.73 As Pamela Oliver and Gerald Marwell explain, emphasizing
the importance and strength of having sizable membership within an organization, “one
person marching for a thousand hours is not the same as a thousand people marching for
one hour.”74 Membership size is an important aspect of social movements, as this is a key
factor that differentiates social movements from other forms of organizing. The size of a
movement’s membership contributes not only to its validity as a social movement, but
also to its impact.
Bringing together all of these understandings and definitions of what makes a
social movement leads to the conceptual definition of a social movement I use throughout
this dissertation. The key concepts for a social movement for this research are: (1) it must
be pushing for change, a shift from what is to what ought to be, (2) there must be a
sustained interaction between those challenging authority and those in authority, (3) it
must be at least semi-organized, (4) and there must be sizable membership/following
within the movement.
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What is “Activism”
Along with “youth” and “social movement,” defining what constitutes “activism”
is complex. Activism is what makes a movement work, the function of what brings about
change or evolution and a change in the system as it is.75 What activism looks like has
changed with the changing of time and technology. “Traditional” activism, such as
marches, protests, sit-ins, petitions, posters, and radio and television interviews, is
contrasted with the “digital” activism of today, where the purpose of spreading a message
is the same, but the means of spreading that message have changed and expanded. For
example, instead of physical petitions, social media users share digital online petitions.
Rather than television interviews, participants might go live on Facebook, Instagram or
Periscope to share their message with the masses. Instead of sit-ins, digital activists might
hack a website. Importantly, activism today does not completely exclude traditional
forms of activism, but rather combines traditional activism with digital activism.
Each case in this dissertation utilizes both traditional forms of activism as well as digital
activism. All three cases incorporate protests and/or marches wherein large groups of
people gather together to bring attention and a loud voice to their cause. They also all use
digital platforms to spread their messages, gain more attention, and recruit new followers.
Despite the differences between traditional and digital activism, the two can, and
do, work in tandem. Digital activism can lead to traditional forms of activism, and
traditional forms of activism can direct participants back toward the digital sphere for
more information and a place to connect with others about the cause. Traditional and
digital activism are not opposite counterparts to one another, but rather they are
complementary acts with similar broad goals to bring about change and evolution.
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Slacktivism is a critique of social media activism and what is considered action,
and beyond that, sufficient action. Yu-Hao Lee and Gary Hsieh use slacktivism to
describe activism that takes place online that is low stakes, low cost, and requires little
effort but still shows minimal support for a cause. 76 Slacktivism is an important aspect to
consider for the three movements studied in this dissertation, but this critique of nontraditional forms of activism should not derail or negate the legitimate contributions these
forms of digital activism provide to the movements themselves.
Along with slacktivism as an argument against digital activism is the idea of
social media as a double-edged sword.77 That is, the benefits and drawbacks that using
social media in one’s activism has can both help and hurt the movement overall. This
helps shed light on potential issues of access and censorship when it comes to technology
and social media across the world. This perspective critiques the sometimes glorified
assumption of digital and social media activism’s ability, on a state or transnational scale,
to solve issues and create impactful change. This critique goes in tandem with slacktivism
in that while yes, social media allows some individuals access to express their views
and/or concerns and need for change, it also poses problems in that not everyone has the
same access and the actual contribution to change that digital activism makes.
Throughout this dissertation, I highlight aspects of what each social movement does that
separates their activism from slacktivism, and where their activism may be considered
slacktivism utilizing Clark and Marchi’s ladder of political engagement.78 Clark and
Marchi discuss steps wherein young people move from interest to participation in a social
movement, a process that involves connective journalism and is stemmed in emotions.
They argue, though, that the engagement does not necessarily stop there, and that this
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type of communication can, in fact, be actionable. To explain in greater detail, this
explanation starts with an understanding of the differences between traditional journalism
and collective journalism as it relates to emotion. First, it is important to note that
traditional journalism does utilize emotion via storytelling as a means to share their
various narratives, but what makes connective journalism different is how viewers of
those narratives connect to them.
Connective journalism is a way of sharing information that builds a collective and
individual identity, and thus is seen when people engage in communicative acts that give
a voice to their way of viewing the world, as well as communicating about how people
ought to feel on those issues. Clark and Marchi argue that young people share what they
feel is important and is often determined through strong emotions such as outrage, anger,
disgust, glee, joy, anticipation, amusement, or appreciation. 79 People do not simply want
to share stories, but rather, they also want to share how they feel about those stories,
creating what Papacharissi calls “affective publics”. 80 While this emotion-based approach
to news has its drawbacks, this type of communication can be actionable, meaning these
rhetorical acts not only share emotional explanations about one’s concerns on issues, but
also what people can do as a response.
This type of journalism involves three specific practices in which young people
move from interest to participation in the social media era, including: (1) sharing, (2)
inserting oneself into the story, and (3) participating in the making of a story. 81 These
three steps are on what Clark and Marchi call the ladder of political engagement, moving
from interest to participation, and is what I use to combat the argument of slacktivism. To
begin, the first major critique of online activism is that it is low stakes and low stakes is
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used to demean electronic political participation. 82 However, each of the three steps
presented here do require a level of interpersonal risk.83
In addition, critiques against online activism argue that online activists do not
engage in other activities outside of the mere slacktivism acts such as changing ones
profile picture, joining a Facebook group, or sharing a tweet.84 Based off Clark and
Marchi’s ladder of political engagement, those small steps are, in fact, just steps in the
shift from interest to participation for online activists. So while not all online activists
move from the sharing stage of online activism, that is just the first stage of online
activism, and not one to be diminished.

How Affect Shapes Youth Digital Social Movement Activism
Throughout this dissertation, I incorporate multiple theories to help provide
insight into the three cases of youth digital social movement activism. I explore the
impact that affect rhetoric has on these movements, specifically with the mobilization of
young people as a key feature in the movements. I then discuss echo chambers and how
the digital landscape impacts who and what individuals hear and learn about and the
significance of this for what might otherwise be ignored or underrepresented issues in
mainstream media. I also bring in Clark and Marchi’s ladder of political engagement to
help explain the importance of the various steps performed by these social movements as
a means to combat the major criticism of digital social movements being nothing more
than slacktivism. It is with these theoretical perspectives that we can see the adaptive
forms of activism various social movements enact and better understand those moves
which can help us study and analyze future social movements.
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Dating back to at least Aristotle, rhetorical analysis has included the study of how
a rhetor uses appeals (ethos, pathos, and logos) in their attempts to persuade their
audience. Over time, however, the understanding of what rhetoric is and does has
progressed beyond neo-Aristotelian criticism. While rhetoric is no longer explicitly
centered on the persuasion attempts of a speaker onto others, the studying of appeals,
specifically pathos has shifted to what is today referred to as affect. Affect rhetoric is a
valuable lens to view digital youth social movement activism because of its modern
connection to digital, sensory, and bodily rhetoric and the impact that all of that has on an
audience.
Affect is a complex rhetorical term that is difficult to define clearly, in part,
because affect is an action. However, understanding affect is important for this study,
specifically, with how affect relates to the youth aspect of each movement and the
appeals to the emotions of outsiders in order to gain their interest, attention, and
ultimately, their action. Affect is an emotional response a person has to a stimulus that is
said to precede cognition;85 that is, affect is a reaction that takes place prior to a person
cognitively thinking through the stimuli that causes that response. Affect is not a personal
feeling, but rather it is the ability to affect and be affected by someone or something. 86
Affect is emotive, but it is pre-emotional.87 Affect is different from Aristotle’s pathos
because affect is the response that one has before that response is labeled with feelings or
emotions.88 In addition to pre-existing emotions, affect also involves an interplay of the
senses. This is also significant when it comes to studying today’s social movements that
involve social media and technology as the advancements of today’s technology and
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media engage multiple senses, and more senses simultaneously, than traditional forms of
media and technology.
Affect is not limited to a response simply from words that are spoken or shared,
but affect is also a response from visuals as well. Elizabeth Brunner and Kevin Michael
Deluca proposed the term affective winds in 2016 to describe the “force of images that
moves people to engage and interact by exploring the affective potency of visual
arguments.”89 This is important to consider when studying social movements today
because of their use of images on social media platforms such as Twitter, Instagram,
YouTube, and various Live streaming platforms. Affect rhetoric is an important aspect of
this research as it provides additional insight into the methods used by youth social
movements throughout the growth of the digital era.
Specifically, in this dissertation, affect is directly related to the youth aspect and
the infantilization of those whom the movement is working to help. Infantilization is
treating someone as a child or denying their age or maturity. Infantilizing is often seen
when discussing individuals with disabilities, such as autism and muscular dystrophy
(e.g. Jerry’s Kids), which, while problematic, has sometimes been used to gain sympathy
and pity from outsiders.90 Infantilization relates to both affect and youth in the cases of
this study because the utilization of young children and girls in the rhetoric, both written
words and imagery, of these social movements elicits emotional responses from those
who see and hear about the movement. It evokes a sense of inability for these individuals
to take care of themselves and the need for outside help, similar to that of a parent to a
child. This emotional response, similar to how it is used with individuals with disabilities,
gains pity, sympathy, and hopefully even funds for the social movements. Each of the
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cases in this study utilize youth in various ways, and thus have unique relationships to
infantilization and different affect impact.
Throughout this dissertation, I show how social movements have worked to move
past this first step of online activism, as well as discuss the impacts on a movement when
it does, in fact, get stuck in this first stage. With each case, I highlight the steps of
political engagement to show how Invisible Children, Bring Back Our Girls, and Never
Again have all created means for activism to take place within each social movement.
Additionally, I explore the evolution of activism and the shift from using offline,
traditional activism to garner more digital activism, to using digital activism to get
participants to engage in offline, traditional activism.

Case Backgrounds
Invisible Children: Uganda
In 2003, a group of young aspiring filmmakers, Jason Russell, Bobby Bailey, and
Laren Poole set out to produce a documentary about the war in the Darfur region of
Sudan.91 Traveling through Northern Uganda, Jason Russell witnessed the vehicle in
front of the one they were traveling in get shot at, and that is when he learned about the
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), and their leader, Joseph Kony. After witnessing this
event in Northern Uganda, the focus of the group’s documentary shifted from the war in
Darfur to the civil war impacting Uganda.
In 2004, Jan Egeland, Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and the
UN’s Emergency Relief Coordinator, called the LRA crisis in Northern Uganda the
“most forgotten, neglected humanitarian emergency in the world.” 92 The Lord’s
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Resistance Army is a rebel group who claimed to have been fighting for the freedom of
the Acholi people in Northern Uganda. However, over the last two decades, the LRA has
mainly attacked the Acholi people by killing, abducting, enslaving, and raping them. 93 As
of 2005, nearly half of the people in Northern Uganda were displaced, living in camps,
and had lost their freedoms due to the LRA. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court (ICC), detailed the crimes alleged against the LRA
beginning July of 2002, when ICC jurisdiction began, stating that two of the most serious
crimes were numerous acts of murder, often reaching into the hundreds of killings within
a single month. In addition to murder, the LRA enslaved many people of Northern
Uganda. Both of these actions the LRA committed, and continues to commit, fall into the
category of crimes against humanity.94
As the leader of the LRA, Kony has arrest warrants issued against him on “12
counts of crimes against humanity including: murder, enslavement, rape, inhumane acts
of inflicting serious bodily injury and suffering; and 21 counts for counts of war crimes
including: cruel treatment of civilians, intentionally directing an attack against a civilian
population, pillaging including rape and forced enlisting of children.” 95 Among all of the
crimes Kony and LRA were committing, it was the abduction and forced enlisting and
enslavement of children that shaped the Invisible Children movement.
According to the Invisible Children website, this movement was created in order
to bring attention to the “most forgotten, neglected humanitarian emergency in the
world.” 96 The founding members of this group believed that “if people around the World
knew the reality of the LRA violence – more than 60,000 children abducted, tens of
thousands killed, and millions displaced – and if they could see the names, faces, and
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stories behind the statistics, they would be moved to take action and demand justice.”97
To accomplish this goal, the group created their first documentary, Invisible Children:
The Rough Cut, released in 2006.98 This film focuses on the youth who have been
abducted and turned into child soldiers by the LRA, and the children who walk long
distances every night searching for refuge in order to avoid being abducted by the LRA.
Invisible Children: The Rough Cut was the first of twelve films, contributing to part of
the over 134 million views across all of their online videos.99
While Invisible Children was started in 2004, the movement applied for, and was
accepted as, a 501 (c) (3) non-profit organization as a public charity. 100 In addition to film
screenings, Invisible Children also sold t-shirts, bracelets, and posters to help raise money
for their cause, to help fund their continual production of films focusing on awareness,
and for humanitarian aid for Northern Uganda that will be discussed further in this
dissertation.101

Bring Back Our Girls: Nigeria
Today it is estimated that over 130 million girls are out of school around the
world. If that number were the population of a country, it would be the 10th largest
country in the world—the size of both the United Kingdom and France combined. 102
Some of these girls have never had the opportunity to go to school, and some of them
have had their opportunity taken from them. Amongst this group of girls are those who
have been affected by political or religious groups who forcefully took their right to
education away. Boko Haram is one of these militant groups that has been working out of
Nigeria with the purpose to impose Sharia (Islamic) law in the country since 2002.103
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Boko Haram is a terrorist group, which, when translated to English, means
“Western Education is Sinful.”104 They target the education of girls, in an effort to keep
women exclusively in the household and not participating in education opportunities.105
Boko Haram has become more radical and violent since 2009 after their founder,
Mohammed Yusuf, died in police custody and Abudakar Shekau became the new
leader.106 This group regularly attacks civilians in places like churches and schools, along
with government officials and military members, as a way to rid northern Nigeria of what
the group perceives as Western influence and to enforce their extreme Islamic religious
ideologies.107 In May 2013, the Nigerian President, Goodluck Jonathan, declared a state
of emergency in three northern states, including Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa, stating that
these states had already been overtaken by these radical groups “whose allegiance are to
different flags than Nigeria’s.”108
One of the most recognized acts of terrorism from Boko Haram to enforce their
ideals was the abduction of over 200 Chibok girls from their school dormitory in April
2014.109 This was the single largest abduction attributed to Boko Haram. 110 On April 14,
2014, gunmen from Boko Haram kidnapped 276 girls aged 12-17 from the Government
Girls Secondary School in the town of Chibok in the state of Borno in north-eastern
Nigeria.111 These girls were abducted from their dormitories and were forced onto trucks
and driven into the bush. It was during this process that nearly sixty of these young girls
managed to escape, leaving around 200 others in captivity.112
Almost three weeks after their abduction, on May 4, 2014, President Jonathan
spoke out about the girls for the first time, saying, “wherever these girls are, we will
surely get them out.”113 The next day, on May 5, Boko Haram faction leader Shekau
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claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of the girls, saying that God instructed him to
sell the girls, that they are his property now, and that he will be carrying out the
instructions of God.114 Some of the elders in the area also claimed that some of the girls
had already been sold as brides to fighters of Boko Haram for 2000 naira, the equivalent
of around $6.115
A week later, a second video was released by Boko Haram, showing about 100 of
the missing girls. It was at this point that the worldwide media campaign was launched,
demanding the release of the girls using the hashtag #BringBackOurGirls. The
#BringBackOurGirls hashtag was first used by a Nigerian lawyer, Ibrahim Abdullahi on
April 23, 2014.116 This tweet echoed the words from former Nigerian minister of
education, and Vice President of the World Bank, Oby Ezekwesili, who led a group of
protesters to Abuja, the capital city of Nigeria, demanding the Nigerian military to ‘bring
back our girls’ after the kidnapping.117
As the hashtag spread online, including images of the missing schoolgirls, the
concern for the safety and return of the Chibok girls became a worldwide issue. The plea
initially began directed at the Nigerian government and military to do something to find
and bring back the young girls who had been stolen. However, the movement eventually
evolved into an appeal to Boko Haram, pleading to bring the girls back, and eventually,
the movement’s demands were directed at the entire world to do something, including the
United Nations.118
The kidnapping sparked outrage and condemnation around the world and among
world leaders and celebrities alike. In addition to celebrities and political leaders, this
movement attracted the attention of youth activist Malala Yousafzai, a spearhead for
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girls’ education across the world. Yousafzai has taken up being a spokesperson for the
Bring Back Our Girls movement, both in the media as well as on the ground in Nigeria
and with political leaders. Through Facebook and Twitter, the Bring Back Our Girls
movement garnered attention from civil rights groups and students’ and girls’ rights
campaigns in the United States, Canada, England, France, Malaysia, and South Africa,
among others, who joined the campaign. 119
While the campaign resonated around the world, with more than one million uses
of the hashtag in less than three weeks, 120 in Nigeria, the Bring Back Our Girls campaign
clashed with then-president Jonathan’s administration. Jonathan accused the movement
of manipulating the victims of terrorism and accused activists of playing politics after his
meeting that was scheduled with the parents of the abducted schoolgirls was canceled. 121

Never Again: United States of America
Around 2:20 p.m. on February 14, 2018, in Parkland, Florida, in the United States
of America, shots rang throughout the halls of Marjory Stoneman Douglas (MSD) high
school. By 2:50, the shooter had left the school and made his way to a local Wal-Mart.122
Roughly thirty minutes on that Valentine’s Day afternoon resulted in the loss of fourteen
student lives and three teachers along with thousands of the surviving MSD students and
faculty forever marked by this tragedy.
As a part of what some call the post-Columbine (1999) generation,123 the students
of Marjory Stoneman Douglas grew up living in a world where school shootings were not
just a scary story being told, but a reality happening throughout their lives, such as the
Virginia Tech shooting in 2007,124 the Sandy Hook shooting in 2012 at the elementary

30

school,125 and the Isla Vista attack near the campus of the University of California, Santa
Barbara in 2014.126
Survivor Cameron Kasky calls his generation the “mass-shooting generation” and
spearheaded a group of student-survivors of the MSD shooting who all decided they were
not going to let this tragedy become just another name on the list of mass shootings in the
United States.127 After speaking to the press on February 14, MSD student David Hogg
was popularly quoted, saying, “Please… we’re children. You guys are the adults. You
need to take some action and play a role. Work together, come over your politics and get
something done.”128
Not willing to be another number, Kasky invited a group of MSD students to his
house two days after the shooting, and that is where these “children” began taking
action.The gathering included Delaney Tarr, Ryan Deitsch, Jaclyn Corin, Sarah
Chadwick, Alex Wind, David Hogg, and Emma Gonzalez. Kasky and his friends were set
on “rewrit[ing] the entire national dialogue about school shootings.”129 The members of
this group quickly decided not to focus on macro-politics, but rather focus on a few,
reasonable, attainable goals, and continue to repeat those specific messages over and over
again. The two main goals decided upon were background checks and raising the age
limit to purchases rifles from eighteen to twenty-one years old.
The group quickly recognized that in today’s digital era, they needed a hashtag to
keep everything related to their movement easily connected across technology and
platforms.130 The group eventually settled on the #NeverAgain hashtag; they recognized
the historical weight of this hashtag and its relationship to Nazis and the Holocaust, and
so they were careful to use the phrase with respect. 131 It was at this point that their
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movement began to take off. Following the establishment of the hashtag, the MSD
students began other efforts to bring attention to their cause and creating a social
movement. These events included the March for Our Lives, one of the largest youth
protests since the Vietnam War,132 which took place in across the United States in cities
including Washington D.C., Boston, Minneapolis, Houston, and Parkland, Florida where
the shooting took place,133 as well as over 800 other marches in smaller cities across the
globe;134 and a push for youth to vote in the 2018 United States midterm elections, Vote
for Our Lives.135
The question quickly arose as to why this group of students was different from
other victims of other school shootings or mass shootings. What about this group made
them think that they could take on these issues and make changes? Reflecting on the
Sandy Hook elementary shooting, the group felt that while society was able to “shrug off
20 dead first graders,” they were not discouraged and continued to move forward despite
knowing the difficulties that lay ahead of them.136 These difficulties and strategies the
movement utilized to overcome them will be explored throughout this dissertation.

Method: Digital Rhetorical Criticism
In this project, I analyze content taken directly from the specific movements’
social media accounts, including Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, and YouTube. This
content will come from the Invisible Children Twitter (@Invisible; verified account),
Instagram (invisiblechildren), Facebook (https://www.facebook.com/invisiblechildren/;
verified account), and YouTube (Invisible Children; verified account); the Bring Back
Our Girls Twitter (@BBOG_Nigeria), Instagram (@bringbackourgirls), Facebook
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(https://www.facebook.com/bringbackourgirls/), and YouTube (Bring Back Our Girls);
and from the Parkland movement Twitter (@AMarch4OurLives; verified account),
Instagram (marchforourlives; verified account), Facebook,
(https://www.facebook.com/marchforourlives/; verified account), and YouTube (March
For Our Lives; verified account). I will also gather data from the content on the websites
that are directly associated with and linked to each movement;
https://invisiblechildren.com/, http://www.bringbackourgirls.ng/, and
https://marchforourlives.com/. From these sites, I have collected content across the
existence of the movement that is directly written or published by the movements’
accounts, including original postings as well as re-posting of outside content that they
share on their specific page(s). I also include text and visual postings (images and videos)
in my analysis.
In addition to the content that is posted and shared on these platforms, I examine
content that has been shared from traditional media outlets, including newspapers,
magazines, and various articles. Along with information from news sources, I also study
the physical activities that have taken place offline, and tangible items and merchandise
that the movements sell and distribute. Using content that has been shared online as well
as content that has happened offline highlights the multi-faceted approach that these
modern social movements have taken. I gathered content from the movements themselves
as well as third-party sources reporting on the movements.
In this research, I conduct a rhetorical criticism of the content collected from the
platforms mentioned above and locations including digital and traditional/offline forms of
rhetorical dialogue. In doing that, I analyze the words as well as the images, texts along
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with videos, and digital along with offline interactions that take place among members
within the social movement. This research explores how these texts are influenced by the
various contexts of the people involved in them and how the context is then, in turn,
influenced by the texts.
The scope of the content collected for this project varies between cases as their
timelines are not the same; Invisible Children began in 2004 and is still continuing today,
more than fifteen years later, whereas the Never Again movement has only been in
existence for a few years. Thus, bounding the content based on equal lengths of time does
not allow the questions of progression throughout the individual movements to be
answered, where a more holistic analysis is more fitting for this project.

Research Questions
This dissertation seeks to answer how youth digital social movements have
changed throughout the twenty-first century. Specifically, I look at how each of these
concepts interact with and influence each other. I seek to answer several questions
throughout this research:
(1) How do these movements, with youth in the forefront, incorporate affective rhetoric
as a means to promote and gain support for their cause?
(2) How have youth digital social movements evolved throughout the twenty-first
century.
Each case in this study has unique relationships to youth, the digital realm and
social movement activism. Throughout each chapter, I examine each case individually to
reveal the specific techniques used and to highlight their role in youth digital social
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movement activism today. I then do a cross-case analysis, looking at how the cases are
both similar and different in their techniques and what this means for the evolution of
youth digital social movements over time.
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Chapter 2:
Invisible Children: Early Digital Era Youth Social Movement Activism

Invisible Children started in 2004, when three young aspiring American
filmmakers went to shoot a documentary about the war happening in the Darfur region of
Sudan, but, while traveling, they witnessed the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) attack the
vehicle in front of theirs and their film project changed direction. 137 The Lord’s
Resistance Army is a rebel group in Northern Uganda who claim to be fighting for the
freedom of the Acholi people in Northern Uganda; however, for over two decades, this
group has continued to attack Acholi people, killing, abducting, enslaving, and raping the
people they claimed to be fighting for. 138 Joseph Kony is the “self-appointed ‘messiah’”
of the LRA, and has been their leader, directing the LRA to “abduct, threaten, destroy
and murder” in his name.139 Throughout the movement, Kony was a key focus for
Invisible Children, aiming to make him known, and ultimately get him arrested.
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Moreno-Ocampo, detailed
the crimes alleged against the LRA beginning July of 2002, when ICC jurisdiction began,
stating that two of the most serious crimes being committed were numerous acts of
murder, often reaching into the hundreds within single months, as well as enslavement.
Both of these crimes fall under the category of crimes against humanity, but
unfortunately, Jan Egeland, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and the
UN’s Emergency Relief Coordinator, referred to the humanitarian crisis happening in
Northern Uganda the “most forgotten, neglected humanitarian emergency in the
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world.”140 According to the Invisible Children website, the movement was created in
order to bring attention to this forgotten humanitarian crisis.141
Specifically, the filmmakers wanted to learn more about and document the
kidnappings that were happening resulting in many young Ugandan boys being turned
into child-soldiers. According to the United Nations and the Paris Principles on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, a child soldier is considered any child who is
associated with “an armed force or armed group… below 18 years of age who is, or who
has been, recruited or used by an armed force or armed group in any capacity, including
but not limited to children, boys and girls, used as fighters, cooks, porters, spies, or for
sexual purposes.”142 Between the times of June 2002 and August 2004, the year the
Invisible Children movement began, UNICEF estimated that nearly 15,000 children had
been abducted by the LRA and over 40,000 children were being displaced every night,
leaving their homes and traveling to urban centers in attempt to avoid abduction and
attack from the Lord’s Resistance Army.143
While the abduction of these young boys and turning them into child soldiers was
not the only offense of the LRA against the people of Northern Uganda, it was the act
that caused, and was the main focus of, the Invisible Children movement. With some
background information on the catalyst of the Invisible Children Movement, this chapter
details the relationship this movement has with youth, with the digital realm, how it has
become a social movement, and ultimately the activism Invisible Children has done over
the years.
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The Role of Youth throughout the Invisible Children Movement
The Invisible Children movement has a strong relationship to youth. Throughout
the movement, youth have been a key focus of both the leaders of the movement, but also
a key demographic of those involved in the movement. Below I explore the various roles
youth have played in the Invisible Children movement, establishing this group as a
cornerstone in each aspect of the movement as a whole.

Youth-affected
To begin, the Invisible Children movement began as a result of young children in
Northern Uganda, specifically young boys, being kidnapped by the Lord’s Resistance
Army (LRA) and being turned into child-soldiers. The young boys of Uganda being
directly targeted by the LRA is the first connection this social movement has to youth.
The Invisible Children movement is first youth-affected. Young boys were the targets of
the abductions and turned into violent soldiers, and young girls were being abducted to
become sex slaves for Joseph Kony.144
In addition to young people being the targets of the violence that spurred the
Invisible Children movement, the use of the word “children” in the movement’s name is
important as well. Using the word “children” in the name of the movement clearly
identified those who were impacted by the movement were young children. Utilizing
children as the face of a cause is not new or unique to the Invisible Children movement.
Studies have found that utilizing children in charities was a powerful way for the those
charities to generate emotional reactions from people, as well as having a greater
commitment to donating money to support the cause. 145 On top of simply utilizing
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children in the movement, utilizing negative emotions involving children generated
significantly more monetary donations and larger donations of time and items as well.146
This relationship between children and emotions, and children and donation of
time, items, and money is significant to the Invisible Children movement. Through
Invisible Children’s use of children as a part of their name, and the use of children in
their promotional materials, such as videos and online images (discussed below), they
were able to tap into the emotions of the public in hopes of gaining their support.

Youth-led
Along with the Invisible Children movement being youth-affected, this movement
is also youth-led. Jason Russell, Bobby Bailey, and Laren Poole were each in their early
to mid-twenties, respectively, when they left for Darfur in 2003 and created the Invisible
Children movement and first film in 2004. These three set out at a young age to take on a
warlord who had been attacking Northern Uganda for over half of their lives. Twentytwo-year-old Ben Keesey joined the Invisible Children movement in 2005 as their Chief
Financial Officer (CFO), the group went on to register Invisible Children as a non-profit
organization in 2006, and then they reappointed then-24 year-old Keesey from CFO to
CEO in 2007. Those working within the Invisible Children movement, both the founders
and leaders, were young adults, all falling into the category of youth as they built this
grassroots movement. This is significant because the Invisible Children movement
highlights young people working to tackle large issues that impact more than simply
them and their surroundings. The young age of the leaders of this movement is also
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related to the final relationship invisible children has with youth; their target demographic
for involvement.

Youth-involved
In addition to being youth-led, Invisible Children movement has youth who are
involved in the movement. In the beginning of the movement, Invisible Children created
their first video: Invisible Children: The Rough Cut, which they took on tour around the
United States, traveling to high schools and college campuses for viewings with other
youth. Specifically, for the Invisible Children movement, their target demographic was
teenage girls and young adult females.147
Throughout their different events, one of the main goals of the Invisible Children
movement was to encourage the youth of America to “do more than just watch” when it
came to their involvement in social movements.148 They elicited involvement from other
youth by hosting events that made those who wanted to be involved in them go out into
public, take up physical space, cover any available surface with posters, hosting
multimedia events with popular musical performances such as Mumford and Sons, The
Plain White Tees, and David Archuleta; all popular artists for those in the youth
demographic.
The movement garnered attention from young people by coming to them directly
at their schools and universities and by making the acts of involvement something the
youth was capable of doing. These acts included purchasing t-shirts with the slogan My
Heart Is Beeping, reed bracelets that were made by the people of Uganda, short videos on
DVD with different colors highlighting different children, and buttons. These were all
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priced where high school and college students could afford them, and with their purchase,
these youths could make contributions to the movement themselves. In addition to
monetary contributions, as a cornerstone of their grassroots advocacy, the Invisible
Children movement encouraged the youth to engage their political leaders via letterwriting, phone calls, rallies, and in-person lobby meetings.149
One of Invisible Children’s large national events that incorporated and appealed
to youth was called Displace Me. The event took place in April 2007 with nearly 68,000
attendees across fifteen cities in the United States. This event encouraged participants to
make and sleep in makeshift villages overnight to bring awareness to the displacement of
the children taking place by the Ugandan government.150 It was this event that got the
attention of musician Pete Wentz from the band Fall Out Boy. Wentz not only attended
the Displace Me event, but he was also inspired to film Fall Out Boy’s next music video
in Uganda.
The band traveled to Uganda with the intention of shooting a documentary-style
video for their upcoming song “I’m Like a Lawyer with the Way I’m Always Trying to
Get You Off (Me and You),” but once the band arrived, their direction changed and they
essentially shot a love-story between two young people in Uganda. This video highlights
young people and young love in Uganda as something that is relatable across the world,
but that familiarity and comfort was juxtaposed with the dangerous reality of young boys
being abducted and turned into child soldiers in the night in Uganda. Invisible Children
co-founder Bobby Bailey described the video as “groundbreaking” and as something that
had the ability to humanize the people in Uganda across the world and bring people
together.151
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Another way Invisible Children engaged the youth to participate in their
movement was through their events. For example, in 2011, the events 25 and Break the
Silence were held across the United States with over 90,000 people pledging to be silent
for 25 hours to represent the 25 years of conflict in Central Africa as an act of spreading
awareness. After the 25 hours of silence, participants were encouraged to gather across
eighteen U.S. cities for Break the Silence. Break the Silence was a multimedia event that
featured exclusive videos and musical performances by artists who volunteered to
collaborate with Invisible Children, creating a festival-like atmosphere to appeal even
more to young people with the hopes that the environment alone could appeal to those
who otherwise might not be interested in social activism.
Finally, the Invisible Children movement held an event called the Fourth Estate
Summit. This was a “broad, educational conference about global justice” designed for
core supporters of the Invisible Children movement. 152 The Fourth Estate Summit
brought experts in film, business, journalism, economics, and international justice
together to “discuss the role of the millennial generation in global justice and
international humanitarian efforts”. 153 One of the standout statistics from this conference
was the average age of attendees, which was just sixteen years old. This emphasizes the
involvement of young people in this movement.
One of the Invisible Children movement’s cornerstones was their engagement
with youth throughout the movement’s existence. From reaching and engaging high
school and college students to providing practical ways those young people could get
involved to partnering with celebrities and musicians, Invisible Children worked to find
ways to get and keep the youth involved.
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The Invisible Children movement has had a connection to youth in every aspect
of the movement. First, the movement was established as a response to the youth of
Northern Uganda being kidnapped and turned into child soldiers by the LRA. Second, the
Invisible Children movement was created and run by youth filmmakers turned activists,
Jason Russell, Bobby Bailey, and Laren Poole. Finally, a large portion of those who were
engaged in the Invisible Children movement were also youth across the world working
toward solving this humanitarian crisis. Invisible Children has a youth component
throughout all stages of the movement making this a unique social movement as it
focuses on youth, is managed by youth, and calls for majority of youth involvement.

Youth and Affect
Throughout the years, Invisible Children has positioned itself within a framework
of young people needing saving, and the idea that young people can save them, and more
than that, they can bring an end to an adult warlord halfway around the world. The
Invisible Children movement tapped into the vulnerability of a group of people (youth) to
invoke sympathy from an audience of roughly the same age. They were able to do this by
appealing to the emotions of these young people; these kids cannot be in school like you,
they cannot go on dates or to the movies, or be with their friends and families like you,
and that elicits that feeling of pity and sorrow toward a group of individuals.
Additionally, the use of the word “Children” in the movement’s name identifies
children as the main focus of the cause, which as I detail below, is much more expansive
than only working to rescue the abducted child soldiers. Invisible Children focused and
highlighted the fact that these were not adults or soldiers, but instead young children; a
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study conducted found that the average age of the children abducted in Uganda was 12.9
years old.154 Bringing attention to the young age of the children who were being abducted
by the LRA is a tactic that is often used in order to not only garner sympathy, but also to
persuade individuals open up their wallets and donate to the cause. 155 This is an important
angle that the Invisible Children movement took on the atrocities happening in Uganda
because the abduction of children was not the only war crime the LRA was committing,
but the movement highlighted these children as the face of the movement as the most
important war crime they were committing.
As media scholar, Susan Moeller notes, children have replaced women in the eyes
of the public as emblems of purity and goodness, and thus, people are motivated to act in
order to protect them or save them. 156 Not only that, but, within the United States,
children who are not from the United States are presented in the media in more
sympathetic terms than those from within the United States–this is especially true for
young black males.157 That means, the young people the Invisible Children movement
were speaking to had been primed to feel more sympathy toward the young black males
who were being abducted as child soldiers than perhaps any other group of individuals.
This verbal and visual rhetoric of presenting these young black boys as the
catalyst and face of the movement cannot be overlooked. While it is nice to believe
young people and all of those who shared, showed up, wrote and called their government
officials on behalf of these young, undoubtedly mistreated boys from Uganda, there is
more depth to those messages that elicits reactions and responses from those who hear
them.
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This is not to downplay the empowering communication used by the Invisible
Children movement to mobilize their youth followers The Invisible Children leaders
focused on their belief that young people could change the world, and they made sure to
tell their members as much. Outside of the movement, there are personal benefits that
youth experience from being engaged in civic activism, such as developing the five Cs:
competence, confidence, connection, caring, and character, and through their activism,
they prepare to experience the sixth C, contribution.158

The Most Viral Video of the Time: How Invisible Children Utilized the Digital
Landscape
In this section, I discuss the relationship the Invisible Children movement has
with the digital landscape. First, I explore the significance of time, both as it relates to the
age of movement leaders and the time the movement came about. The next aspect that is
important to consider when discussing the digital impact on the Invisible Children
movement is the location in which the movement takes place. Location is significant
because it has an impact on access, infrastructure, and spreadability. Additionally, when
discussing the significance of the impact of digital aspects on the Invisible Children
movement, limitations cannot be overlooked. Limitations include the concern of echo
chambers among movement members, as well as censorship in the locations where the
movement spreads. Finally, I discuss the overall significance of the digital aspects of the
Invisible Children movement have had as it relates to social movements and participants.
To begin, I look at the impact that time has played in the Invisible Children
movement. First, I discuss the age of movement leaders and their relationship to the
digital realm. As discussed above, the Invisible Children movement was led and
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participated in by mostly youth. The age of the movement leaders and members is
significant due to the relationship that young people have with the digital world. Youth
who grew up with technology are referred to as “digital natives”; that is, they were
children in the time of increased personal Internet usage in the mid to late 1990s. 159
Invisible Children’s founders, Russell, Bailey, and Poole, were all in their early to midtwenties when they created the movement and organization in 2004. This puts the
founders in a little older category than what is considered digital natives. They were still
young enough to have a relationship to digital technologies, but they were not young
children growing up alongside communication technologies.160
The founders of Invisible Children might not be considered digital natives, but
their main demographic of followers, mostly being in high school and college, would be
considered digital natives. This is significant because while the leaders might not have an
instinctual relationship to technology and social media, the followers of the movement
do. Invisible Children movement followers, being digital natives, are used to, and prefer,
receiving information very fast. They also prefer graphics before text and random access,
such as hypertext, where they can navigate to new and related information with a single
click. These digital natives ultimately function best when they are networked and
connected to others.161 All of these preferences and characteristics of the digital native
members helped to share and spread the message of the Invisible Children movement in
ways the leaders may not have been instinctually aware of.
While youth do generally have a stronger relationship to social media as a way to
achieve their goals,162 the Invisible Children movement began in 2004, which was still in
the early stages of social media, and a time when both Facebook and Twitter were not
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even available to users worldwide. 163 This speaks more to the era in which the Invisible
Children movement came about than to the age of the leaders or members.
The time in which the Invisible Children movement came about and grew is
important to the movement’s relationship to the digital world. For example, when the
movement first began in 2004, Facebook was brand new and simply expanding from
Harvard to other universities and had not yet reached the masses. In February 2005,
YouTube first went live, and by the Fall of the same year, Facebook expanded to high
school students in the United States and was later available in the United Kingdom,
Ireland, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. 164 Twitter did not come about until
Summer 2006, the same time that the now virtually non-existent Myspace became the
most popular social networking site in the United States. Apple did not release its first
iPhone until the following Summer at the end of July 2007.165 All of these rapid changes
in social media and technology highlight some of the digital landscape that the Invisible
Children movement has had to navigate since its early years. The Invisible Children’s
smaller digital footprint in its first few years of existence can be attributed, in part, to the
changing digital atmosphere in the early stages of the movement.
As the movement progressed over time, more and more usage of digital means
like social media and more dynamic websites developed alongside the creation of the
movement as a whole. Invisible Children joined Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, with
verified accounts on each, and they eventually added Instagram to their social media
profile as well. The movement transitioned into the social media era with digital native
followers who helped to promote and share their message.
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The Invisible Children movement’s digital impact is most prominently seen in
their Kony 2012 campaign. The purpose of this campaign was to see if an online video
could “make an obscure war criminal famous” and, if he became famous, would “the
world work together to stop him or let him remain at large?”166 The movement leaders
created and produced their tenth video, which started not by exposing the humanitarian
crisis happening in Uganda, but rather by highlighting the importance of global
connection through social media. Following their initial call for connection, the
remainder of the film exposes Joseph Kony, a then relatively unknown Central African
rebel. At that time, the Kony 2012 video became the “fastest growing viral video” with
over 100 million views in six days.167 During this time, the Invisible Children movement
took advantage of the digital era it found itself in the middle of, regardless of the age of
movement leaders, and directly reaching the youth digital natives.
The Invisible Children movement leaders were right on the cusp of being digital
natives, and their target demographic was, and continues to be, nearly all digital natives
themselves. The Invisible Children movement’s connection to the digital realm has
improved over the years, in part, due to their relationship to the digital realm. Because of
their close relationship to the digital world, the movement has been able to adjust to the
changing digital landscape over the growth of the digital era. Both the age of the leaders
and followers and the time in which the movement has taken place have contributed to
the growth and spread of the Invisible Children movement.
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A Ugandan Crisis, An American Movement
Age and time are not the only important aspects of the Invisible Children
movement as it relates to the digital realm, the location of the movement is also important
to discuss. The location of a movement is important as it relates to access and
infrastructure, which ultimately impacts the ability of the movement to spread outside of
the local area where the movement developed. Additionally, limitations like censorship
and echo chambers are important to explore as it relates to the location of the movement
as well.
While the cause of the Invisible Children movement was centered in Uganda and
Central Africa, the leaders and headquarters of the movement are all in the United States.
The location of this movement is significant when it comes to access and infrastructure.
When the Invisible Children movement originated in 2004, 63% of U.S. American adults
used the Internet, and of that 63%, 77% of 18–29-year-olds used the Internet, the highest
percentage of all other age groups. 168 Today, there are over 288 million active Internet
users, 246 million active mobile Internet users, 230 million social media users, and over
225 million active mobile social media users.169 This shows the growth of Internet users
in the United States since the inception of the Invisible Children movement.
While access to the Internet is high, at 87%, in the United States, there are still issues of
access and infrastructure. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) estimates
that more than 21 million people living in the United States do not have Internet access,
including 27% of those living in rural places, as well as 2% of individuals living in cities
in the U.S.170 In addition to not having Internet access, nearly 45% of adult in households
with incomes lower than $30,000 do not have broadband access. Having access to
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broadband Internet, according to the FCC, is critical to civic engagement, among other
important aspects of today’s world, and this digital divide still impacts individuals living
in urban areas, larger numbers in rural areas, and even larger numbers on Tribal lands. 171
Without access to the Internet, and more specifically, without access to broadband
Internet access, the Invisible Children movement was not able to reach everyone through
their digital engagement; especially those with lower household incomes.
Not only does this exclude individuals in the United States from actively
participating in the movement, but it limits the movement in its abilities to try to solve a
problem in Uganda. If we take a look at Internet access to those in Uganda in 2004, only
7.2 per 1000 people had Internet access.172 This number has increased over the years. In
December of 2019, 40% of the Ugandan population had internet access, an increase of
10% in just two years.173 However, compared to the Internet penetration in the United
States, the Invisible Children movement, over the years, has still been less likely to reach
those who are most impacted by the atrocities they are fighting against.

Adapting the Digital Plan: Reaching Ugandans through Available Digital Technologies
Outside of what is considered the use of modern media, including websites and
social media platforms, the Invisible Children movement has used various other forms of
media in their goals to help the people of Uganda and Central Africa. Specifically, the
movement has worked hand in hand with Central African organizations and international
experts producing and sharing messages to educate the public on violence prevention and
conflict mediation, among other issues related to violence. This is done with the goal of
creating a better understanding of the issues happening and providing ways in which
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people can work to end the cycle of violence. The movement utilizes traditional FM radio
as well as SD cards and what they call an innovative mobile cinema program.174
Throughout their work, Invisible Children has produced and broadcast over 600 hours of
FM radio messages across seven radio stations, and have held two mobile cinema film
screenings in Central African communities.
In addition to their work on spreading information and education on violence
across Central Africa through their digital productions, the Invisible Children movement
has also utilized digital means through their crisis tracking and conflict analysis. The
Invisible Children movement recognized that the LRA was striking and killing people in
remote and isolated communities in Central Africa with little international attention.
Because of this, there has been a lack of data on the violence taking place, making it
difficult for humanitarians, policymakers, and security forces to help protect these
communities.175
The Invisible Children staff worked with partners in Central Africa, local
communities, and crisis mapping experts to collect and verify reports of attacks via the
Invisible Children’s Early Warning Network. The Early Warning Network was
developed as a response to a lack of access to basic communication infrastructure which
put these communities at risk. Working with local community leaders, the Invisible
Children movement installed new High Frequency (HF) radios and repaired existing
radios in their communities. They also trained local operators on how to safely report
incidents of violence.176 Through this work, over 100 communities have received
potentially life-saving information via this Early Warning Network, over eighty
individualized community action plans created with local leaders have been put into
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place, and over 300,000 people have directly benefitted from the Early Warning
Network.177
In addition to the Early Warning Network, Invisible Children has brought the
Crisis Tracker to Central Africa. The Crisis Tracker, according to their website, is a
“geospatial database and reporting project that tracks armed group activity and conflictrelated incidents,” specifically focusing on the Northeastern Democratic Republic of
Congo and Eastern Central African Republic. 178 The information that is gathered from
the Early Warning Network, along with data from the United Nations local nongovernment organizations (NGOs), and firsthand research conducted by Invisible
Children and peer organizations is all compiled together, vetted, and put into the Crisis
Tracker database. The information gathered and produced is publicly available through
various means, including a digital map, a breaking news feed, regular data analysis
reports and media documenting.179 Since its inception in 2008, over 3,000 incidents of
armed group activity have been reported on the Crisis Tracker and twenty-nine Crisis
Tracker security analysis reports have been created and shared with local stakeholders. 180
Despite a lack of access to digital infrastructure in many parts of Central Africa,
the Invisible Children movement has continued to utilize the media that does exist locally
to help promote information and safety for the people most impacted by the LRA and
their violence. Through alternative technology, the Invisible Children movement has been
able to tap into the ways in which they can most benefit the people of Uganda and
Central Africa.
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Digital Activism: Four Styles of Internet Engagement
To best study the digital activism of the Invisible Children movement, I utilize
Earl et al.’s work on four broad styles of Internet engagement: brochureware, emobilization, online organizing, and online engagement.181 These four categories help
explore and analyze forms of activism in the Internet activism era. I use this framework
to explore the various activism done by the Invisible Children movement to help better
organize and understand the efforts done by this movement and to ultimately argue that
the Invisible Children movement was more than simply online slacktivism.

Internet Engagement: Brochureware
Brochureware is when a movement utilizes the Internet to spread and share their
message. This is very similar to passing out hard copy brochures person-to-person in
traditional forms of activism, but, it is often easier and cheaper to disperse the
information to a wider audience via technology and digital means. Depending on the
infrastructure in place where the movement begins, brochureware is often also more
financially feasible than passing around pieces of paper. That is, assuming those creating
the content have access to digital technology and the ability to share their message, and
those who the message is intended to reach also have those specific forms of
connectivity.
As discussed above, the Invisible Children movement came about prior to the
social media era when sharing information was as simple as a click of a button and access
to the Internet was not at people’s literal fingertips in the way it is today. However, as
time progressed, Invisible Children has used the Internet and social media that came
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about with the rise of the movement to share their information via text, emails, images,
and, most notably, videos. This form of activism benefits movements because it extends
their reach of new potential followers in a more financially feasible way. This is a
significant aspect of not only digital social movements, but social movements that are
created by and directed toward youth as they often do not come from, or require, a
movement to have a large financial backing.

Internet Engagement: E-mobilization
E-mobilization is when a movement uses online tools to bring people together inperson for face-to-face activism.182 In addition to brochureware, e-mobilization utilizes
non-tradition forms of activism, but also leads to more of the traditional forms of
activism as well. When it comes to Invisible Children, this type of activism was seen
most frequently in their mobilization phase of their activism. The movement started inperson with their national tours, but as time and technology progressed, Invisible
Children used online tools to share information about their various events over the years.
It was through this e-mobilization that events like Displace Me (2007), 25 (2011), Break
the Silence (2011), and Cover the Night (2012) gathered over 200,000 activists across not
only the United States but also dozens of countries as well.183 This type of activism
enabled the Invisible Children movement to reach far and wide to share their message,
which some argue helped Invisible Children set a blueprint for other social movements to
follow for humanitarian advocacy on a large scale. 184
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Internet Engagement: Online Organizing
Online organizing is when a movement organizes an entire campaign and/or
movement online, requiring no physical place to gather in order to make change.
Typically, this type of activism comes about from organizers who have little background
in activism, and does not require large amounts of money to execute.185 Because of this,
online organizations typically have different priorities and concerns than those of
traditional social movements because they are not having to levy funds from outsiders to
move their cause forward. The most prominent form of online organizing from the
Invisible Children movement was the Kony 2012 campaign. This campaign took place
almost exclusively online, and had no real offline presence or even goal. Invisible
Children utilized social media platforms to share their Kony 2012 short film and
encouraged others to do so as well.
The ultimate goal of the Kony 2012 campaign was to make Kony known, that is,
to raise awareness of who he was and what he was doing. This is also why, in part, many
activists, scholars, and outside observers reflected upon Kony 2012 in the frame of a
“failed” social movement. This dissertation is not set out to determine the value of a
movement, or of a campaign within a movement, but it is important to highlight this
finding. Because the Kony 2012 campaign existed almost entirely online, there was no
tangible “change” for onlookers, or even participants, to point to and say “this is what
this campaign did.” Making a war criminal famous, or infamous, was a broad goal, one
that ultimately did nothing to stop Kony and the LRA.
However, through the virality of the Kony 2012 video, Invisible Children argues
that they were successful. Had the goal of Kony 2012 been to gather X-amount of
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signatures, or to pass legislation, had crowds across the world gathered at local
government offices, had this campaign incorporated more traditional forms of activism
along with the online aspect, the perception of this campaign, and of the Invisible
Children movement as a whole, could have been drastically different.

Internet Engagement: Online Participation
The final of the four types of Internet engagement is online participation. Online
participation is when individuals engage in various forms of activism that take place
online, such as petition signing, coming together to deny services and/or attack a
company or person, and virtual sit-ins and demonstrations.186 This is often referred to as
“flash” activism because it often resembles that of a flash flood; the activism comes on
quickly and with ferocity, and it is not the longevity of the acts that are impactful, but
rather the force that comes up quickly that makes a lasting impression. One of the biggest
benefits of this type of activism is that individuals who might not otherwise participate in
political activism are more likely to engage because of the quickness and ease of this type
of activism.187
The Invisible Children movement utilized this type of activism, again, most
notably, through the Kony 2012 campaign. This campaign was a quick and strong
onslaught of content shared across various social media platforms in a short period of
time. The purpose of this campaign was to bombard people with information about a war
criminal who was virtually unknown around the world. Again, because of the ease of this
task, it was easy for individuals who might not otherwise take the risk of joining a social
movement in the traditional sense to join via sharing, commenting, or posting the Kony
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2012 video or information. These low-risk tasks were more viable options for more
people than higher risk ones, like participating in a march, which is how a movement is
able to create that flash flood feel–the more people, and the easier it is for them to
participate, the bigger the swell.188
For the Invisible Children movement, a movement where the target demographic
is young, white women, this low-risk level of participation gave them a way to contribute
in ways that felt both doable and safe. And while this might seem simply to fulfill young
white women’s needs to feel good about their doing good, flash activism in this sense is
still important because of the size of membership that can be obtained. Quick, short-lived
online engagements are usually larger than offline engagement, which is important
because the size of a movement is important to the attention that movement gets and also
can be related to the success of a movement. 189 So, this type of engagement, while it
might seem futile on the surface, actually serves a bigger purpose for the movement as a
whole.
However, with every social movement that utilizes digital means, there are
concerns that those movements need to consider and work toward avoiding, or learn how
to work through them. Below I explore the issues of echo chambers and censorship.

Digital Concerns: Echo Chambers and Censorship
Ultimately, there are issues when it comes to the digital aspects of this social
movement. The inability of the Invisible Children movement to reach those most
impacted by the LRA through modern digital means in the early 2000s created an issue
where the crisis and what to do about it were only being discussed by a group of people
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similar to one another and without actual connections to the violence taking place. This
creates what is called an echo chamber. Echo chambers are when groups of people with
the same ideas and concerns exclusively seek out and speak to one another, essentially
only hearing their own voices and opinions echoing back to them.
Echo chambers are significant when it comes to the Invisible Children movement
because if the majority of the communication about the LRA and Joseph Kony is coming
from people in the United States, people very removed from Uganda and the issues that
are actually happening daily there, the potential not to understand the problem accurately,
and the desire to “save” anyone they deem in need of rescue is high. A variety of voices
and opinions are needed in order to actually work to solve these problems. This also
relates to the issue of the white savior complex that is often associated with Westerners
attempting to “solve” and “fix” issues that they see taking place in the global South, with
strong ties to colonialism.190 Without truly hearing and listening to the voices of those
directly involved in the crisis or conflict, outsiders communicating amongst themselves
does not only not solve the problem, but it perhaps creates an additional problem in
thinking that others need you to save them.
Echo chambers are not the only issue of concern when exploring the digital
aspects of the Invisible Children movement as it relates to location. The next aspect to
consider is the issue of censorship; both on a governmental level and on an individual
level with self-censorship. In the United States, due to the First Amendment, freedom of
speech is protected against government censorship.191 However, social media sites such
as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and YouTube, are all private companies and they are
able to censor what individuals post on their platforms based on their own guidelines;
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many of which do, in fact, censor hate speech, obscenity, misinformation, and harassment
at varying degrees.192
Taking into consideration that the Invisible Children movement focuses on the
crisis in Uganda, it is important to explore the digital censorship in Uganda. According to
the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA),
the Internet, especially various social media platforms including Facebook and Twitter,
are significant and highly utilized tool for “social, economic, and human rights
development in Uganda and Africa at large.”193 While some argue that the Internet is the
only remaining place in Uganda for free assembly, the Internet is now being censored as
well.194 The Ugandan government claims they only shut the media and Internet when
there is a threat to security, CIPESA argues that the Ugandan government is using laws to
curtail the Internet freedoms of its people under the guise of protecting national
security.195 This censorship prevents the people of Uganda from continual access to the
Internet and limits their ability to participate and contribute to social movements
including the Invisible Children movement.
Not only does the Ugandan government censor access to the Internet for their
citizens, the government has also imposed a daily fee of 200 Ugandan Shillings ($0.05
USD) to access the popular social media sites such as Facebook and WhatsApp. 196 With
this daily fee, some Ugandans are not able to pay to access those applications and sites,
so they cannot see the communication from the Indivisible Children movement taking
place on those sites, and they are also unable to contribute to the dialogue about the
issues and solutions. This imposed paywall is a form of censorship that those in Uganda
have to overcome in order to participate in social movements that engage via these digital
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means. This is simply not an obstacle that individuals in the United States who want to
participate in social movements via Facebook and WhatsApp have to overcome.
While the Internet is available and “partly free” according to the Freedom on the
Net report by Freedom House, rights have shrunk for Ugandans over the years, and
Ugandans have experienced increased control, repressive laws, persecution, and detention
of Internet users.197 This has resulted in individuals practicing more self-censorship,
according to Dr. Wakabi, executive director of the CIPESA.198 This means that because
of the repercussions individuals have faced for speaking out online, for example, some
Ugandans have self-imposed censorship so they do not end up facing prosecution. 199 This
type of self-censorship is still a kind of censorship that limits what is said and shared on
the Internet for those living in Uganda.
Due to the limitations and restrictions Ugandans face when it comes to the digital
landscape, including access and infrastructure, as well as censorship from both the
government and self-imposed censorship, it is more difficult for Ugandans to participate
in the digital aspects of social movements seen in the Western parts of the world. This is
perhaps an important reason for those outside of Uganda to work with the people there to
help spread their message and cause. If the people of that country are not able, or are
afraid, to speak out against what is happening, other outside voices can bring global
attention to the cause, with caution to speak with rather than speak for the people they are
hoping to aid.
The Invisible Children movement has had an interesting connection to the digital
realm throughout the years since its existence. The time of the movement’s creation,
2004, was just before the social media era, with many of the most popular social
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networking sites either not in existence or in their infancy at the time. However, while
many of today’s popular social networking sites were not as prominent in 2004, the age
of the movement leaders and participants contributed to the movement’s ability to adapt
and change with the changing digital atmosphere of the time. With young leaders and
digital native followers, the Invisible Children movement was, in fact, able to utilize the
digital realm in beneficial ways.
Finally, through their incorporation of various digital means, the Invisible
Children movement has helped their followers be able to first become aware of the
problem the children of Uganda are facing, and second have the means and ability to
share that information, bringing attention to what was then a virtually unknown
humanitarian crisis. Next, the use of digital means allowed both to insert themselves into
the story by posting and sharing their involvement in the movement. The Invisible
Children movement struggled to help its followers complete the transition from interest to
participation as they struggled with the final step of having followers make the story their
own, because it was not their own, and the work that needed to be done was too far away
to move offline effectively.
Ultimately, the Invisible Children used various digital means in different ways
depending on the time and their specific audience. Because of the time in which the
Invisible Children movement came about, the movement had to, and did, adapt to the
changing media landscape over the years. The movement was created at a time when
many major social media platforms were not widely popular, or even in existence yet, but
they were also able to create and distribute what was then the most viral video on the
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Internet with their Kony 2012 video. The movement was able to adapt to the times in
order to maintain their relevance and social presence.
The importance of the Invisible Children’s relationship to digital media is their
adaptability. The adaptability was most prominently seen through their adjusting to the
developing Internet and social media boom of the early 2000s, as well as through their
differing media plans based on the location of whom they were trying to reach. This not
only helped the movement grow and maintain relevance throughout the years, this plan
also allowed the movement to connect directly with and assist those whom the movement
was designed to help.

Invisible Children as a Social Movement
The next factor to explore when looking at the Invisible Children movement is the
social movement aspect. Scholars in the social media field have defined “social
movement” with various key components, such as the preference to change some element
of the current social structure,200 being a sustained interaction of those with authority and
those challenging that authority, 201 and an ultimate shift from what is to what those
organizing the movement think “ought” to be. Additionally, social movements must be,
at least, minimally organized; that is, a social movement must have some internal
organization and cannot be simply a group of individuals doing multiple independent
acts.202 Along with this organization, social movements must have a sizeable membership
in order to maintain their existence in the long-term, and it is both the size and scope of a
movement that distinguishes it from pressure groups, lobbies, and campaigns.203
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Invisible Children meets the requirements of a social movement as it focuses on
changing the current social structure in Northern Uganda where the LRA have
maintained cruel and enduring control for over thirty years.204 The movement is working
for and on the behalf of those in Northern Uganda without control over their situation,
who are being targeted and tortured in the current social structure.
The Invisible Children movement is also an organized group; an important aspect
of becoming a social movement. In 2006, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) officially
declared Invisible Children a nonprofit organization,205 and in order to become a
nonprofit organization, one of the requirements that must be met, among many others, is
that the applicant must have obtained official status as a corporation, association, or
trust.206 The fact that Invisible Children was able to obtain 501(3)(c) status means that
had to be established as a corporation which in and of itself requires, at least, minimal
organization. The members of Invisible Children’s organization also provide the
movement’s goals and successes in great detail throughout the Invisible Children website,
which also highlights the group acting collectively rather than several individuals acting
independently.
Another source of organizational validity is the verification that a person or group
receives on the various social media platforms. According to author, entrepreneur, and
marketer Neil Patel, being verified is one of the most important things that an
organization can do on social media. He states that verification provides “instant social
proof and credibility” when an organization is searched for online and verification puts
that organization at the forefront in their particular area as a trusted option. 207 While
verification may not have been a contributing factor to the validity of an organization
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twenty years ago, it is a reasonable assessment criteria for organizations conducted in
today’s digital era.
To become verified, a group or individual must follow the requirements of the
various platforms. For example, to become verified on Facebook according to the
Facebook Help page, an account must be authentic, representing a real person, registered
business or entity; the account must be unique, meaning only one account per person or
business may be verified; the account must be complete with an about section, profile
photo, at least one post, and should be active; finally, the account must be notable
representing a well-known person, brand, or entity.208 The process to become verified on
Twitter is similar to that on Facebook.209 Instagram, however, states that, at this time,
“only Instagram accounts that have a high likelihood of being impersonated have verified
badges” meaning that while the process to get verified is similar to other platforms,
Instagram does not verify all accounts that meet those requirements. They instead suggest
users link to their other verified Facebook page in their profile (important to note that
Facebook owns Instagram, thus the push to link verified Facebook accounts over other
platforms).210
Invisible Children is verified on multiple platforms including Twitter
(@Invisible),211 Facebook (@Invisiblechildren), 212 and YouTube (Invisible Children). 213
This speaks to the validity and organization of Invisible Children as an organized group,
and their verification status helps individuals who are searching for the movement to
locate and identify their pages and content. The searchability of the verified accounts
leads to the next question concerning social movement status: membership size.
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While identifying the exact size of the membership of a group, and what the
weight of each “member” has relative to that of another “member” is nearly impossible,
there are some measures to help get an idea of the following a movement has. For
starters, the Invisible Children movement does have a record of the number of attendees
at their various events across the globe detailed on their site. From their first effort of
what they called their “National Tour,” where the Invisible Children group traveled to
schools, community centers, and places of worship across the United States, their
statistics show that across the sixteen national tours and over 13,000 screenings, they
were able to reach over five million people.214 However, “people reached” does not
equate to membership size. The Invisible Children website also details specific events
and work the movement has done over the years, including 1,500 attendees at the Fourth
Estate Leadership Summit,215 80,000 attendees at the 2006 Global Night Commute,
68,000 attendees at the 2007 Displace Me event, and over 400,000 total participants
across all events.216
One of the most notable instances that highlights the sizable membership of the
Invisible Children movement is the Kony 2012 video. At the time of its release, the Kony
2012 video amassed over 100 million views in 6 days and 3.7 million citizen signatures
on a pledge for the arrest of Joseph Kony. 217 In addition to the statistics listed on the
Invisible Children’s website, examining the social media sites of the Invisible Children
movement highlights the amount of social media followers or subscribers they have.
Invisible Children currently has followers or subscribers ranging from 210,000218 –
230,000219 on Twitter and YouTube, respectively, to over 2.5 million followers on
Facebook.220
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Looking at the social media following along with the numbers of attendees and
activists who have participated in the various Invisible Children events, a more holistic
understanding of their sizable membership is established. Their following meets the
standard for a “sizable membership” in order to be considered a social movement lasting
in the long-term from its conception in 2004 to today, where the movement continues to
have a strong following.
The Invisible Children movement meets all of the requirements of a social
movement established for this study. These are important aspects to consider when
studying any potential social movement so as to denote whether or not something is, in
fact, a social movement, or if it is actually a pressure group, lobby or simply a campaign.
Social movements are meant to change the status quo and shift from what is to what
ought to be, and often times, in order to do that, social movements will be disruptive and
can make people uncomfortable. Again, this is why it is so important to clearly establish
what is or is not a social movement in order to properly analyze them and their actions.

Activism Through the Years
Activism is the work movements do that brings about change or evolution; it is
the acts that bring about a change in the system. 221 In this section, I discuss the specifics
of what the Invisible Children movement has done over the years as activism. First, I take
a look at the traditional and non-traditional forms of activism, and then I explore how
Invisible Children mixed both traditional and non-traditional forms of activism together.
Next, I discuss the connection between the Invisible Children activism and youth and
activism and digital. Finally, I end with a discussion of activism and the digital realm,
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where I explore whether Invisible Children partook in activism or simply slacktivism,
and what we, as scholars, and social activists alike, can learn from this movement.

The Boundary between Traditional and Non-traditional Activism
The phrase “traditional activism” might be somewhat of a misnomer. Activism is
intended to be disruptive; it is supposed to go against the grain of what already is. With
that in mind, what is considered “traditional” today was perhaps “radical” for the time in
which it was being implemented. Women who partook in the Freedom Trash Can event
of the 1960s, wherein women threw away items such as mops, lipstick, and high heels,
items they viewed to be oppressive to women, were seen as “young radicals.”222 Civil
Rights activist Rosa Parks, who refused to give up her seat on a segregated bus in 1955,
among decades of additional political work, who is now referred to as the mother of the
Civil Rights movement, was seen as rebellious in her day.223 However, today, the image
of women protesting and marching for their own rights, of sit-ins and demonstrations, are
all a part of what is now considered “traditional” forms of activism; marches, protests,
sit-ins, physical petitions, etc. For the purpose of this dissertation, “traditional” forms of
activism will include actions that do not utilize digital means as their main method of
activism.
The Invisible Children movement, throughout its sixteen years of existence, has
done, and detailed, a lot of activism both within the United States and in Uganda. While
the specific purpose of this dissertation focuses on youth digital social movements, I do
want to highlight some of their more traditional forms of activism alongside the digital
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activism. However, I will not go into great detail about every act for the sake of
conciseness.
Specifically, the Invisible Children movement organizes their activism into a
four-part model that they believe best addresses the conflict with the LRA in its entirety,
focusing on both immediate needs and long-term needs of those who have been affected
by the LRA.224 The four parts of this model include media, mobilization, protection, and
recovery.
Invisible Children co-founder Jason Russell, states that “at Invisible Children…
content is king. It has to be the most compelling, the most astonishing, the most
passionate [in order to] tell a story that is quality, entertaining, and heartbreaking in hopes
that the viewer wants to participate.” 225 It is not surprising, then, that Invisible Children
made storytelling through various forms of media a cornerstone of the movement. Over
the years, Invisible Children produced and shared over a dozen short films highlighting
the crisis happening in Uganda. starting with “The Rough Cut,” to creating and
distributing various “color” films that focused on individual children affected by the
LRA, and ultimately with their infamous Kony 2012 video. From the beginning,
including media as a large factor of their movement highlights the more non-traditional
and digital shape of activism that the movement was doing.
This second aspect of activism was focused on spreading awareness around the
world of the crisis happening in central Africa and the LRA conflict. 226 In their
mobilization phase, there were five main areas where the movement focused their
attention: national tours, artist relations, the Fourth Estate Summit, grassroots advocacy,
and international events. The mobilization part of the model consisted of much more

68

traditional forms of activism like traveling around the country, touring schools, and
hosting conferences and events for activists to attend. Most of these events took place inperson and focused on what individuals could do to create change and bring an end to the
LRA, including writing letters to politicians and holding rallies and lobby meetings.
Additionally, it was through this portion of the model that the Invisible Children
movement orchestrated international events to garner global attention to their cause.
The last two phases focused specifically on the LRA-affected communities.
Importantly, the programs that have been put together in the recovery phase have all been
overseen by the Invisible Children Uganda (ICU) and their national offices in Kampala,
Gulu, and Pader, as well as in the Democratic Republic of Congo, as opposed to leaders
from the United States “fixing” the problems from afar.227 Programs from the recovery
phase include scholarship and literacy programs, water and sanitation programs, and
helping women in LRA-affected communities by providing them with job opportunities
as seamstresses in order to give them a marketable skill that could help them
economically. In addition to helping those in the communities, this program was designed
to help the children who had been abducted by the LRA up to six months before they
were reunited with their families in an attempt to help rehabilitate them from the
atrocities and trauma they had been subjected to as child soldiers.
The protection part of the model focused on setting up technologies to help the
communities alert one another when and where the LRA was active. This was done
through the Early Warning Network and the LRA Crisis Tracker. Updates from the Crisis
Tracker can be found on the official webpage at: LRACrisisTracker.com, on Twitter at
@CrisisTracker, and on mobile devices via the iPhone or Android app. In addition to the
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Early Warning Network and Crisis Tracker, deflection fliers and FM radios were the final
parts of the protection phase. These were both attempts to encourage LRA soldiers to
surrender.
The four-part model detailed by the Invisible Children movement covers both
traditional forms of activism with things like rallies and lobbying, as well as more nontraditional forms of activism including the media blitz across social media and the Crisis
Tracker. The use of the technologies available to the masses in Uganda, like the FM radio
announcements, shows that the Invisible Children movement was adaptable to the
situation they were in; if they were speaking to high school and college students in the
United States, they could use things like social media to spread their message, but if they
were speaking directly to members of the LRA trying to get them to surrender, they knew
to adapt and adjust their technique and reach them via FM radio.

Digital Activism: The Shift from Offline to Online
As I have mentioned above, the Invisible Children movement came about prior to
the mass availability of broadband Internet and the popularity of social media. However,
as time progressed, so too did the movement’s relationship with the digital realm. Most
notably, the Invisible Children movement used digital means to produce and distribute
videos and content they created, such as the Kony 2012 campaign. Utilizing the digital
realm within the movement creates a landscape where anyone with access to the Internet
could participate in the online activism. This availability for large groups to participate in
activism helps get outside attention on the movement and is linked to the success of a
movement as a whole.
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An important aspect of this form of activism is that, through these digital means,
the youth are able to find and select what they view as important news and share
information that relates to those issues. When relying on traditional media, such as
television broadcast news and/or newspapers, an individual can only digest what the
gatekeepers of those institutions deem significant. However, through online activism,
which includes sharing information, individuals are able to discern what they view as
important and newsworthy. This allows attention to be brought to unknown issues, like
the child abductions among other atrocities committed by the LRA in Uganda. Allowing
young people to have control over what they view as news is an important facet of digital
activism that ultimately has the ability to lead those young people into activism where
they might otherwise be disengaged from the issues strictly presented to them by the
mainstream media.

Activism versus Slacktivism
Much of the work Invisible Children has done over the years took place offline,
however, their most well-known activism was the Kony 2012 campaign, which did take
place almost exclusively online. This is also one of the aspects of the Invisible Children
movement that has come under the most scrutiny. Because the first goal of the Kony
2012 campaign was to make a virtually unknown war criminal infamous, Kony 2012 set
itself up to be criticized as a type of slacktivism. Some may argue: what does making a
war criminal known do to stop the war criminal from continuing their path of
destruction? However, the purpose was to bring attention to a part of the world that does
not frequently make headline news, and making Kony infamous was only the first step in
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the Kony 2012 movement. The Kony 2012 video is the most rapidly spread human rights
video ever, so when it comes to spreading their message, Kony 2012 did exactly what
Invisible Children intended; they made this unknown war criminal known. 228
While Invisible Children arguably achieved their first goal of the Kony 2012
campaign, the second goal of this campaign was to stop Kony and the atrocities of the
LRA, and that was not as achievable via sharing a video online. The argument that
surrounds Kony 2012 is that raising awareness is simply not enough, and this is where the
critique of slacktivism comes in. Tweeting, sharing, liking, etc. is low-cost and low-risk,
and so, some argue, it lacks the effort to create actual change. 229 Clicking and sharing
does not solve problems. Bringing attention to a cause does not change the situation to
which attention is now directed. Twitter does not solve global crises.
However, I argue that this type of engagement is a necessary but insufficient step
in activism in today’s digital world. Research on young people and the media has found
that the youth use the media to participate in politics, specifically, they utilize media to
circulate information, collaborate with others to create and share information and content,
and to connect with others through various platforms.230
Additionally, I explore the steps from interest to participation below to highlight
how important the first step of creating and sharing one’s own news is and how this first
step can lead to additional actions by utilizing Clark and March’s ladder of political
engagement as a way to combat the argument of digital activism as slacktivism.231
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Sharing: The First Step of the Ladder
First, the Invisible Children movement reached out to young people and gave
them information that they were able to relate to and share through digital means. The
digital aspects, such as utilizing social media, provided a place for these young people to
see and share what they decided was important news; the abduction of children in
Uganda, an issue that was not getting much attention outside of the Invisible Children
movement. Through the use of digital means, individuals were able to highlight and bring
outside attention to the issue and cause.
Sharing what followers viewed as news through digital means happened
throughout the Invisible Children movement, from sharing information and images
supporting the movement, to the viral Kony 2012 campaign. Having access to digital
means allows individuals to create and share what they consider to be news. This type of
access and ability to share helps bring attention to issues that are not being covered by
traditional media. Sharing and spreading the message of the Invisible Children movement
via digital means, the movement was able to grow in size and in attention.
To call this type of activism low-cost and low-risk is accurate, but to argue that
this is ultimately where that form of activism ends ignores the idea that social activism is
a process that participants move through, and sharing and posting is, at least sometimes,
only the first step in that process. Rather than disparaging this step of the activism
process, and potentially discouraging the work youth are doing, it is important to
encourage the continual step forward from interest to participation.
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Inserting Oneself into the Story: A Step Closer to Engagement
The next step of moving from interest to participation in Clark and Marchi’s
ladder is the ability of followers and members of the movement to insert themselves into
the story they were sharing. The Invisible Children movement provided opportunities for
participants to insert themselves into the story in-person through various acts like
protests, sit-ins, and various other events, but they also had opportunities to insert
themselves through technology. The Invisible Children movement used hashtags in
various phases of their activism, such as #MyHeartIsBeeping, based off of their first
bracelet video campaign, and of course, most popularly, the #Kony2012 hashtag. These
hashtags allowed followers to post and share pictures of themselves using the hashtag so
they became a part of the message and story they were sharing. Through these hashtag
campaigns, members of the Invisible Children movement with access to digital
technologies were able to insert themselves into the story.
Because of the time in which the movement came about, the ability to insert
oneself into the story was more difficult for followers outside of attending the few
gatherings that took place once a year. As time and technology progressed, members
were able to insert themselves into the story more frequently, which helped keep the
movement in the forefront of people’s mind and attention. The more people were able to
feel like they were a part of the story, the more likely they were going to move to the
final step from interest to participation in the movement.
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Making the Story their Own: The Final Step of Engagement
Finally, participants in the movement moved to make their own story as the final
step from interest to participation. It is in this final step where participants of the Invisible
Children movement shared their own personal stories about how they participated in the
movement to address the problem, and this is where the emotional connection to a
movement came in. This is the riskiest step in the ladder of engagement because it is the
most personal and exposes not only how an individual feels about a problem, but also the
actions they have taken to address the problem. Individuals who participate in Invisible
Children events, be they protests or contacting local governments to push for
international action, then had the opportunity to share their experiences online with
friends, families, followers, and the public at large.
This last step moving from interest to participation often moves the social
movement offline, especially for the Invisible Children movement and the era in which it
came about. Not having an interactive and direct way to communicate with leaders during
the early development of the Invisible Children movement hindered the digital ways in
which movement participants could take control of the story and make it their own. This
is often part of the biggest criticism of the Invisible Children movement: it was nothing
more than liking and sharing content online, slacktivism.
However, the time in which Invisible Children came about is part of this problem.
A social movement that came about alongside the developing social media era was
traveling an unforged path. Ways to transition followers from interest to participation had
not yet been laid out for the movement to follow. Invisible Children was setting that path
and becoming a learning tool for future social movements.
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Ultimately, it was difficult for followers and members of the Invisible Children
movement to impact and change the issues the children in Uganda were facing directly.
Despite the connectivity that the digital realm provided, the distance from where the issue
of the movement was happening and where the majority of the activism was taking place
made making that final step from interest to activism much more difficult. However, it
does not, and should not, diminish the work that Invisible Children has done, as it
provides useful information for future movements and scholars alike to learn from. An
appropriate argument is not to rid today’s social movements of this type of digital
activism, but rather to encourage those participating in what is often considered
slacktivism to take their passion and momentum offline as well.
The digital arena provides a platform for more, and less mainstream, issues to
come to the forefront. Digital activism allows massive spread of an issue that may not
otherwise garner the same amount of attention. As opposed to diminishing this type of
activism, the focus should be on how this first step can lead to more forms of activism
that can ultimately lead to more change. An important critique of the Invisible Children
movement is to focus on this follow-through step of more meaningful activism. A
movement cannot stop with awareness, but bringing awareness to an issue should not be
frowned upon as a part of a social movement.

Conclusion
This chapter has focused on the four key concepts of this research in the Invisible
Children movement. First, I explored the relationship the movement has to youth.
Importantly, the Invisible Children movement had a connection to youth in all three main
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areas: the movement came about from a youth-affected crisis, the movement was also
created and led by youth leaders, and ultimately, the movement’s target demographic for
involvement was youth.
Importantly, I also discussed the rhetoric surrounding the use of children,
specifically, young black males, and the relationship with sympathy and pity that has to
U.S. audiences. This critical look at the Invisible Children movement as a whole, looking
both at their written and verbal rhetoric as well as their images and videos provides
additional insight into virality of the movement and the overwhelming reaction to want to
help or “save” these boys. This speaks to the initial draw to social movements, such as
the Invisible Children movement, but the lack of deeper connection to the movement and
those affected by the cause can be pointed to as to why that initial draw wanes.
The next section of this chapter explored the relationship between the Invisible
Children movement and the digital sphere. This section highlighted the adaptability of the
Invisible Children movement as a whole to the changing digital landscape in order to
keep their movement alive and not get lost as much of their target demographic
transitioned online.
Following the digital aspects of the Invisible Children movement, I broke down
the components of a social movement, including a push for change, sustained interaction
between those challenging authority and those in authority, and the movement being at
least minimally organized, all important distinctions to make so as to better understand
acts that may potentially be seen as disruptive.
In the final section of this chapter, I explored the activism done by the Invisible
Children movement. Specifically, I first detailed the traditional and non-traditional and
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digital forms of activism done over the years utilizing the Invisible Children’s four-part
model. The Invisible Children utilized their in-person presence to drive what seemed to
be digital activism of the time; viewing their Kony 2012 video. But, and perhaps due to
the movement being one of the first of the digital/social media era, the Invisible Children
movement was not able to turn that digital activism into more than likes and shares,
ultimately harming the movement and its reputation in the long-run.
Throughout this chapter I have highlighted the importance of youth to the
Invisible Children movement and the impact that has had on bringing attention to the
movement and getting young people involved in making change. In addition, I discussed
how being adaptable throughout their development over several years helped Invisible
Children navigate the changing digital landscape and the impact that had on keeping the
movement relevant in the age of digital social movements. The ability to adapt and
change is one of the strongest aspects of the Invisible Children movement as they
pioneered the new digital landscape not only to continue sharing their message and
purpose, but also to use new ways of connecting and sharing to create the most viral
video of that time.
Finally, while the Invisible Children movement may seem like an example of
what in digital social movements is often criticized as slacktivism, the movement’s work
demonstrates that raising awareness ultimately can be an important step from interest to
participation for those thinking about or wanting to get involved. Beginning with lowrisk, low-cost acts is an important step to get people, and perhaps especially young
people, involved in causes that they otherwise may not be able to participate in. The most
important aspect of this type of activism is that is indeed a stepping stone to more and
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more meaningful participation and not a final destination ending with sharing a post or
changing a profile picture filter.
The Invisible Children movement is an important case to study when looking at
youth digital social movements because it incorporated youth at every aspect, from the
catalyst for the movement (youth-affected) to the movement leaders (youth-led) and
finally to the target demographic (youth-involved) for members of the movement. Not
only has Invisible Children included youth throughout the movement, they also came
about at a unique time as it relates to the digital world we are currently in. Finally, the
insight Invisible Children movement brings to youth digital social movement studies as it
relates to activism versus slacktivism and the importance of low-cost, low-risk activism
that acts as a stepping stone to more impactful and meaningful activism. Through their
media blitz campaigns, Invisible Children proved that digital social movements that focus
on, are run by, and utilize youth can bring about attention and change to virtually
unknown problems in seldom publicized places of the world.

79

Chapter 3: Bring Back Our Girls: Developing Digital Era Youth Social Movement
Activism

Bring Back Our Girls is a social movement that began in 2014 after the terrorist
group Boko Haram abducted more than 200 school girls from their school dormitory in
Northern Nigeria. Boko Haram is an Islamic terrorist group which practices Jihad and has
been active in Nigeria since 2002. 232 Translated to English, “Boko Haram” means
“Western education is sinful,”233 and thus, the group targets the education of girls with
the purpose of exclusively keeping women in the household.234
After the death of their leader, Muhammed Yusuf, in 2009 while in police
custody, Boko Haram developed an armed insurgency in an act of revenge for killing
their leader.235 Over the next several years, Boko Haram continued their attacks across
Nigeria in their attempt to enforce Sharia law, even among those who were not
Muslim.236 In May of 2013, Nigerian President, Goodluck Jonathan, declared a state of
emergency in three northern states where the Boko Haram terrorist group had an
especially strong hold, including Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa, informing the people that
parts of these states had been overtaken by groups who do not have allegiance with
Nigeria.237
While this was not their only act of terrorism, the abduction of more than 200
schoolgirls is one of Boko Haram’s most worldwide recognized acts of enforcing their
ideals.238 This abduction marked the single largest abduction attributed to Boko Haram.239
During the abduction, nearly sixty of the young girls managed to escape, leaving a total
of 219 girls in captivity. Along with the abduction of the girls, the terrorists set fire to the
school, burning a large part of the school and destroying school records, making it
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increasingly difficult to account for the girls who were at the school and thus the girls
who were missing.240
Faced with uncertainty about exactly who was missing, where the girls were, and
how to get them back, family and concerned Nigerian citizens came together to pressure
their government to take on Boko Haram in order to locate and safely rescue these young
girls. The rally cry of this movement moved online with the Bring Back Our Girls
hashtag campaign, and eventually spread across the globe, reaching global leaders and
citizens alike, all demanding the same thing: to return these abducted girls back to their
families and away from Boko Haram.
In this chapter, I delve into the Bring Back Our Girls social movement. First, I
look at the impact youth has had on the movement, from being the catalyst of the
movement, to the development of the movement, to the utilization of youth as a part of
the movement’s membership, and finally the impact of the rhetoric surrounding youth of
the movement. Next, I discuss the impact digital technologies and infrastructure have had
on the Bring Back Our Girls movement based on when and where the movement took
place. I also address some of the digital concerns with this movement. Following the
digital section, I explore what aspects of the Bring Back Our Girls movement made it and
actual social movement. I conclude with a discussion of the activism that the Bring Back
Our Girls movement has accomplished over the years, both traditionally and nontraditionally, and examine how their online activism fits into the four styles of Internet
engagement.
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The Role of Youth throughout the Bring Back Our Girls Movement
When it comes to the relationship the Bring Back Our Girls movement has with
youth, the first place to begin is the relationship between those affected that led to the
creation of the movement. As stated above, Bring Back Our Girls came about because
young girls were the victims of a terrorist attack by Boko Haram for, and while, attending
school. The next important relationship to explore is how youth have been involved in the
leadership of the movement, which sets the Bring Back Our Girls movement apart from
the other three in this dissertation because it was not originally created by young people,
but rather brought in a prominent young voice to act as leadership within the group.
Finally, as it relates to youth, I discuss the affect rhetoric surrounding the movement.

Youth-affected
While Boko Haram was not a new presence in Nigeria, the abduction of more
than 200 schoolgirls was a tipping point for members of the community, both those
related to the abducted girls, but also for members of the community at large. This was an
attack by a terrorist group that was explicitly directed at young girls. While this event
directly impacted the girls in Nigeria, the abduction spoke to a larger issue around the
world: the education of youth. Around the world, education for young people is a global
issue with more than 263 million children out of school in 2014. This issue is even more
prominent for girls who are out of school in places such as Sub-Saharan Africa at a
higher rate than boys.241 This direct attack from Boko Haram on these young schoolgirls
is what led to the creation of this movement, creating the first, and strongest, direct
relationship the Bring Back Our Girls movement has to youth.
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Youth-led: An Outside Voice
Next, we look at the relationship youth have as the driving force of this
movement. This movement was initially started at a protest by family members of the
missing girls, and it quickly moved online, gaining the attention of many individuals
across the world, including young female education activist, Malala Yousafzai, who
eventually became a spokesperson for the movement while still a teenager herself.
Malala Yousafzai is one of the most well-known young girls who has been
impacted by the violence directed at young girls and their right to an education. At the
age of 11, Malala was encouraged by her father to speak out against the Taliban, which
was extending its reach into her home region of the Swat Valley in Pakistan. In October
2012, fifteen-year-old Malala was shot in the head coming home from school;
unbeknownst to her, the Taliban had issued a death warrant for the young girl due to her
being outspoken over several years for girls’ rights to an education.242 Not only did
Malala survive the attack, by her sixteenth birthday, she was speaking to the United
Nations about this issue, for which she had been fighting for years. 243 The kidnapping of
the Chibok girls in Nigeria was an issue that was close to Malala and her activism. Her
passion for the cause ultimately led her Nigeria on her seventeenth birthday to be a part
of the movement to bring the young girls back from their captors.
Malala met with the parents of the girls who had been abducted to show her
support and put pressure on Nigerian president Jonathan to be more aggressive in his
work to bring these abducted girls back home to their families. Malala expressed her
desire to be a voice for the movement, continuing to speak up for the abducted girls until
each of them had been returned safely and allowed to continue her education.
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Malala not only reached out to the Nigerian president, but she also left a message
for Boko Haram as well. She told them to reflect on their behavior and recognize what
they are doing does not only not represent Islam, but is reflecting poorly on Islam. 244 A
year after the abduction, with the majority of the girls who had been abducted still in
custody, Malala wrote an open letter to world leaders, criticizing their insufficient efforts
in the release of the Chibok girls. 245 At eighteen years old, Malala called on the new
Nigerian President, Muhammadu Buhari to continue further action in releasing the girls
and ending Boko Haram altogether. When Buhari responded to Malala that Boko Haram
had been handled (though girls were, and are still, missing), Malala continued to push the
president to continue fighting for the missing girls, and that this issue was not over until
all the girls had been returned.246 Over the years, Malala has continued to be a leading
voice in the Bring Back Our Girls movement through her personal blog sites and social
media accounts, and politically talking with and to global leaders to continue efforts to
bring each one of the abducted Chibok girls back.
Malala is an example of youth leadership within the Bring Back Our Girls
movement. While she was not an originator of the movement, she was an early
contributor and ultimately became a loud voice of leadership for the movement. Because
of her prior activism involving young girls and their right to education, her voice was a
powerful aspect of this movement, regardless, and perhaps even in spite, of her
youthfulness.
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Youth-involved: Bringing Young People Together through Social Media
Next, when looking at the Bring Back Our Girls movement, youth have played an
active role as members of the movement. The Bring Back Our Girls movement took
place, in large part, on social media, specifically via Twitter through the use of the
hashtag (#BringBackOurGirls). While the youth demographic may seem more
disinterested in engaging in “traditional” politics, the use of digital media, such as using
Twitter and hashtags, is a tactic that can be used to engage this specific demographic in a
more social, entertaining, and authentic form of communicating than traditional media. 247
According to the Pew Research Center, individuals who fall into the definition of
youth for this research (13 – 29 year-olds) make up the top two largest user demographic
categories based on age in the United States; 32% of 13–17 year-olds and 40% of 18–29
year-olds use the platform.248 Worldwide, the 13–24 age demographic makes up 30% of
Twitter users. (ages 25–29 are combined through age 34, but this group makes up another
29% of all Twitter users). 249 The age of Twitter users is significant because of the
presence that the Bring Back Our Girls movement had, specifically on Twitter with their
digital campaign.
As early as July 2014, the Bring Back Our Girls hashtag (#BringBackOurGirls)
had generated over four million tweets, and while not all of those tweets were from
youths, it is a relationship that cannot go unnoticed. 250 The following tweet heat map
shows how the hashtag spread from April 23, 2014, to May 6 of that same year,
exploding from a cluster of tweets happening almost exclusively in Nigeria to a mass of
tweets around the world, with large amounts of tweets coming from the United States,
Europe, and even Australia.251 Taking into consideration the majority share of Twitter
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that belongs to the youth, this is a significant connection for the Bring Back Our Girls
movement.

Youth and Affect: Who are the “Girls” in Bring Back Our Girls
The use of the word “girls” in the movement’s title Bring Back Our Girls
highlights young people at the center of the cause. However, when looking at the ages of
the abducted girls, most of them were mid-to-late teenagers. In many places, this age
demographic could be, and is, considered “young women” or “young adults.” The
specific rhetorical use of the word “girls” in the movement could be seen as strategic in
that youthfulness signifies a sense of vulnerability and elicits more sympathy and
compassion from others.
Using the word “girl” in the name of the movement and in the globally used
hashtag infantilizes the victims of the abduction. Many of the girls who were abducted,
while still what I consider “youth” in this dissertation, were, in fact, in their late teens
when abducted and many are in their twenties today. If the movement became known as
“Bring Back Our Teenagers” or even “Bring Back Our Daughters,” a different tone
would be conveyed. What this means for the Bring Back Our Girls movement is that
when people hear the word “girls,” often, a young girl is what they picture, not a
seventeen-year-old teenage girl. A young girl being abducted strikes a chord within
people, a feeling a pity or sympathy, and people feel more inclined to help. Emphasizing
the “girl” aspect of the abduction presents the abducted students as young and vulnerable,
in need of help and protection. Referring to someone as a “child,” and perhaps especially
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a female child, ignites this emotional appeal to others that those girls need help, and is
ultimately a useful tactic across movements.
Wrapped in the BBOG movement is also the fight for the education of girls
worldwide. Bringing activist Malala Yousafzai in as a spokesperson, a young activist
known around the world for her fight for the education of girls, also presents another
unique rhetorical move. As Wendy Hesford denotes, critically, in the chapter Spectacular
Children in her book Spectacular Rhetorics, education has been used as a part of a
“rescue narrative” wherein education becomes the agent for change, meaning that
education is seen as the way in which these youth can be helped/saved. 252 Portraying
education as a way to rescue individuals, as the answer to problems, speaks to a Western
idea of what should be. Intertwining the infantilization rhetoric along with the education
as a rescue narrative creates an enticing situation for outsiders to get involved in.
Youth have had a direct impact on the Bring Back Our Girls movement
throughout the various aspects discussed in this section. Specifically, this movement was
created as a result of youth being directly affected in abduction from the Boko Haram
terrorist group. While this movement was not as directly and explicitly driven by youth as
the Invisible Children movement, it did include leadership from youth activist Malala
Yousufzai as an important aspect of this movement. Additionally, the Bring Back Our
Girls movement used affect rhetoric through their usage of “girls” to invoke an extra
sense of pity and sympathy from outside members. Even though this choice may be
somewhat infantilizing, it also sometimes even results in more donations and financial
support for a cause. This, combined with the rhetoric surrounding the importance of
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education and the idea and support for girls’ education worldwide as a universal fix to
many problems, laid the groundwork for an outpour of support from around the world.

A Hashtag Heard ‘Round the World
The next important section to discuss for the Bring Back Our Girls Movement is
the movement’s relationship to the digital landscape. In this section, I explore the
important digital aspects of the Bring Back Our Girls movement as it relates to the time
the movement took place and the location of the movement. I also address the digital
means that the movement used. Finally, I explore additional digital concerns the
movement has had to consider and the implications of those concerns.

Non-digital Natives in a Digital World
As discussed above, the Bring Back Our Girls movement was not started by
exclusively youth in the same way that the Invisible Children and the Never Again
movements (discussed later in this dissertation) were. As previously mentioned, Malala
Yousafzai was one of the only youth spearheads of the movement. This relates to the
digital aspect of this movement as it relates to the discussion of digital natives and nondigital natives’ impact on movements. With the majority of the Bring Back Our Girls
leaders not belonging to the youth demographic, their innate relationship to the digital
world was not as second-nature as it is for those who grew up with the technology
advances that are available today. Because of their increased use of social media, digital
natives process information differently than older generations. 253 These differences are
evident, among other places, in the way digital natives relate to and use social media to
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work to achieve their goals compared to non-digital natives.254 The Bring Back Our Girls
movement did use social media, despite the majority of their leaders not being digital
natives, however, their execution of their social media usage and presence has not had the
same impact and fluidity as other movements.
The impacts of the majority of the Bring Back Our Girls leadership not being
digital natives can be seen in how they interact and run their various social media sites.
To begin, the only social media page that is verified for the Bring Back Our Girls
movement is their Facebook page. I discuss the implications of verified accounts on
movements in the following section, but as it relates to the digital aspect, not having
verified social media pages makes it difficult for followers or potential followers to
identify which account is run by the actual movement. Digital natives are aware of the
need to be verified on various platforms for consistency and ease of access for attracting
and maintaining membership. Some even argue that getting verified, specifically on
Twitter, has more to do with being good at Twitter than with the account user’s
identity.255 This speaks to the leadership of the Bring Back Our Girls movement not
being as digitally savvy as younger leaders may be, making finding and following the
movement’s account more difficult for those who are potentially interested in the
movement.
Along with the difficulties around identifying movement accounts, the actual
posts from the Bring Back Our Girls movement differ from those of digital natives as
well. For starters, some of the platforms used by the Bring Back Our Girls movement
have outdated content and have large gaps between postings. Additionally, much of the
Bring Back Our Girls content is not directly created by the Bring Back Our Girls
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movement, but rather postings from other sources that the BBOG movement shares, retweets (RT), or re-posts. While digital natives do share or RT content, they also include
their own voice and add their own commentary on said content; in other words, they
share while adding to the story. This kind of engagement is missing from the social media
platforms from the non-digital natives behind the Bring Back Our Girls movement. As a
result, the unique voice of the movement is missing.

Time: A Double-Edged Sword for the Bring Back Our Girls Movement
Despite not being led exclusively by digital natives, one benefit the Bring Back
Our Girls movement did have going for it was the time in which the movement
developed and gained worldwide attention. The Bring Back Our Girls movement most
popularly chose Twitter as the social media platform to spread their message, though the
campaign spread across other popular platforms such as Instagram and Facebook as well.
In the Spring of 2014, when the Bring Back Our Girls movement first appeared on
Twitter, the platform had around 260 million monthly active Twitter users globally. 256 In
addition to the amount of users on Twitter in 2014 globally, broadband access was also
on the rise. By the end of 2014, fixed-broadband penetration was reported to have
reached nearly 10% of the globe, mobile-broadband was said to have reached over 2
billion subscribers, accounting for 32% of the world, and there was a total of three billion
Internet users globally.257
While the timing of this movement benefitted Bring Back Our Girls with
worldwide access to the internet and broadband internet access growing, the relevance of
Twitter was on a decline. In 2014, Instagram became more important than Twitter for
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youth users, LinkedIn ranked more popular than Twitter among U.S. adults, and Snapchat
came in as the youngest social network with more than 60% of Snapchat users ages 1824.258 Outside of the United States, in 2014, Twitter fell below other social media sites
including QZone, Google+, LinkedIn, and Instagram in terms of popularity and usage. 259
What all of this means for the Bring Back Our Girls movement is that though
Twitter was still a popular platform in 2014, it was not the most important or most used
platform by youths, nor was it the most popular for the older demographic of adults
inside the United States. Keeping all of this in mind, Twitter still skewed heavily toward
U. S. users, with 143 million of the worldwide Twitter accounts being registered to users
in the United States.260 If the Bring Back Our Girls movement was trying to reach the U.
S. audience, then Twitter would definitely be capable of reaching them, and it did.
However, even with the majority of platform users being U. S. users, the platform was
still not the most important or valued platform for those users. This means that while U.
S. users would have, and be on, Twitter, it was not their main social media platform of
choice, and if the Bring Back Our Girls movement wanted to spread their message and
create sustainability through their social media presence, relying heavily on Twitter might
not lead to the worldwide payoff that the movement was aiming for.
However, while not the most popular site across the world, or even the most
popular in the United States where it skewed the heaviest, Twitter does have advantages
that LinkedIn, Instagram, and Facebook did not offer, such as the ability to connect with
social networks based upon interest rather than personal connection. (Facebook is
currently including more of this type of engagement opportunity with Facebook Groups,
but in 2014, the connections users had were much more direct and personal). This is one
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of the biggest advantages that the Bring Back Our Girls movement had through its
Twitter use. They were able to get their message out to wider audiences than if they had
started in a more insulated platform like Facebook or Instagram. Once the message
spread to users via Twitter, those users could then search out the movement on various
other platforms and follow accordingly.
The time in which the Bring Back Our Girls movement came about had its pros
and cons. In 2014, broadband penetration was spreading, and because of the decrease in
the cost of mobile devices, access was becoming more available to more people
worldwide. On the other hand, the social media platform most utilized by the Bring Back
Our Girls movement at the time was on a decline for both youth and adults alike. Twitter
was still their best option at the time, though, as it had the advantage of allowing users to
see and follow information based on interest in the content, and not a personal connection
to an individual.

Location, Location, Location: The Benefits and Struggles of the Location of the Bring
Back Our Girls Movement
The next important aspect as it relates to the digital nature of the Bring Back Our
Girls movement is the location of the movement. When looking at the location of the
movement, I examine both the location where the movement started, in this case Nigeria,
as well as the location to whom the movement is reaching out. In this section I discuss the
implications of location, including access, infrastructure, and the state of Nigeria as a
country as the movement came about.
The digital aspect of the Bring Back Our Girls movement started in Nigeria with
the first use of the hashtag #BringBackOurGirls coming from a Nigerian lawyer, Ibrahim

92

Abdullahi on April 23, 2014.261 The importance of this movement starting in Nigeria as it
relates to the digital aspect of this movement is important to examine. According to the
Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC), there were over 83 million active mobile
internet subscriptions by the beginning of 2015.262 In 2014, the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) estimated that 43% of Nigerians had access to the
internet, an increase from 2013 where only 38% of Nigerians had access.263
In Nigeria, and in much of the world, the increase of access to the internet was
spurred by mobile devices that were internet-enabled, which provided affordable services
to mobile users.264 The low cost of data services made mobile internet access attractive to
many youth in Nigeria with costs as low as $17 a month (USD) in January 2014, a price
that dropped to $7.50 a month by April of the following year. 265 This price was
significantly lower than fixed wireless access (FWA) that cost $63 a month in 2014.
The ability for individuals in Nigeria to access the internet is important as it
relates to the digital aspect of the Bring Back Our Girls movement. With upwards of 80%
of the Nigerian population having access to mobile phone services, this would allow
individuals in that country the ability to access and share information through
nontraditional media and social media platforms. 266 However, access does not mean easy
or complete access. Below I discuss some issues that are related to digital access and
infrastructure in Nigeria.
While mobile usage in Nigeria is growing, and mobile teledensity nears 100% and
with over 65 million active internet subscriptions,267 the quality of the service available to
the people of Nigeria is still lacking. According to the ITU, mobile broadband penetration
was only 10% in 2013.268 Internet speeds averaged just under 2 Mbps in 2014, with a
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worldwide average of nearly 4Mbps. 269 This means that for the majority of internet users
in Nigeria, while they have access to the internet, that access is not seamless, it is slow,
and ultimately for 90% of those using the internet, they are not getting the full benefits
the Internet has to offer just by simply having access to the internet. Even for those who
have access to broadband, that service can still be limited. It is reported that only 0.1% of
Nigerians had access to fix-broadband internet in 2013, meaning only around 15,000
subscribers were accessing consistent broadband speeds greater than 4 Mbps.270
Not only do many Nigerians have slower internet speeds, but they also have to
deal with infrastructure issues like power outages, which impacts their ability to use the
internet and their mobile phones. Many Nigerians have reported they have to use private
generators in order to maintain their connection to the internet during the frequent power
cuts the nation was experiencing in 2014. 271 With power outages reportedly occurring
daily between five and seven hours per day, many Nigerians must rely on alternative
electricity in order to utilize their technology, among other things.272 The financial burden
of having to pay for expensive back-up sources of energy not only puts a strain on the
individual citizens of Nigeria, but it has also caused many cybercafes in the area to
close.273
The issue of access to the adequate broadband and proper infrastructure to
maintain the access to and functionality of the internet and mobile devices creates a
battle for those using digital media as a platform for their social movement in Nigeria that
social movements located elsewhere do not have to deal with. In addition to the location
of the movement and the access and infrastructure posing a challenge for movement
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leaders, these issues also make it more difficult for the people where the movement is
taking place, in this case, Nigeria, to be as involved and invested in the movement.
However, as it so happened, the city of Port Harcourt in Nigeria was named as the
World Book Capital of 2014, and Obiageli Ezekwesili, the first person to promote the
hashtag, spoke at the event honoring the selection of Port Harcourt as the World Book
Capital of the year. This event brought international attention, and, during her speech,
Ezekwesili called the audience to work together in the rescue of the school girls.274 In
addition to having a strong hashtag, the Bring Back Our Girls movement got international
attention from this World Book Capital event that helped aid in the spreading of the
movement and cause.
The final aspect related to location I want to discuss is related to the ultimate
reason for this movement: the terrorist organization Boko Haram and their grasp on
Nigeria at the time. During this time, Nigeria as a whole was facing a large threat from
Boko Haram. In May of 2013, President Jonathan declared a state of emergency in three
northern states, including Borno, where the Chibok girls were abducted, stating that these
three states had already been overtaken by the radical group.275 Because of this ongoing
and wide-spread control of Boko Haram across Nigeria, this, understandably, takes time,
attention, energy, and resources from the people of Nigeria that, under different
circumstances, could be put toward other causes. Looking at this from Maslow’s
hierarchy of needs, the people of Nigeria were fighting for more basic necessities,
constantly, against Boko Haram, including safety, and without being able to fulfill that
need, it becomes difficult for other needs to take priority. This means, while families are
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worried about their own safety, it might be difficult for them to find the time, energy, or
ability to fight alongside the Bring Back Our Girls movement.
This is actually a strong argument for why the Bring Back Our Girls movement
needed to reach out internationally. With local resources limited, extending the call for
help and support to other places and people who are not dealing with the same immediate
threats and needs as those on location in Nigeria is a way to gain a level support the
movement might otherwise lack.
As mentioned above, the Bring Back Our Girls hashtag spread across the globe
and was able to reach and multiply across locations with more openly available access to
digital means and infrastructure. Great Britain had Internet connection in 84% of
households in 2014.276 Additionally, in the United States, around 80% of U.S. households
had high-speed Internet connection. 277
Reaching these locations across the globe was important for the Bring Back Our
Girls movement because of their digital access and infrastructure. With more widely
accessible Internet in places like Great Britain and the United States, the Bring Back Our
Girls movement was better able to reach larger audiences through their digital campaign,
despite their own limited digital access. While this will not solve their problem, garnering
an international following is something that can benefit a movement, because, as
discussed earlier, the size of a movement is important to its longevity and ultimate
success.
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Adapt or Disappear
Next, in relation to location, I want to explore the spreadability of the Bring Back
Our Girls movement. Specifically, I look at the ability of the movement to spread based
on the relationship the movement has to the digital realm, keeping time and location in
mind. Then, I look at issues concerned with spreadability, including echo chambers and
censorship.
The Bring Back Our Girls movement, despite facing the challenges of being
located in Nigeria, a part of the world with below average broadband speeds and access,
still managed to spread their message across the world. The ability to spread their
message was, in large part, due to the use of their social media hashtag. The use of a
hashtag allows a message to spread from network to network, creating new connections
and building new networks. Hashtags allow users to come together for the same cause
under one phrase that is easily searchable and easy to use. And while finding the
“official” social media accounts for the Bring Back Our Girls movement was not
streamlined, searching for and following the hashtag was, and it helped the movement
spread far and wide.
The way to create an effective hashtag is similar to some other common
communication techniques; be unique to your cause, be concise and clear, and evoke
emotion.278 Research on the use of hashtags on social media have found methods to
creating strong ones. The Bring Back Our Girls hashtag did this; the hashtag was directly
related to their cause and the tweets they shared along with it, it was concise and clear,
and it also managed to evoke emotion through the imagery created through the use of the
word “girls.” In addition to the emotional response from the use of the word “girl,” the
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hashtag also made a personal connection with those who used it through the use of the
word “our.” The hashtag never got changed to #BringBackTheirGirls or
#BringBackTheNigerianGirls, it remained and spread with the use of “our” girls. 279 This
connected all of the users of the hashtag personally to the missing girls. Those who
shared that hashtag were taking personal relation and claim to the missing girls. They
were not girls in the abstract. These 200+ girls were the world’s girls.
This hashtag created a connection between those who started the movement and
their audience to feel a connection to the girls who had been abducted. Not only did it
make a personal connection through the hashtag, the hashtag also identified the specific
outcome the movement was aiming to obtain. The hashtag was specific, it was clear, it
related directly to the movement’s cause, and it made the connection to the intended
audience. These methods helped the spreadability of the Bring Back Our Girls movement
on social media through their use of rhetorical digital techniques.

Internet Engagement: Brochureware
Brochureware is essentially when a movement uses the Internet to share
information about their cause. The Bring Back Our Girls movement sent out
brochureware to spread their message to a wide audience at an incredibly fast rate that
would not have otherwise been possible coming from this specific group of movement
leaders. As mentioned earlier, the fact that the Bring Back Our Girls movement was
organized and led by women, and more specifically young women, made it difficult for
their voices to be heard and taken seriously based on their specific cultural dynamics. The
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use of brochureware as a means of moving this movement forward gave those voices a
way to spread and spread quickly.

Internet Engagement: E-Mobilization
E-mobilization is a mix of traditional and non-traditional activism.280 The Bring
Back Our Girls movement engaged in e-mobilization through their use of online
communication in order to coordinated offline activism, specifically their marches and
international government involvement in their mission. Across the globe, BBOG rallies
were scheduled and documented via social media. 281 In addition to scheduling offline
rallies, the Bring Back Our Girls movement organized a Social Media March via
Facebook for May 8, 2014.
This type of Internet engagement also works as a powerful recruitment tool,
which is exactly what the Bring Back Our Girls movement needed in order to add
additional outside pressure to their government. This type of activism is powerful in that
it allows a movement to gather a large following, which then results in attention from
traditional media. For a movement that felt ignored by their own government,
international media attention was a positive step for to get attention from large audiences,
who would, ultimately, add additional pressure to their government.

Internet Engagement: Online Participation
Finally, the type of activism that the Bring Back Our Girls movement used on a
global scale was what is essentially online participation, specifically flash activism. Flash
activism is a form of activism where a movement gains a lot of attention in a very short
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period of time, similar to the power of a flash flood.282 Just like a flash flood, the power
of flash activism is not in its longevity, but rather in its massive and quick onset.
Flash activism was seen through the Bring Back Our Girls hashtag, which spread around
the world with millions of engagements in a short timeframe. The benefit of flash
activism is that movements that have this form of activism often have larger audiences
than something that was achieved offline, and the size of a movement is an important
aspect of the success of a movement. 283 One of the reasons why flash activism is able to
gather large amounts of engagement is because this form of online participation is lowstakes. In addition to being low-stakes, it is also low-cost, as the cost to participate in a
movement online is much lower than physically participating in a movement, and thus it
is much easier for people, especially young people, to engage.284
The Bring Back Our Girls movement came about in a significant time where not
only was social media growing rapidly, but so too was access to the internet, specifically
in Nigeria where the movement was centrally focused. Unfortunately, the main platform
used by the Bring Back Our Girls movement, Twitter, was on the decline both in
popularity with youth and adults alike, all of which created a dynamic landscape for this
movement to navigate in.
The location of the movement as it relates to the digital aspects of the movement
have also shown to be important as it relates to access, infrastructure, and the ability to
spread the message. While access and infrastructure are both growing in Nigeria,
broadband speeds are still below the world average, and issues with power outages
lasting for hours at a time add difficulties to continue spreading the message via the
digital world. The issue of communicating digitally was not only stunted by power

100

outages, but individuals who wanted to push through that obstacle were also then faced
with the expensive option of needing a personal generator to supplement electricity,
adding an additional strain to those who were trying to enact change.

Digital Limitations: Some Battles Proving Harder than Others
As it relates to the digital realm, the Bring Back Our Girls movement faced some
additional limitations to consider as well, including echo chambers and censorship.
Below I explore the impact these concerns had on the movement throughout the
development and continuation of the movement.
The issue of echo chambers is one that every social movement that utilizes digital
media must consider. While the arguments that echo chambers are a troublesome
hindrance to social movements in the digital sphere may not be as significant as they
once were, it is still an important aspect the Bring Back Our Girls movement has had to
manage.
To begin, the Bring Back Our Girls movement struggled with echo chambers in
that the only people originally talking about the movement were those in Nigeria who
were already active in the movement. This was a necessary aspect of the movement;
people in Nigeria did need to be the ones talking about, tweeting about, and bringing
attention to the movement. However, the conversations happening within the country
were not proving to be sufficient to propel the movement forward enough to create the
change they were aiming for.
As the movement moved outside of Nigeria, the argument against the real impact
this movement could have is that it only reached those who were already engaged in
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political activism, and then those are the only people who ultimately engage in the
movement’s activism. However, the Bring Back Our Girls movement was using social
media in order to get attention from a large audience, and from important international
figures in order to put enough pressure, both internally and externally, on the thenNigerian President Goodluck Jonathan. Having individuals who were already politically
active but had not heard about, or were not already working to rescue, the Chibok girls
learn about the Bring Back Our Girls movement and then begin participating helped the
movement gain the attention it was searching for.
In fact, people involved in political activism perhaps had more power and weight
behind their tweets than the average person. For example, seeing people such as First
Lady of the United States Michelle Obama, British Prime Minister David Cameron, CNN
reporter Jim Clancy, United States Secretary of State John Kerry, and the United States
Department of State tweet in support of the movement led to political action offline and
added social pressure to those in power who had not yet put effort in to support the
movement.
Another area of concern about echo chambers comes from partisan ideologies
only listening to and hearing similar partisan ideologies. However, the Bring Back Our
Girls movement was not divided by political agenda, like some social movements. That
lack of division made it easier for individuals across various political ideologies to come
together in support of this movement. There was no real echo chamber here for the
movement to get stuck in from a political ideology perspective, at least not abroad.
Additionally, as Ibrahim Adbullahi, the first person credited with tweeting the
Bring Back Our Girls hashtag, stated, nearly everyone has girls in their lives, and the
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hashtag appealed to almost everyone because of that. 285 This helped keep the Bring Back
Our Girls movement from falling completely into the trap of an echo chamber through its
digital communication. Because the movement was not appealing to just one type of
person, a divisive belief system, or a controversial topic, the movement was able to gain
traction with a wide variety of individuals. With large amounts of online discussion of the
movement, traditional media then began covering and discussing the movement. 286 And,
as studies have shown, media coverage has the ability to influence policy, 287 which is
ultimately what the leaders of the Bring Back Our Girls movement wanted: governmental
changes that protected and brought the missing girls back from the Boko Haram.
Bring Back Our Girls’ large appeal to virtually any and everyone was an
advantage for the movement. This was an advantage that helped them avoid one of the
bigger concerns for digital social movements of echo chambers: keeping the message
stuck and repeating amongst the same group of individuals, at least from a political
mindset. The movement did struggle with echo chambers in that it struggled to reach
people outside of those who initially cared, and perhaps adds to why the movement
fizzled out in the way that it did.
The second potential limitation the Bring Back Our Girls had to face was that of
censorship. In 2014, Nigeria’s freedom on the net status was considered “partly free,”
scoring a 33 out of 100 (zero being the best and 100 being the worst).288 The categories
used to determine the level of freedom on the internet include obstacles to access (10 out
of 25), limits on content (8 out of 35), and violations of user rights (15 out of 40), again,
the closer to zero, the closer to being considered free. I have discussed limits concerning
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access above, and for this section, I focus more specifically on the limits on content and
violation of user rights issues that Nigeria has faced.
Online media in Nigeria is generally free from restrictions, and, as of 2014,
authorities had not blocked or filtered out content, in large part due to the complexities of
the internet infrastructure, making it difficult for authorities to carry out filtering or
censorship.289 However, issues that have happened in the past, as they relate to content or
websites being inaccessible, have been documented as technical issues rather than
governmental intervention.290 In 2013, a filtering device from the company Blue Coat, a
company known for monitoring and filtering and is used in countries such as China,
Russia, and Bahrain, was discovered on private ISP in Nigeria, causing concern when it
comes to filtration and censorship of content. Additionally, in 2015, a local Reuters
correspondent was arrested under allegations of espionage as it related to the 2015
election.291 Citizens suspected this was an act of censorship by their government to keep
the outside world from gaining information about their upcoming election. These
instances of control and censorship create a feeling of uncertainty when it comes to what
Nigerians feel they are able to see and say online.
While on the surface social media sites such as YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter
are freely available and highly popular in Nigeria, government officials have made
statements about clamping down on social media. 292 This was seen, in part, due to online
communication that has been critical of the government on the internet, and the
government’s response has given Nigerians the impression that online censorship is on
the horizon.293 With the threat of censorship seeming impending for Nigerians, this could
impact the way they communicate online in one of two ways: first, as a result of potential
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increased censorship, this could cause an influx of creating and sharing critical
communication about the government while doing so is still a possibility, but it could
also lead to self-censorship with the threat of government intervention looming.
Self-censorship is a form of censorship that is not top-down and implemented by
the government or authorities directly, but rather it is when the individual chooses to not
communicate in what might be considered controversial or critical rhetoric in order to
avoid any potential consequences from the government. While the Nigerian constitution
includes freedom of expression and of the press, actions that have been taken cause pause
for individuals as to what they do or do not say online.294 Citizens in Nigeria do practice a
level of self-censorship, but in recent times have become more open about discussing
previously taboo topics online. Unfortunately, this freedom from self-censorship has not
expanded to all topics. Nigeria’s anti-LGBT climate has caused many individuals to filter
what they discuss as it relates to their sexuality online and even self-censor personal
information.295
The self-censorship is not only seen on an individual level, but also from
journalists throughout the country as well. For instance, during the coverage of the 2015
Nigerian presidential election, there was a large number of violent attacks against
journalists by both Nigerian security forces and militant groups. These attacks led to
journalists self-censoring and cautiously reporting on the elections in order to avoid a
similar fate.296
Self-censorship, as it relates to the Bring Back Our Girls movement, is important
because a large portion of this movement criticized the way the government had been,
and was currently, handling the kidnapping of the girls and their rescue. Leaders and
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members of the movement did not believe the government took the abduction seriously
and, as such, were not doing enough to return all of the abducted schoolgirls home safely.
Being critical of the government, while technically legal in Nigeria, still posed potential
threats to individuals and reporters alike. This threat was especially high during the 20142015 years as Nigeria was in the midst of a presidential election, and being critical of the
current president and leadership put his future as the president of Nigeria in jeopardy.
This is why the ability to spread the Bring Back Our Girls message outside of the country
and across the world benefited the movement; if concerns of censorship within the
country gave individuals pause on speaking out or speaking out as frequently and
critically against the government as they felt necessary for fear of governmental
retaliation, those outside of the country could do so without that same fear.

Bring Back Our Girls as a Social Movement
The following section explores the Bring Back Our Girls movement’s will to
change an element of the current social structure, the sustained interaction between those
challenging authority and those in authority, the desired shift from what is to what ought
to be, the organization of the movement, and ultimately the size of the membership.
Below I examine each of these established criteria that are used to classify a social
movement and discuss their significance and impact as it relates specifically to the Bring
Back Our Girls movement.
The first element of a social movement is that it must be striving for a change in
the current social structure. As discussed in Chapter One of this dissertation, while
defining a social movement is complex, one of the most common threads seen across
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scholars is the notion of creating change, of shifting from how things currently are to how
the members of a movement think they ought to be. The Bring Back Our Girls
movement, at its core, is rooted in this desire for change.
From an outside view of the movement, the BBOG movement may not seem to be
working to change elements in the social structure of post-2014 Nigeria. However, as one
delves deeper into the movement, it is clear that this movement was more than just a call
to action to retrieve these abducted girls. Leaders of the Bring Back Our Girls movement
felt that the government was not working in favor of the people and was not working hard
enough to return the abducted girls from the Boko Haram. This need for change in the
current structure is what ultimately sparked the movement. Adding to the change in social
structure, the Bring Back Our Girls movement has been a women-led, young-girlsaffected issue, which in and of itself has also challenged the social structure of the
patriarchal, male-dominated society of Nigeria. 297 Women calling for change in the maledominated social and political structure in Nigeria have contributed to the social
movement status of the Bring Back Our Girls movement.
On top of the female leaders within Nigeria calling for attention to the abduction
of youth female school students, Pakistani youth female education advocate Malala
Yousafzai became an international spokesperson for the movement. Malala represents a
change in an element of the current social structure as well. Yousafzai was shot in the
head by the Taliban in Pakistan for very similar reasons the Chibok girls were abducted
by Boko Haram in Nigeria: the perception that the pursuit of education for young girls
was seen as evil, bad, sinful under certain interpretations of Muslim law.298 Not only did
Malala continue her education after surviving being shot in the head, she continued to
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push for the change in the culture surrounding female education by becoming an
advocate across the world. As she joined forces with the BBOG movement, at the still
young age of sixteen years old, she represented a change that the other leaders and
members of the Bring Back Our Girls movement wanted to see in their current social
structure: an educated, empowered, young woman whom people listened to and valued.
The significance of BBOG being women-led and directly impacting young girls is
an important one to consider when studying this movement. Specifically when examining
the Nigerian political realm, women today still have a minimal role in politics with their
rights being protected only as recently as 1979.299 Additionally, women have been, and
continue to be, marginalized in both the public and their private lives in Nigeria. 300 With
the Bring Back Our Girls movement, the leaders are working to prioritize these young
girls who were abducted for simply obtaining an education, a threat that young girls are
particularly vulnerable to in the country. Women and young girls pushing for the
advocacy and protection of other young girls in Nigeria is a shift in the current social
structure.
On a political level, leaders of the BBOG movement have had issues with how the
then-president Goodluck Jonathan handled the initial abduction of the girls as well as his
response thereafter. When the abduction initially happened, Jonathan made no official
statement. Two days after the abduction, Jonathan went on a political rally where he still
did not comment on the girls’ abduction or what he planned to do to ensure their safe
return.301 Jonathan’s lack of response to the abduction is, in part, what spurred the
movement to seek change in the social structure. Leaders of the movement did not feel as
though the girls who were abducted were valued by their president, and felt instead as if
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his upcoming reelection campaign was more important than the safe return of his own
youth. This is when international attention to the movement was not only valued, but
also, some felt, needed, as a way to put pressure on the Nigerian president to act as the
leader of the country and make efforts to rescue the girls of Chibok.
All of these efforts for change relate to the current social structure in Nigeria,
from young girls being allowed an education to the voices of women being valued and
taken seriously in the political realm to ultimately simply seeming to value the lives of
the girls who had been abducted. They represented a shift that this movement was
attempting to make from what is to what they strongly believed ought to be. Young girls
ought to be able to get an education safely. Women ought to be able to express their
voices and be heard and taken seriously in politics. The lives of the girls who had been
taken by the terrorist group Boko Haram ought to be as important to the president, to the
country, and to the world as any other girl in the world.
The significance of this shift from what is to what the movement believes ought to
be is a large one to examine from the perspective of an international social movement,
especially a social movement that is situated in Africa and spreads to Western countries.
Questions around Western aid to African countries are wrapped in colonialism and the
white savior complex.302
This relationship between the West attempting to help “develop” or “fix” African
countries and the Bring Back Our Girls movement is essentially because of Westerners
seeing the ideas that Boko Haram hold as “backwards”: that Western ideas and ways of
life are wrong and that girls should not be in school and getting an education, among
other things. So, this particular case of wanting to shift from what is to what ought to be
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is a unique intersection of the Western ideas and norms becoming a part of Nigerian
culture. This creates a difficult idea of what to fight for when studying this case as it
relates to what the role of the West ought to be. On the one hand, is intervening and
pushing Western ideals and beliefs on a different culture with a different set of values
what ought to be? On the other hand, is intervening simply in the best interest of the
young girls who were abducted, and thus what ought to be? Leaders of this movement
argue the latter; they believe strongly in the pressure that the West can provide to their
current government to act on behalf of these abducted young girls.303
In fact, it was only after the Bring Back Our Girls hashtag spread internationally,
getting attention from prominent political figures that Nigerian president Jonathan finally
spoke publicly about the abduction. 304 It was through this international attention that
youth activist Malala Yousafzai became involved in the movement, and it was only after
his meeting with her that Jonathan agreed to meet with the parents of the abducted
girls.305 The attention and intervention from the West and others across the globe in and
of itself is a shift away from what some view as what ought to be done when it comes
problems taking place in Nigeria and elsewhere.
It is not just the attempted shift from what is to what ought to be that makes the
Bring Back Our Girls movement a social movement, it is during this attempted change,
the continued interaction between those who are challenging authority and those who are
in authority that is important. This is a complex area for the BBOG movement as well,
because, from a global perspective, that conversation has very much dwindled. However,
the local voices that have been challenging the authority from the beginning continue to
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do so to this day. The other complexity here is wrapped around to whom the movement is
speaking; the Nigerian government, Boko Haram, or both.
When exploring the communication between the Bring Back Our Girls movement
and the authority of the Nigerian government, it has been complicated from the day of the
abduction. Starting on April 14, 2014, the Nigerian government had not been clear on the
severity or the intervention the government had made in relation to the abducted girls.
The government originally stated that around 100 students were missing, while parents
and girls who had escaped were saying more than 200 girls were still missing, and two
days later the government finally came out stating that most of the girls had been returned
and only eight remained missing.306 By mid-April, a government source attempted to
explain the discrepancy with the number of girls missing. The communication between
the BBOG movement continues in this way, back and forth, at, rather than with each
other, until intervention from youth activist Malala Yousafzai met with President
Jonathan and convinced him to meet directly with members of the BBOG movement and
parents of missing girls.
The dialogue between local BBOG members and the Nigerian government has,
and continues to be, tense. Bring Back Our Girls protests were banned from the capital in
the summer of 2014, citing a security threat as the reason.307 The president of Nigeria at
the time of the abduction called the movement politically motivated. 308 The movement
continued to accuse the government of not caring enough or doing enough for the return
of the girls.309 Eventually, Jonathan was even accused of rejecting an offer from Britain
to rescue the Chibok girls, which he denied.310 This type of communication from those
most intimately involved in the movement and the government they have been trying to
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work with is, in fact, sustained, albeit strained, but meeting the qualification for Bring
Back Our Girls to be a social movement.
The communication between BBOG and the Nigerian government escalated as
the movement gained international attention as well, when followers of the movement
reached out with the same message: Bring Back Our Girls. This communication was less
sustained, but represented more of what Bennett and Fielding refer to as flash activism,
discussed more below.311 This communication happened in large amounts and happened
very quickly, and the impact of this communication from the members of the BBOG
movement to the Nigerian government added pressure to President Jonathan to speak out
on the abduction and ultimately to live up to the responsibilities to the Nigerian people. 312
The communication from the movement to the government did not end with Jonathan,
and the newly elected president Muhammadu Buhari addressed the missing girls in his
inaugural speech, promising the government would not claim they had defeated Boko
Haram until all of the girls were freed.313
The communication from the people of Nigeria and those communicating
internationally via social media to ‘Bring Back Our Girls’ has been mostly directed to the
Nigerian government, calling for their intervention to return the missing girls. Even with
this direct pressure on the Nigerian government, as of Spring 2020, there are still over
100 girls missing.314 The fact that there are still so many girls who have not been rescued
and returned home highlights, to some, the inefficiency of the Nigerian government, and
is argued to be the reason Goodluck Jonathan lost the 2015 election. 315 However, it was
not the Nigerian government who abducted the girls, but Boko Haram, and
communication directly to Boko Haram had been limited.
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Though limited in their communication to Boko Haram, BBOG youth leader
Malala Yousafzai, has multiple times reached out directly to Boko Haram, calling on
them to think of their own families, especially their daughters and sisters, and to release
the school girls back to their families. 316 In response to Malala’s requests, and the Bring
Back Our Girls movement as a whole, Boko Haram released a video, mocking the Bring
Back Our Girls movement.317 So while the majority of the communication to and from
the BBOG movement has been with the Nigerian government, there have been instances
where communication has gone to and from Boko Haram as well.
The next aspect that sets a movement apart is their organization. The Bring Back
Our Girls movement is organized when it comes to leadership, events, and the message of
the movement. The movement began at a protest and the hashtag was first shared by a
Nigerian lawyer, Ibrahim M. Abdullahi, and while this is where the call to “bring back
our girls” originated, Abdullahi is not the leader of the movement. The movement’s
leadership consists of five women; Aisha Yesufu, Florence Ozor, Maureen Kabrik, Dudu
Bakam, and Oby Ezekwesili. Each of them had important roles in putting pressure on the
Nigerian government, even through regime change, to return the missing girls. The
women have organized daily meetings at the Unity Fountain in Abuja, along with over
200 protests inside and outside of Nigeria between 2014 and 2018.318 The five original
leaders of the movement only stepped down from their leadership roles when Ezekwesili
announced her run for president, and the other four women joined in her campaign,
noting that this was the next step they felt they had to take in order to ultimately achieve
the movement’s goals.319 The change in leadership in 2018 resulted in the following
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taking the various positions within the movement: Yassin (coordinator), Nifemi Onifade
(spokesperson) and Gapani Yanga (sit-out coordinator).320
The movement’s organization is significant because having clearly identified
leadership helps those who are rallying around the movement know who to look toward
for guidance, information on events, and any results that may or may not be happening.
The specific leaders of the BBOG movement also came about naturally in a grassroots
nature. Similar to other grassroots movements such as Mothers Against Drunk Driving
(now Mothers Against Destructive Decisions) and the Million Mom March, Bring Back
Our Girls developed from a local group of individuals who have come together to solve a
problem, collectively advocating for change. A social movement developing from the
ground-up as a grassroots organization is a positive step in developing a strong social
movement.
However, the positive impact of a grassroots movement does not end at the
singular group development, but rather requires multiple local groups developing around
the cause in various locations that are organized by various individuals who are not in
power but are fighting for the same cause of the movement as a whole.321 This is where
BBOG did not continue with their grassroots development. While the movement began
with grassroots leadership, the movement was mostly centered around that leadership and
did not have groups around Nigeria or the world starting their own “chapters” of the
BBOG movement to keep the it moving. This lack of spreading of the movement makes
it difficult as it relates to the impact and longevity of the movement as a whole.
In addition to the organization of the movement, in the digital world that the
Bring Back Our Girls movement has infiltrated, their digital organization is also
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important. Bring Back Our Girls has an organized website with easily viewed contact
information for current leaders including phone numbers, email addresses, and social
media handles. In addition to contact information, details on upcoming protests and sitins are also organized on the website along with their mission and goals. However, while
the website does have this information, it is not very detailed, and can leave those
wanting to become more involved in the movement looking for more.
In addition to their somewhat lacking website, BBOG’s social media are not
easily found or identified, in part, due to their lack of verification. If one begins on the
BBOG website, there are links to the Bring Back Our Girls Facebook and Twitter,
however, the social media pages are difficult to find on their own. Neither the Facebook
nor the Twitter accounts are verified, which can make identifying which page belongs to
the actual movement difficult for those who want to be involved. Not having verified
social media accounts, especially for a movement that uses social media, is a hindrance in
the organization of the Bring Back Our Girls movement that has made growing and
sustaining membership difficult.
Exploring the membership size is the next important aspect when looking at a
social movement. Membership size is significant as it relates to the longevity of a social
movement, and ultimately sets movements apart from pressure groups, lobbies, and
campaigns.322 The Bring Back Our Girls movement has explicitly expressed the value
that outside pressure and attention brings to their cause and the impact large membership
has had on their movement.
At the height of the Bring Back Our Girls movement, those showing support for
the movement had utilized the Bring Back Our Girls hashtag more than one million times
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in less than three weeks.323 In under a month, the movement had amassed around two
million uses of the Bring Back Our Girls hashtag, with posts coming from prominent
political figures such as Michelle and Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, and David
Cameron, as well as celebrities including Kerry Washington, and Chris Brown.324 The
seemingly large size of membership and attention from celebrities and politicians via
digital means are what brought international attention to this movement, which ultimately
put pressure on the Nigerian government to respond to the abduction. The U.S.
government, the British government, and even the United Nations all got involved,
reaching out to the Nigerian government to discuss how they could assist in safely
rescuing and returning the missing Nigerian school girls.325 The impact of the massive
following of this movement in a short amount of time is what finally led to a response
from the president of Nigeria, something that the movement had been waiting for since
the abduction happened.
However, after the popularity of the hashtag campaign died down, the number of
followers of the movement fell as well. Looking at the social media pages, for example,
the Twitter profile that is linked on the Bring Back Our Girls has 35,000 followers, and
their official Facebook page has just over 8000 followers.326 The Bring Back Our Girls
movement is not exclusively online, though, so while this is one metric to use when
looking at current followers of the movement, it is not the only one of significance for
BBOG. In fact, daily protests and sit-ins in Abuja, as well as weekly and bi-weekly
events held in Lagos, are still attended by members of the movement regularly, though
those numbers, too, are dwindling.327 As national and global attention refocused on
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various other events, the Bring Back Our Girls movement lost followers, and many to this
day are not aware of the status of the missing Chibok girls.328
The fluctuation in the membership for the Bring Back Our Girls movement has
significant importance to the movement as a whole. When followers were massive and
attention was directed right at Nigeria and the missing young girls, the Nigerian
government could no longer avoid the situation and had to make efforts to find and
rescue the girls. However, as attention and membership waned, the government’s
involvement in rescuing the girls also dissipated. The wide international attention did not
bring all of the girls home, but it did put a magnifying glass on how the Nigerian
government was handling the abductions and gave a louder voice to those who had been
fighting on the ground in Nigeria from day one to rescue the girls.
As membership faded over the years, knowledge of the situation, and some might
argue, care for the missing girls, too faded. Sizable membership has had a direct
relationship with the longevity of the Bring Back Our Girls movement here. There are
still many people in Nigeria fighting for the return of the girls, but globally, that fight is
no longer there, and, six years later, more than 100 girls are still missing.
The sizable membership is a significant factor in the sustainability of a
movement, and unfortunately for BBOG, the large membership that developed
internationally through digital means dissipated over time as other news stories took
precedence and the missing Chibok girls received very little international attention,
resulting in a decline of followers. In Nigeria, though, some followers are still showing
up daily, weekly, and bi-weekly to protests and sit-outs to keep the Nigerian
government’s attention on the 100+ girls who are still missing some six years later.
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From the ultimate shift from what is to what ought to be, to the communication
between the movement and the Nigerian government, to the organization and use of
social media platforms, and ultimately the fluctuating membership size, the Bring Back
Our Girls movement is indeed a social movement, but it is clear to see that some aspects
of this movement have impacted the longevity and potentially even the impact that the
movement as a whole has had over the years. Next, I will look at the specific forms of
activism Bring Back Our Girls has done over the years both traditionally and nontraditionally, as well as discussing the four styles of Internet engagement, and finally I
discuss the connections among youth, digital, social movement, and activism.

Bring Back Our Girls Activism
The BBOG movement has utilized both traditional and non-traditional forms of
activism. First, I look at where the movement started, beginning with a very traditional
form of activism, a protest. Nigerians began marching immediately after the young girls
were abducted from Chibok. The protest was originally meant to be a one-day event in
Nigeria’s capital, Abuja. However, a relative of an abducted girl begged for the small
group of protestors not to leave, arguing that the government would forget about the
people of Chibok and the abducted girls if the group disappeared. 329 The protests did, in
fact, continue with several hundred attendees marching in the rain toward the National
Assembly, nearly all dressed in red and carrying signs to find and return the missing girls.
The purpose of these protests taking place in different parts of Nigeria was to
bring together the people of Nigeria, rich and poor, “the high and the low,” people with
influence coming together with people from Chibok who felt they had no influence.330
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All of these Nigerian people’s voices came together with the hopes of getting national
attention from the Nigerian government. With such great attention and voices expressing
their concern over the issue, the government could not ignore the abduction and they
would have to come together and “do the right thing” to rescue the abducted girls.331
The Bring Back Our Girls marches continued, with a march on the Nigerian
Defense Headquarters in Abuja on May 6, 2014. After the movement grew international
attention via social media, people around the globe began joining in protests at the
Nigerian embassies in London, Los Angeles, and New York.332 By June 2014, however,
the Nigerian government had banned demonstrations about the abduction of the Chibok
girls, citing a security threat to citizens in the capital. 333
This ban has not stopped the Bring Back Our Girls movement from continuing
with their activism in both traditional and non-traditional settings. To date, there are daily
gatherings in Abuja at the Unity Fountain from 5 p.m.–6 p.m., and in Lagos there are
gatherings every Saturday at the Falomo Roundabout and every other Saturday at the
International School from noon to 1 p.m.334 These gatherings may not be as massive as
the original protests, but members of the movement continue to show up and fight for the
still over 200 missing girls of Chibok.
The use of traditional forms of activism by the Bring Back our Girls movement is
significant because it first relates to the grassroots nature of this movement. Bring Back
Our Girls came about from a group of locals who were intimately connected to the girls
who had been abducted and all came together to try and get the attention of their
government. There was no “higher up” who attempted to control the movement or its

119

members, but rather a group of equals who all worked together toward a similar goal of
bringing back the missing girls.
While the Bring Back Our Girls movement began with and continues to utilize
traditional forms of activism like protests and sit-ins, they gained international attention
through their use of non-traditional forms of activism. On April 23, 2014, the hashtag
#BringBackOurGirls was first used after being chanted at the World Book Capital
celebration in Port Harcourt. The phrase spread via Twitter across the globe and was used
by celebrities and world leaders alike. Within a month, the hashtag was shared on Twitter
alone more than four million times. 335
This form of activism, while non-traditional, was an avenue in which the message
about the abducted girls from Chibok, and the dangers of Boko Haram that the people of
Nigeria have to face every day, was able to reach an audience that otherwise might not
have heard or cared about. However, simply posting a photo holding a sign that says
“Bring Back Our Girls” or sharing a tweet using the #BringBackOurGirls hashtag alone
is not where the use of non-traditional activism stopped for the Bring Back Our Girls
movement. This movement also worked to incorporate both traditional and nontraditional forms of activism together in order to not just make their cause known but to
also ultimately make change and rescue the abducted Chibok girls.
Bring Back Our Girls has used social media to spread their message across the
world. With their ultimate goal being to put pressure on the Nigerian government to pay
attention to the people in this poorer part of Nigeria and to act on their behalf in the
rescue of over 200 young girls, international viral attention was right on course with what
the movement needed. This international attention was not exclusively through social
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media, though. Florida Representative Frederica Wilson, for example, is a U.S.
Congresswoman who continues to fight at the congressional level to rescue the abducted
girls of Chibok.336 California Representative Barbara Lee, a representative to the U.N.
General Assembly, has also worked to bring bipartisan collaboration on the issue.337 And
Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi continues to wear red on Wednesdays to show solidarity
with the Bring Back Our Girls cause, working to make sure the girls are not forgotten in
the U.S. Congress as they continue to work toward their release. 338 Outside of the United
States, the International Red Cross and Swiss government mediated the release of twentyone Chibok girls following two months of negotiations in 2017, three years after they
were abducted.339 This international effort from everyday citizens to political leaders
speaks to the impact of blending digital and traditional activism.

Lost in the Aftermath of a Flash Flood of Activism: Why Bring Back Our Girls
Seemed to Disappear After their Massive Hashtag Campaign
From a global perspective, the Bring Back Our Girls movement used digital
activism most notably to spread awareness. However, the use of digital activism was
taken on more by followers of the movement than movement leaders themselves. The
hashtag campaign blew up internationally, but the Bring Back Our Girls movement’s
digital footprint aside from that has been rather small. Below I explore implications of the
movement relying so heavily on their digital activism and not planning for the future.
Much of the conversation surrounding the Bring Back Our Girls movement
focuses on the digital activism that the movement became known for, their hashtag
campaign.340 The #BringBackOurGirls campaign gained international attention with
celebrities and politicians, along with average everyday people suddenly flooding Twitter
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along with other social media platforms with a very clear call to action: returning the
abducted Chibok girls. In a few short weeks, the #BringBackOurGirls hashtag had been
used over a million times worldwide. 341 And while this is an impressive and viral aspect
of the movement, it is virtually where the digital activism ends.
To date, the Bring Back Our Girls digital presence has remained limited aside
from the hashtag campaign. The movement leaders continue to post on their social media
accounts, but those posts are less forms of activism and more information sharing,
reminding people how many girls are still missing and how long it has been since they
were abducted. There are fewer instances of calls to action, fewer international and
digital rallies being organized, and fewer ways for members to get or stay involved with
the movement.
The movement has not had an official end, and there are still dozens of girls
missing, of course. But based on the digital presence of the movement, both from leaders
and followers alike, that is an easy conclusion to draw. The Bring Back Our Girls
movement essentially got lost online without a follow-through of next steps of where to
go or what to do after sharing their selfie along with the hashtag.
As communication scholars continue to study social movements, specifically
digital social movements, this is an important lesson to take away from the Bring Back
Our Girls movement. This movement has shown that massive amounts of people around
the world can, and will, rally around an important cause. People are even willing to move
further than simply sharing content about the cause and including their personal image
attached to the cause as seen with the selfies as a part of the hashtag campaign. Bring
Back Our Girls also shows the power of this kind of attention through large and
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widespread gathering of not just everyday Internet users, but also political leaders with
potential international pull and power. The Bring Back Our Girls movement seemingly
had the perfect storm of digital activism in front of them. They brought together a large,
captivated audience through anger at atrocious act and had powerful forces that seemed
ready and willing to intervene however they could. Nevertheless, the movement still
seemed to fizzle out without all of the girls being returned.

Activism, Slacktivism, Both, or Neither?
A common question surrounding the Bring Back Our Girls movement is whether
the acts of the movement were activism or simply feel-good slacktivism from a group of
young online people with no real vested interest in the movement or the end result,
whenever it may come. Research has shown, though, that young people are, in fact, using
social media as a way to connect with others and to produce and share information.342
These are steps to being a part of participatory culture, which is ultimately changing the
way people operate and their expectations about how to approach various activities
ranging from learning and creating to civic and community engagement. So, by this
understanding, young people may not, from a traditional perspective, be seen as
participating in activism, but to these people who engage in and embrace participatory
culture, this is, in fact, seen as a productive kind of activism.
Below I explore additional ways in which the Bring Back Our Girls movement worked to
overcome the issue of slacktivism using the Clark and Marchi’s ladder of political
engagement to highlight the importance of each step taken, and where in this climb the
movement struggled.
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Sharing: The First Step Up the Ladder
Sharing content is the first step of moving up the ladder of political engagement.
This includes sharing content about the movement, retweeting or sharing a post from the
movement, either from leaders or other members, and ultimately doing what one can to
spread the movement’s message far and wide. This is important for social movements
because it is through this first step that individuals are really able to bypass gatekeepers
of traditional media and to share and attempt to make known the issues that they are
concerned with.
The Bring Back Our Girls movement did exactly this. They used social media to
create their own news. They created a hashtag that spread across the world and gained
attention to a cause that they deemed important. It was not just the leaders spreading and
sharing their message anymore. Because of their use of digital technologies, outsiders
were able to hear about this cause and they, too, were able to share the message. It was
through this step that the BBOG movement was able to circumvent traditional media by
going through nontraditional means in order to get the worldwide attention that they
decided their movement needed. Their ultimate hope was to put pressure on their own
government to act.
This first step is relatively low-stakes for those who participated in it, though.
That means that British people who shared tweets with the #BringBackOurGirls hashtag
were not really risking much by doing so; they were not sticking their necks out for the
cause through a share. The low cost of this step is not to be diminished, though, because
it is the first step toward future engagement. If individuals are not sharing information
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about the movement online, then they are not likely to continue to climb the ladder for
that particular cause. This is the first step that shows true interest in a cause.

Inserting Oneself into the Story: A Second Step Up the Ladder
Next, the BBOG movement provided participants an opportunity to insert
themselves into the story on social media through the use of the Bring Back Our Girls
hashtag campaign. This campaign was two-fold in that there was the hashtag attached to
tweets shared across social media, but the movement also encouraged participants to take
pictures of themselves holding a sign that said #BringBackOurGirls. These were two
ways where members can insert themselves into the Bring Back Our Girls story.
Specifically, including a picture holding a sign that said #BringBackOurGirls, by
including the hashtag in the post, individuals of no political or social significance got the
sense of being included in making a change.
Posing in a picture along with the hashtag not only appealed to the youth, it
potentially gave them a sense of empowerment and agency. Research on images of
oneself that are shared online (selfies) highlights various reasons why people share these
images online. For instance, Cruz and Thornham have found consistently that selfies have
been a source of empowerment feelings for individuals who post them, and those selfies
help individuals build identity performance in the social media era.343 As it relates to the
Bring Back Our Girls movement, the posting of selfies with the Bring Back Our Girls
hashtag was not only an easy way for individuals to participate in the movement., but
also to build an identity of someone who cared, of someone who wanted to be a part of
the change to rescue the abducted Chibok girls.
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While this was a way for individuals across the globe to insert themselves into the
story, the Bring Back Our Girls movement did not provide additional ways, resources, or
steps for those who became interested in the movement to do much other than post their
pictures or share the hashtag. The inserting oneself into the story ended digitally with the
pictures and hashtags. Without a step forward, interested participants were not able to
take the final step of making the story their own in order to fully transition from interest
to participation.

Making the Story their Own: Where Bring Back Our Girls Fell Short
What this movement lacked, was the ability for users to make their own story as it
related to the Bring Back Our Girls movement. Because of the distance those outside of
Nigeria were to the cause, both physically, and perhaps even emotionally insofar as it
came to being able to relate to the mass abduction as a whole, it was difficult for this
movement to sustain its massive influx of attention. Those who had been involved in the
movement thus far were not as easily able to connect emotionally with the cause enough
to move into more tangible forms participation. There was also difficulty, especially
without the explicit help from movement leaders, for followers of the movement to make
the story their own to push them into the actual participation stage of activism.
The inability for users to make the story their own resulted in a disconnection
from the movement at large. Without more direction, simply sharing a post or retweeting
a tweet seemed sufficient enough because there was nothing more that other users outside
of those immediately affected knew to do; they had no other connection to the cause
other than sharing the tweet and/or photo using the hashtag.
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This speaks to some of the difficulty of social movements reaching out
internationally might face. A movement can create their own news and make their cause
popular, and it can give people a way to participate through a hashtag campaign, but if
others are not able to make the story their own and connect on a personal level and do
something on the ground, those followers’ engagement in the movement wanes. As a
chart from Topsy shows, the hashtag hit its peak on April 10, 2014, and immediately
began declining just one day later.344 For a social movement that is already physically
distant from those being vocal on its behalf, not having a clearly established next step
forward leaves too much ambiguity and difficulty for followers to make the movement
their own, take it up, and become active participants outside of online engagement.
With no clear next steps and this lack of connection, the Bring Back Our Girls
movement is often dismissed or labeled as a lesson in slacktivism of what not to do. But
there is more to learn here than simply brushing this movement of as a failure because of
lazy, young people only willing to click the ‘Share’ button. The takeaway from this
movement as a whole is the importance of looking for and planning for the next step.
After getting the rally cry to bring back the girls spread across the globe, then what?
What was the movement’s next step? What was the next step for the followers of the
movement? Without that clearly denotated and shared as widely as the hashtag itself,
participants, and specifically outsiders, will not know what else to do and how else to
contribute. Taking a look at the ultimate end result and then working backward, step by
step, as much as possible, lining the path from point A to point B is an important step to
keep digital social movements from getting lost in the aftermath of their flash flood
activism.
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I do not, of course, argue that issues as complex as negotiating with terrorist
groups like Boko Haram can be solved with a more detailed plan from movement leaders.
I am arguing that for the movement to stay in the forefront of people’s minds, to continue
getting political and international attention, a movement cannot rest on one large swell,
but rather continue to build from swell to swell.

Conclusion
This chapter has focused on the Bring Back Our Girls movement, starting with the
unique connection BBOG has to youth, moving into the relationship the movement has
with the digital realm, what makes Bring Back Our Girls an actual social movement,
focusing on the specific activism that has been done over the years, and finally ending on
a discussion of the efforts of the movement in relation to the argument of activism versus
slacktivsm.
In the section focusing on youth, I highlight the connection the movement has had
with being youth-affected, midly youth-led, and the involvement of youth as online
activists. I concluded the youth section with an important discussion about the
implications behind the rhetoric used throughout the movement, including the use of
“girls” in the movement’s name, and the idea of education as a rescue narrative. By
bringing attention to the young age of the girls who were abducted, and drawing on the
emotional appeal, especially of those in the West, of the importance of education, created
an image of a vulnerable person that they should help. Drawing upon the need to help the
vulnerable, and this idea that education is the answer to help “save” people is perhaps
some of the strongest moves the Bring Back Our Girls movement made in their existence.
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Where their connection and usage of the digital realm fell short or became disjointed, the
emotional connection to the movement was what got so many people invested so quickly.
I ended with a discussion on where and how the Bring Back Our Girls movement
stalled and fizzled out due to a lack of future direction and inability for members to
connect deeply with the cause and make it their own. While the initial emotional
connection to the movement drew in people, the distance between them and the
movement made it difficult to have a deeper connection to the cause. The issue was far
away, the problem seemed like something out of their immediate ability to change, and
so, outside of sharing Tweets and posting pictures as forms of support, there were no real
next steps for those online activists. I concluded with what I argue future digital social
movements, and scholars in the area, can learn from this movement as opposed to
brushing it off as a complete failure.
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Chapter 4: Parkland: Contemporary Digital Era Youth Social Movement Activism

On February 14th, 2018, in Parkland Florida, the students of Marjory Stoneman
Douglas (MSD) High School experienced six minutes that would change their lives
forever as shots rang through the halls of their campus, resulting in seventeen lives lost.
The shooting at MSD was the eighth school shooting of 2018,345 but the students of
Marjory Stoneman Douglas refused to let their tragedy be reduced to nothing more than
just a one-day headline where government officials offered “thoughts and prayers” and
where the same type of tragedy could shake the lives of other young people while they
did nothing more than attend school.
Over the next two years, student leaders from Marjory Stoneman Douglas have
organized and promoted student walk-outs across the country, one of the largest youth
protests that the United States has seen since the Vietnam era,346 city hall meetings, and a
national tour focusing on the youth vote in the 2018 midterm elections. The national tour
included information sharing, voter registration, and information about voting, which
ultimately culminated in what turned out to be the largest youth turn-out in a midterm
election that the U.S. had seen in the last 40 years.347
This chapter explores the Never Again movement from its inception through the
following two years. First, I explore the impact of youth on the movement from various
angles, including being youth affected, youth led, and youth involved. I then discuss the
rhetoric surrounding youth and the movement as a whole. Next, I look at the relationship
the Never Again movement has had with the digital realm, including the time in which
the movement came about, and the location of the movement as it relates to its
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connections and infrastructure, and then potential digital concerns that the movement has
faced. Following the digital section, I discuss what it means to be a social movement and
how the Never Again movement fits into the specifics designated in this dissertation. I
then break down the traditional and non-traditional activism that the Never Again
movement has done over the years and provide insight on the argument of activism or
slacktivism. Finally, I end on key lessons we can take away from the Never Again
movement as a whole for future youth digital social movements and research in the same
area.

The Youth Say Never Again
The main areas of specific focus as it relates to youth are the movement being
youth-affected, youth-led, and youth-involved. The Never Again movement was created
explicitly and directly as a result of an act of violence targeted at youth. The shooting at
Marjory Stoneman Douglas on February 14, 2018, took the lives of fourteen students
along with three staff members. The attack on the school and the murder of more than a
dozen young people is where this movement’s relationship to youth begins.

Youth-affected
Mass shootings in the United States are not uncommon. A Metro News article
reported on forty of the most highly publicized mass shootings in the United States
(involving a lone active shooter or pair of active shooters) since 2000, highlighting that
this list is merely a glimpse into the list of mass shootings that have happened across the
country.348 Since the 1999 massacre at Columbine High School, the United States has
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seen more than 230 school shootings, and over 228,000 children have seen a shooting
happen at their school, not including those that have taken place at colleges or
universities.349 The shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas was not, by any means, the
first school shooting to take place in the United States, and it was not the last school
shooting in the United States, with twenty-two school shootings happening in the first
half of 2019 alone.350
Due to the frequency of mass shootings, or even more specifically, school
shootings, the Marjory Stoneman Douglass shooting does not stand out because of the
shooting itself, but rather because of what unfolded after the shooting. The students of
MSD were determined to not let the tragedy that just unfolded before their eyes be just
another name on the list of mass shootings in the United States, and, thus, immediately
began to act. The following section explores the youth-led aspect of the Never Again
movement.

Youth-led
One of the first Marjory Stoneman Douglas students to make headlines was
seventeen-year-old David Hogg, who returned to the school the day after the shooting to
speak to the press. Hogg spoke out for the youth, for students who have to live in a
society where they practice active shooting drills in class, and for those who, like him and
his schoolmates, have experienced these acts of violence in the place where they are
supposed to be getting an education. Two days after the shooting, students gathered
together alongside organizer Cameron Kasky with the intention of “rewrit[ing] the entire
national dialogue about school shootings.”351 The group established their main priorities,

132

along with a hashtag to rally behind. Shortly after the group formed, the Never Again
leaders began organizing nationwide walkouts, large national and international
demonstrations, and voter registration campaigns, ultimately culminating in a push for
youth voters to show up at the polls. While the movement has been almost exclusively
led by youth on a global level, youth play one final, and very important role in the Never
Again movement.

Youth-involved
The Never Again movement’s goal has been to change gun legislation, and while
that large task may not seem, or be, in the hands of young people, the Never Again
movement leaders set out to prove that idea wrong. Because the movement was created
as a result of another youth-affected school shooting, the movement was seeking those
youth voices as the powerhouse of the movement. Like with all the cases of this study,
non-youth participants are, of course, a part of the movement, but the Never Again
movement was hyper-focused on connecting with, motivating, and ultimately mobilizing
youth voices.
The one-month anniversary walkout took place at schools across the United
States with students of various ages participating, some even against the behest of their
school’s administrations, who threatened suspension for participating. The Never Again
movement involved youth most notably by developing and organizing the March for Our
Lives event. According to the Associated Press, March For Our Lives, which took place
less than six weeks after the massacre at Marjory Stoneman Douglas, was one of the
largest youth protests since the Vietnam War.352 The protest focused on bringing about
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the gun reforms that students originally outlined just two short days after the school
shooting. The Washington, D.C. protest brought over 800,000 attendees, including many
students.353 Along with the massive protest happening in D.C., large protests were also
taking place simultaneously in various cities across the United States, including Boston,
Minneapolis, Houston, and the students’ hometown of Parkland, Florida.354 These
protests did not just take place in large cities in the United States, but also in over 800
other marches that happened in smaller U.S. cities.355 It even inspired sister marches
across the globe in other countries, such as France, Germany, England, and Brazil.356
Speakers at these events were youth, attendees were also youth, and the signs and posters
were made by the youth and spoke to this issue that has been impacting them directly.
Outside of the walkouts and protests, the Never Again movement focused on
getting the youth registered to vote and then making sure that those young voters would
turn out to vote in the 2018 midterm elections about six months later (along with the
longer-term goal of a massive youth turnout for the 2020 Presidential election). Inspired
by the Civil Rights Movement Freedom Riders of the 1960s, who traveled across
Mississippi to register African American voters, the Never Again leaders toured the
United States in the summer of 2018 in what they called the Road to Change. 357 On this
tour, they made stops across the United States getting youth educated, registered, and
motivated to vote in the Fall.
Along with nationwide participation from the youth with the Never Again
movement in the United States, youth from across the globe have participated in various
Never Again movement events as well. Students in Israel, Tanzania, Iceland, and Great
Britain participated in the March 14 school walkout from their respective countries,
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showing their support for the movement and making their voices heard across the globe
in protest of gun violence.358
While youth from other countries are not able to participate in U.S. elections and
voter registration, and their countries do not seem to have the same gun crisis that the
United States is witnessing, youth across the globe recognize this issue and the
importance of their voice in the matter as well. An eighteen-year-old from Finland who
protested in Denmark commented that he believed he had an impact on this cause, stating
that we all live in a global world, and no issue is only a local issue anymore.359
The work of the Never Again movement has not stopped either. The movement
continues to focus on gun reform at the state and federal level, they continue to encourage
and help young people register to vote in the United States, and they provide helpful
voting information, such as how to find polling locations, mail-in voting information, and
voter rights. The leaders continue to connect with youth as youth themselves, many just
voted in their first presidential election this Fall.
Throughout each of these steps, the youth leaders from Marjory Stoneman
Douglas High School took charge and pushed forward with their agenda for political and
social change related to gun reform through their communication and various movement
activities. The Never Again movement represents a youth social movement that was
developed and led by youth as a result of those youth being directly affected by another
school shooting. Throughout their work, the Never Again movement have had their eyes
on big state and federal goals, but they have focused their attention to youth as those
change agents. I next explore some of the affect rhetoric from the Never Again
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movement and how the emotional responses elicited have contributed to the movement as
a whole.

“We’re Children”: The Rhetorical Impact of Youth on the Never Again Movement
The students of Marjory Stoneman Douglas present an interesting dynamic as
they relate to youth and the rhetoric surrounding them. Student David Hogg is popularly
quoted as saying, “Please… we’re children. You guys are the adults. You need to take
some action, and play a role. Work together, come over your politics and get something
done.”360 Through statements like this one, Hogg and his classmates explicitly
highlighted the youth aspect of this tragedy. While speaking eloquently and passionately,
Hogg’s words reminded his audience that he and his fellow schoolmates were, in fact,
children who had been attacked in their school. And they were; all of the students at
MSD were just high school students, most under eighteen years old, many of them even
just fourteen, as the shooting took place in the Freshman Building. As mentioned
throughout this dissertation, there is a sense of vulnerability, and an innate desire to
protect children, but Hogg, in that moment, was pleading with the “adults” to do
something, because, as children, they did not feel, and on that day were not being,
protected.
With that in mind, though, the Never Again leaders knew simply being “children”
was not enough. After all, no sweeping federal changes happened after the mass shooting
took place at Sandy Hook Elementary School in 2012. MSD students felt like the country
could “shrug off 20 dead first graders” and not make changes, so they and others asked
what chances this group of teens might have.361
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With the MSD students caught in between the adults who are supposed to “do
something” and the young children of Sandy Hook, the Never Again movement had to
find a way to navigate somehow not quite belonging to one, and not quite belonging to
the other. They are both, and neither, children or adults. The group is still somewhat
vulnerable and in need of some protection, and yet they are old enough, perhaps wise
enough, to know how to fight for that protection themselves. Bradley A. Serber argues
that this is actually an advantage that these students have that victims of other shootings
and those advocating on their behalf did not have. Focusing on their dual status as young
adults, or soon-to-be adults, he argues that as young adults, they retain some of the
vulnerability and hope of children, like those from Sandy Hook Elementary, but as young
adults, they have the autonomy that those young students lacked in their ability to
understand the situation and speak up for themselves.362
The Never Again leaders have worked through their activism to push the
boundaries on both of those categories. They have focused on the fact that so many
school shootings have happened, that kids are in school to learn (a place that, by law,
children under a certain age are required to attend in some form), and that they are not
doing anything to cause these shootings, but rather are simply just taking tests and
editing videos and studying history like they are supposed to be doing. By all counts,
students are doing all the right things, and are still being targeted and attacked in their
schools. This is a resounding message from the Never Again movement, and this type of
rhetoric is used as a means to garner some more of that sympathy from outsiders, from
lawmakers, and from voters. Put simply, the message is, “students are fish in a barrel,
help.” They speak to other students about how this could happen anywhere. It happens at
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normal schools across the country, and that instills this idea that any school could be
next. While statistically speaking, the reality of a school shooting happening to many
U.S. school students may not be a reality they actually face, the perception, and fear, of
this threat seems very real for youth in schools across the country, and as a result, youth
have joined the movement and become active participants.
But on the other side of their communication, the Never Again movement is using
powerful rhetoric to motivate the youth to make the changes they wish to see themselves.
They do not exclusively use fear as their only weapon, however. The Never Again
movement makes it a point to each youth they are speaking so that they can make a
difference, that they can make change. The Never Again movement does not just talk
about changes youth can make. They show up. They traveled the country to get people
registered to vote, they attended town hall meetings, and they voted. The youth turned out
to vote in historic numbers for the U.S. midterm elections of 2018 with an estimated 31%
of youth participation compared to just 21% only four years prior in the 2014 midterm
elections. Of course you cannot link all of the increased youth voter turnout to the Never
Again movement, but they definitely played a role in mobilizing other youth to vote..
Their words and actions sent a powerful message to other youth that this is an important
cause, that this cause is worth fighting for, and that youth can affect change.
The Never Again movement has strong ties to youth in every aspect. The
movement came about as a result of youth being directly affected by an act of violence,
the movement has been, and continues to be, led by youth activists, and finally youth
have been major players in the activism by the movement over the last two years. In
addition to the role of youth throughout the movement, Never Again also uses rhetoric
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around being able to get both the attention of, and hopefully help from, the “adults” by
reminding them that they are just kids and they are being shot at, and in schools of all
places. They highlight their vulnerability and plead for someone to help them. On the
other hand, the Never Again movement does not let their being a group of youth activists
stop them from enacting change themselves. In fact, the movement specifically uses
rhetoric that empowers other youth and motivates them to become active in civic
engagement and to show up and make their voices be heard. The Never Again movement
has a distinctive advantage of balancing in this unique area between vulnerable youth and
articulate activists because they fall into this “young adult” or “soon-to-be adult”
category where they are not quite one or the other yet. This is not the only advantage the
Never Again movement has as it relates to their age demographic, but it is an important
one. Below I explore the movement’s relationship to the digital realm.

#Digital: How the Never Again Movement Incorporated Digital Aspects
As it relates to the Never Again movement and the digital aspects of the
movement as a whole, I explore three main areas, including the time in which the
movement took place, the location of the movement and its followers, and the digital
means that have been and continue to be used by the movement. I then discuss specific
digital concerns that the movement faces as it relates to the areas mentioned above.

The Right People at the Right Time: How Age and Time Benefitted the Never Again
Movement Leaders
As explored in the previous chapters, the relationship a movement has to digital
technology is tied to both the time and place that the movement comes about. The Never
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Again movement and its leaders have a strong relationship to digital technology. To
begin, the Never Again movement started in 2018. At this time, globally, the number of
internet users reached just over four billion, representing 53% of the world’s
population.363 At this time, Facebook, YouTube, and Instagram were the number one,
number two, and number seven, respectively, most used social platforms on a global
scale, with Twitter and Snapchat ranking at number eleven and number sixteen.364
Additionally, the annual growth of social media users worldwide in 2018 was 13%, with
nearly one million new social media users every day over the previous year. These data
represent the growth of not only internet use worldwide, but also the growth of social
media across the globe. Much of the internet user growth that took place leading into
2018 was driven by affordable smartphones and data plans with over 200 million people
getting their first mobile device. 365 As of January 2018, there were over five billion
unique mobile phone users, equating to nearly 70% of the population at that time.366
While these numbers might seem high, at the beginning of 2018, more than four
billion people were not connected to the internet. 367 However, the timing of the Never
Again movement as it relates to 3G or 4G network coverage worldwide obviously plays
to their advantage. Comparing these numbers to those of 2014, the percentage of
uncovered individuals has nearly halved by 2018, dropping from 25% to 13%.368
In addition to the large amount of internet and social media users across the globe,
the founding members of the Never Again movement have intimate connections to the
digital world, all being born within the turn of the century, many falling into what
generational expert Meagan Johnson refers to as Linksters, as this group is the first to
grow up being linked to technology from birth. 369 Quite literally growing up with
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technology, the youth leadership of this movement are digital natives, meaning they are
“native speakers” of the digital language. 370 This means that the leadership, and much of
the following, of the Never Again movement have a native pulse on how to use digital
technologies and social media that appeal to others in that same demographic; developing
a hashtag is not a second thought, but a natural part of developing a social movement,
sharing information via Twitter and Instagram is the way to connect with members, not a
way to connect with members. This is not to say other generations cannot learn and adapt
to these technologies and ways of communicating – some better than digital natives – but,
those who are referred to as “digital immigrants” have to adapt, and often come along
with an “accent” that shows that they are not quite as native in the digital realm. 371

Benefits of Location: How Being U.S.- Based and U.S.-Focused Benefited the Never
Again Movement
The time in which the Never Again movement came about and the fact that the
leaders and many members are digital natives are not the only advantages that this
movement has as it relates to digital technology. The Never Again movement also is
centrally focused in the United States. The event that sparked this movement happened in
the United States, and the movement is reaching out to members primarily in the United
States, though the message and support has spread worldwide. The significance of the
location of the movement is related to both to access to infrastructure as well as issues of
censorship.
The Never Again movement is located in the, United States and that serves the
movement a great advantage in terms of digital communication. According to the Digital
in 2018 special report, North America has 88% internet penetration rate, compared to the
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12-27% internet penetration rate in Central and Eastern Africa for the Invisible Children
movement that is affecting Uganda, and the 39% internet penetration rate in Western
Africa where the Bring Back Our Girls movement is located in Nigeria. 372 With more of
the population in North America having access to the internet, the Never Again
movement has been able to reach a greater portion of individuals in the region where the
catalyst that started the movement took place. This not only helps the leaders spread their
message through digital means because of their access, but it also allows more
individuals in North America to hear about the issue and the proposed solutions that the
movement is promoting.
Over 80% of U.S. Americans own smartphones, and 96% of youth 18-29 years
old own smartphones.373 Smartphones make documenting and sharing aspects of social
movements easier than relying on desktops or laptops, and they also allow leaders and
members of the movement to document and share their experiences in real-time across
various media platforms. The ability of the Never Again movement to share their content
to the majority of Americans is an advantage this movement has that other movements
that arise in other places of the world with less internet and smartphone penetration do
not have.
In addition to an 88% internet penetration of the North American population, 95%
of the population has broadband mobile connectivity in this region.374 Having broadband
connectivity is high-speed internet access that is faster than dial-up and always on, which
is an important factor to consider when examining digital social movements. 375 The
ability to connect to the Internet seamlessly is important in times of tension, specifically
in times of tension with one’s own government or government officials.
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The Never Again movement has been actively working to change aspects of the
U.S. government and go against a powerful lobbyist group, the National Rifle
Association (NRA). The Never Again movement’s ability to reach out to its members
continually to spread and share information, to contact members of U.S. Congress, and to
reach out to leaders of the NRA are all significantly easier due to the ease of access to
digital infrastructure and the ability to spread their information to large portions of the
people directly impacted by the Never Again movement’s cause.

Digital Activism: The Four Styles of Internet Engagement
To study Internet engagement, I continue again here, as I did in my previous
chapters, with Earl et. al's work, which helps classify various types of work done on the
Internet by movements to better understand the intricacies of what has been done online.

Internet Engagement: Brochureware
Brochureware is how movements spread their messages through the Internet.
Essentially a digital brochure on the issue at large that does not require paper, printing, or
traveling/mailing out physical documents to people. This is especially significant for the
Never Again movement because of its low cost and wide reach. Because this movement
was so exclusively run by youth, without huge financial backing, and because they were
working so quickly, the use of brochureware to spread their message was especially
important. In just over a month from when the shooting took place at their school, this
movement was able to spread the word to over 800,000 individuals to join and/or start
their own marches across not just the U.S., but also around the world, for the March for
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Our Lives event. The movement continues to take advantage of digital technologies to
share their message, be it on voting registration, early voting, or election day materials.
Because of the dynamics that make up this movement, brochureware is one of their mostused forms of Internet engagement.

Internet Engagement: E-mobilization
In tandem with brochureware, the Never Again movement engaged in emobilization. This is when a movement uses the various tools on the Internet to bring
people together in-person. Of course, this has most prominently been seen with the Never
Again movement in their work on the March for Our Lives event. This is very closely
tied into their online organizing.

Internet Engagement: Online Organizing
Online organizing is when a movement organizes an entire campaign or event
exclusively online and does not require a physical place to meet in order to plan. While
the movement leaders did meet with each other in person to plan and execute the March
for Our Lives, they did not have to physically meet with people around the world to
organize and plan massive protests elsewhere. The movement has local chapters
throughout various places in each state, and even within other countries, which all
worked together through the use of digital technologies to plan and organize this march
all without ever having to physically be together. This speaks to the ability of the
movement to be so widespread as well. Because they did not need to meet face-to-face to
organize, they could grow bigger than their physical reach.
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Internet Engagement: Online Participation
Finally, online participation is when movements participate in activism that takes
place exclusively online, such as signing petitions, coming together to attack a company
or deny them service, virtual sit-ins, etc. The Never Again movement fostered online
participation, in part, through their online work to put pressure on companies who either
took money from or had special deals and privileges with the NRA. Members of the
movement took to social media and questioned companies about their support for the
NRA and threatened to pull their patronage if they did not distance themselves from the
NRA. Companies such as Delta Airlines, MetLife, and Hertz all cut ties as a result of this
pressure.376
This type of activism is incredibly important in today’s digital age, not only
because so many potential patrons are online, but because so many companies are also so
predominantly on social media as well and are very easy to find and publicly contact. The
Never Again organizers were able to flood a company’s account right after a mass school
shooting with questions about who they are aligned with, tagging the company in posts
about how other companies have cut ties, and asking why this company had not done the
same. This type of online participation acted as a type of social pressure cooker. With the
spotlight on these companies to make a decision, and with all eyes on them, even a nondecision is a decision. This gives a lot of power to those online activists, and, as the
Never Again movement has shown, this can result in actual changes, and thus should not
be overlooked as a form of activism.
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A Divisive Subject: Echo Chambers
The ability for a movement to spread its message through digital platforms, like
social media, also comes with some potential setbacks. One of the biggest concerns when
it comes to this type of communication through social media is the creation of echo
chambers. As discussed, an echo chamber is a phenomenon when an individual online
seeks out and is then surrounded by similar or reaffirming views that that person already
has on an issue. Research on this topic has shown that people are more likely to search
out similar opinions than to search for differing opinions. This practice reinforces
divisive forms of information rather than content that challenges a person’s ideas or
beliefs.377
Because the Never Again movement came about and has worked heavily online,
it is important to consider the potential impacts of echo chambers and issues of political
engagement, even though the research on the topic is conflicting. As leaders and
followers of a movement, being conscious of falling into these potential holes could
ultimately halt a movement from growing. As I discuss in more detail in the activism
section below, there is evidence that the Never Again movement is not just an echo
chamber, but is reaching people in different regions and across party lines in the United
States in order to create change.

Land of the Free, Home of the Shadowbanning: Issues of Censorship in the United States
In the United States, the government is not able or allowed to censor content that
is put out or spread, barring a few specific cases, such as instances of libel or slander.
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This lack of government censorship has allowed the Never Again movement’s message
to be shared and spread to the masses across the country through digital means.
However, while the government cannot censor content, private companies do
have the ability to censor content. This issue of private censorship does cause reason for
concern. For instance, according to law professor Danielle Keats Citron, companies are
using blunt algorithms to filter out hate speech with vague definitions, which could lead
to more filtering and removal of content, which will “likely include critiques of hate
speech and dissenting speech.”378 This is a type of censorship is called algorithmic
censorship, and it can be detrimental to a social movement. For example, with the
Occupy Wall Street movement, when the movement was surging and gaining massive
media attention, the hashtag #OccupyWallStreet was nowhere to be found in the trending
topics. This was seen as censorship by Twitter, but was marked up as the result of a
complex algorithm.379 Today, some argue that social media platforms, like Instagram and
Twitter, participate in what is called Shadowbanning. Shadowbanning is the partial
censorship of online accounts, pulling their content, shutting down pages, and/or making
their hashtags not show up in searches, all the while not informing the owner of the page
these changes have been made; instead, it happens in the shadows.380 With
shadowbanning, the censorship is often not realized until the effects of that ban have
happened.
So, while government censorship may not be of concern for the Never Again
movement, potential censorship from private companies, such as Twitter, Facebook, and
even Google, is important for the movement and its followers to consider. If content
disappears or if a large event does not show up on the “Trending Topics” of Twitter, this

147

could impact the movement’s reach and potential future activists for the movement.
Specifically for the Never Again movement, which relies heavily on the Internet and
those complex algorithms to promote and keep their movement in the trending topics and
on others’ newsfeed to gain more attention and followers for their movement, this is a
potential concern that they have to be aware of and address.
The Never Again movement has a unique relationship to the digital sphere that
social movements of the past have not enjoyed, but a relationship movements of the
future will move beyond. This movement came about during the height of social media
and a time where the internet and internet access are growing at rapid rates. While there
is still a digital divide, in 2018, more than half of the world’s population had access to the
internet in some capacity, and in the United States, that number was even higher. This
period of time, coupled with the fact that the leaders, and many followers, of the Never
Again movement are digital natives, creates a perfect storm for digital communications to
take place and spread across the U.S. and other parts of the world.
The movement must, however, be aware of and attempt to work against the
creation of echo chambers where their message is only being shared among those who
already agree with their message and make sure they utilize digital technology to reach
outside of that sphere. The Never Again movement taking place almost exclusively in the
United States means that the movement does not have to worry about censorship at a
governmental level, however, private censorship is something they need to be aware of
when utilizing platforms provided by these companies.
Ultimately, due to the youth-led and youth-involved components of the Never
Again movement, along with the location in which the movement is taking place and the
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lack of governmental censorship in the United States, the Never Again movement has a
strong and natural connection to the digital realm. The ability of the young people
involved with the movement to navigate multiple platforms, know how to reach out to
other youths, and find ways to attempt to make change. The variables that contribute to
the Never Again movement create a unique environment for this type of social movement
to come about, gather followers, and work toward making change.

Never Again as a Social Movement
The definition of a social movement for this research highlights a few important
areas: a change of an element of the current social structure, sustained interaction
between those with authority and those who are challenging that authority, a shift from
what is to what organizers think “ought” to be, at least minimal organization, and finally,
sizable membership. The Never Again movement touches each of these requirements,
making it a social movement, which I will explore below.
The first component of being a social movement is to discover if the movement is
working to change an element of the current social structure. The Never Again
movement’s ultimate goal is to change legislation that is currently in place in the United
States in relation to gun control. According to their website, this movement has a “peace
plan for a safer America.”381 In this plan, the Never Again movement details six steps to
address their plan for a safer America ownership, using the acronym CHANGE. Their
first step is to Change the standards of gun ownership.Second, they want to Halve the rate
of gun deaths in 10 years. Third, they want accountability for the gun lobby and industry.
Fourth, the movement wants to Name a director of gun violence prevention. Fifth, they
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want to Generate community-based solutions. Finally, they want to Empower the next
generation. Each step listed above is a movement toward changing elements of the
current social structure, with the overall goal to change the current social structure of the
ease of accessing a firearm in the United States with little federal involvement on the
issue of mass shootings, and a gun lobby that has run Washington without any
repercussions.382 These are big goals for a movement, but goals that are indeed aimed at
changing the current social structure as it relates to firearms in the United States.
One of the biggest messages of this movement is to work toward changing both
legislation around gun control and the mass shooting society that U.S. Americans live in.
The movement highlights the legislation that citizens currently abide by, which makes
gun access too easy in many instances. Along with laws and policies, the movement
draws attention to and hopes to change the U.S. culture that has become desensitized to
mass shootings in schools and directed at children, to the point to where these events
happen and “thoughts and prayers” are sent, and then society moves on, waiting for the
next one to happen to send more “thoughts and prayers.” Marjory Stoneman Douglas
senior Delaney Tarr stated that “we’ve had enough of thoughts and prayers… we are
coming after every single (elected official) and demanding that you take action,
demanding that you make a change.”383 Both of these issues seek to change what
currently “is” in the United States to what they believe “ought to be.”
The next aspect of a social movement looks at the sustained interaction between
those in authority and those who are challenging said authority. The Never Again
movement has reached out to authority figures, including members of congress, both
nationally and locally.384 Members of the movement have been in contact with those in
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authority in a variety of ways, including going to local legislation buildings, contacting
members of Congress, directly interacting with political leaders in Town Hall events, and
directly responding to government officials and NRA members via social media
communication. The Never Again movement also uses social media, most specifically
Twitter, to engage continually with those who are in authority.
The next aspect of this movement that makes it a movement is the organization
this movement has. To be considered a social movement, the group must be at least
minimally organized. The Never Again movement is organized on a nationwide level as
well as at a local level. Their website promotes finding local chapters with a zip-code
search to help individuals “organized with other high school and college students near
you.”385 The official website is also an indication of the organization of the movement,
with forms to join the movement,386 information on registering to vote,387 and how to
donate to the movement.388
The movement has a few prominent leaders, including David Hogg, Emma
González, Cameron Kasky, and Jaclyn Corin, all students at Marjory Stoneman Douglas
High School at the time of the shooting. Each of these leaders are verified on Twitter, 389
along with the March For Our Lives Twitter account, which is used to continue tweet
information for the Never Again movement. 390 On Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube,
the March for Our Lives accounts are also verified. 391 Being verified on these platforms
helps with the ease of accessing those heavily involved in the movement leadership. A
verified Facebook page is one to follow for information that is guaranteed to be
connected with the movement, comparted to a page that is not verified and could be run
by any number of people who are not in direct connection to the movement.
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In addition to verified accounts, membership size is important. Again, there is
difficulty in figuring exact number of members of any given social movement with both
an online and offline presence, but the March for Our Lives official website has
information stating that their social media followers amount to over 1 million across the
March for Our Lives verified accounts, leader Emma González has more than 1.6 million
twitter followers, and the other three young leaders collectively have an additional 1.5
million twitter followers. Perhaps the biggest event that is a testament to the size of this
movement is the amount of people who participated in the March for Our Lives on March
24, 2018. Various reports mark the attendance of the march in Washington, D.C.,
anywhere from 200,000392 to over 800,000393 attendees at the single location. According
to The Washington Post, between 1.3 and 2.1 million protesters took part in the march
across the United States.394 Marches were held across the United States in cities like
Manhattan, Chicago, Los Angeles, Boston, Atlanta, Pittsburgh, Parkland, and more,
including smaller cities across the country such as Wichita, Kansas and Corpus Christi,
Texas.395 Outside of the U.S., several cities globally also participated in this March, with
over 100 solidarity marches outside of the U.S. including marches in Geneva, Sydney,
Tokyo, Edinburgh, and London.396 Outside of physically being a part of the March for
Our Lives Marches, over 3.3 million tweets were sent with the hashtag
#MarchForOurLives on the March 24.397
In their short existence, the Never Again movement has managed to create a
strong and, thus far, sustainable movement through their strong organization. The
strength of the Never Again movement begins with their approach and development as a
movement. With local chapters throughout the country, the Never Again movement has
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identified local issues and mobilized those local members, while ultimately working
toward not just local and state changes, but changes at the federal level as well.
Not only has the Never Again movement developed as a movement in a
grassroots style, but it has also adopted a grassroots mentality when it comes their
activism as well. This relationship of starting from the ground-up when building a
movement has translated to the way the Never Again movement has tackled their issues
and overall cause. With the overall goal to create a nationwide adjustment of gun reform,
the movement has worked from the ground-up to achieve their goal.

Never Again and Activism
In this section, I explore the activism that the Never Again movement has done
over the past two years. First, I discuss traditional and non-traditional activism, as well as
activism that blends the two types together and a discussion of Internet engagement. I
then explore the relationship between youth and activism, followed by the connection
between activism and the digital realm. Finally, I end with a discussion of the Never
Again movement and activism or slacktivism and what we can learn and take away from
this movement as a whole.

Traditional and Non-Traditional Activism: A Connected Approach
The Never Again movement has set their goals boldly to “end the gun violence
epidemic in America,” but it is the steps they have taken and continue to take to get there
that mirror the grassroots development of the movement itself.398 Starting with the large
goal to end gun violence in the United States, the movement has essentially worked
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backwards to obtain that goal; starting from the bottom and working their way up to their
goal through their activism.
The movement focused on bringing the youth voice to the forefront of political
conversation. They went on tour to educate young people about their politicians,
specifically to inform them of who takes money from the NRA and who has a voting
history of supporting or not supporting gun reform, in order to help them better
understand who and what they were voting for. Much of this information aspect of the
movement has been done through non-traditional digital means. Through the use of social
media, the Never Again movement shares information and resources to help those who
are following the movement learn more about the cause from a holistic perspective; they
are not just demanding that followers show up and do something, but they are also
presenting information to support their reasons for their call to action through the use of
digital technologies.
According to the March for Our Lives website, the first form of activism the
Never Again movement took was organizing what turned out to be the “largest single day
of protest against gun violence in history” with the March for Our Lives protests that took
place across the globe. Planning for the March began just four days after the shooting
took place at MSD, and the group of youth leaders encouraged young people across the
country and beyond to join. The protest focused on bringing about gun reform and
reportedly brought over 800,000 attendees to the Washington D.C. protest alone. 399
Along with the massive protest happening in D.C. large protests were also taking place
simultaneously in various cities across the United States.400 The March for Our Lives
protests did not just take place in large cities in the United States, but protests also took
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place in over 800 other smaller U.S. cities.401 More than two million people participated
in the March for Our Lives protests, 402 with demonstrations being held in 387
congressional districts, making up 90% of all U.S. voting districts and with the protests
reaching across party lines.403
The March for Our Lives protests took place in both red and blue districts,
including 28 of the 33 “red to blue” districts identified by Democratic Congressional
Campaign Committee.404 This bipartisan participation across locations and districts in the
United States shows how the Never Again movement, and the March for Our Lives event
specifically, managed to avoid the digital pitfall of echo chambers by only reaching to a
demographic who already agrees with them. This speaks to the ability of social
movements today that do use, and even heavily use, social media to gain followers, to
garner support. It shows that they can organize activism to reach outside of their own
interest groups and spread their messages to a wide variety of potential future members of
the movement, and to transition that online presence to large offline activism as well.
In addition to U. S. activism, March for Our Lives marches were happening
across the globe in other countries, such as, France, Germany, England, and Brazil, with
activists showing support from Australia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Azerbaijan, Nigeria, and
Venezuela.405 This global support speaks to the spreadability of the Never Again
movement, as the problem occurs most frequently in the United States, and the ultimate
goal of the movement to change U.S. legislation, and yet, support from around the world
still poured in for the cause. The Never Again movement had the advantage of having the
digital infrastructure to spread their message worldwide, the leaders were all digital
natives who knew how to use the digital realm to get their messages heard, and
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ultimately, the movement as a whole had to worry very little about censorship of their
message even as they argued against some of the oldest Untied States legislation in the
Second Amendment to the United States Constitution.
As a way to reach their large goal of changing gun control laws in the U.S., the
Never Again movement set their sights on the 2018 midterm election, the Never Again
movement focused their attention on bringing continued awareness to the issue of gun
reform, local leaders’ stance on the matter, and registering new voters. The group visited
schools, townhalls, and college campuses to share information about their cause and
ultimately work to help youth register to vote. During this national tour, the Never Again
movement continued to engage in both traditional forms of activism and digital forms of
activism. The Road to Change was more of a traditional type of activism by the Never
Again movement. This specific form of activism follows closely to what Leslie
Crutchfield discusses in her book How Change Happens as the 10/10/10/20 = 50
tactic.406 This specific technique came about through the LGBTQ movement in an
attempt to get same-sex marriage legalized in the United States. Instead of setting their
goals as trying to get all fifty states to completely legalize same-sex marriage, they made
the decision to get ten states with full marriage, ten with civil unions, ten with some form
of relationship recognition, and the other twenty states with non-discrimination laws.407
This plan essentially focuses on making smaller, local changes rather than focusing on
large federal reforms. This change happens through local advocacy, going town to town,
state to state, and making small wins that build momentum. With this momentum and
connection with people on a more individual level, the movement is then able to work
together to make bigger changes down the line.
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The Road to Change essentially took on aspects of this format through their
visiting of towns across America, stopping at colleges, town halls, and other local venues
to engage with individuals on a personal level about making changes in their local
elections. With the ultimate goal of changing federal regulations as they pertain to guns
in the United States, the youth leaders of the Never Again movement began tackling the
issue on smaller, more localized levels in order to build momentum and support to lead to
bigger statewide and ultimately federal reform. The Road to Change was not only about
sharing information with young people, but the Never Again leaders also focused on
getting youth to register to vote for the upcoming 2018 midterm elections. And while the
number of reported new registered voters is impressive, their website citing more 50,000
new voter registrations throughout the national tours, 408 it is not only the number of new
voters the movement registered that is important to look at, but also how the movement
went about getting those voters registered.
While touring the nation was a display of more traditional activism, it was the
registering of youth voters where the Never Again leaders begin engaging in more
modern and non-traditional forms of activism. In forty-nine of the fifty U.S. states,
excluding North Dakota, an individual must register to vote in order to cast a ballot.409 As
of January 2020, thirty-nine states plus the District of Columbia allow online voter
registration. This digital option to register to vote supplements the traditional paper-based
process for individuals who have state-issued driver’s licenses or identification cards.410
Through both their website and a unique t-shirt design, the Never Again
movement worked to make online voter registration even simpler for new youth voters.
On their website, the Never Again movement has a short form to fill out, including an
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email address and zip code, which then takes the new voter to the more detailed form,
which asks for all the personal information required to vote, including address and ID
number.411 While the online form on the movement’s website is a more non-traditional
type of voter registration than the paper registration process, the movement went even
further with their clothing.
Jammal Lemy, the creative director for March for Our Lives, set out to design
clothing with the hopes of encouraging more youth voting. In an interview with Dezeen,
Lemy expressed his desire to mobilize young people across the country and said that the
group needed a shirt that would “help personify what (their) message was.”412 Lemy
designed both t-shirts and hoodies with the image of an American flag, with the top left
corner being a blue QR code in the place of the stars, and the stripes giving the
appearance of a barcode. The QR code in the top left of the image is scannable by digital
scanners such as smartphones through their standard camera function. Scanning this code
takes individuals straight to the movement’s voter registration page.
Through his design, Lemy also used visual rhetoric with the flag symbolism. He
notes that the design came about after looking at tactics the NRA use. The National Rifle
Association often utilizes the image of the American flag in their campaigns and has
garnered major support, in part, built off a feeling of patriotism. The use of this symbol in
the Never Again scannable clothing was done with the intention of highlighting the vast
differences between the NRA and the Never Again movement. Lemy contends that the
Never Again movement is also patriotic, that the movement believes in the political
system that exists in the United States, and this image represents both of those aspects in
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one.413 Through these shirts, the Never Again movement leaders say that around 10,000
people have registered to vote using the shirt alone, as of August, 2018.414
The use of the QR codes on clothing that link right to voter registration forms
through something as common in American youth as smartphones speaks to the ability of
the Never Again movement to not only identify their target audience, but also unique
ways to reach that audience. According to Pew research, 96% of U.S. youth from ages
18-29 have smartphones, meaning that most of today’s youth have a smartphone with the
ability to scan these QR codes.415 Additionally, while QR codes began with a bumpy
start, the use of QR codes today has not only improved, but QR codes are also very
popular in messenger apps with younger generations, such as Snapchat, Facebook,
Twitter, WeChat, LinkedIn, and Instagram.416 The Never Again movement tapped into a
technology (smartphones) that most youth in the U.S. have, and a technology feature (QR
scanning) that young people are familiar with and utilizing regularly in their social media
usage.
Following the Road to Change tour, the Never Again movement held events
across the nation with over 200 mayors, called Mayors for Our Lives. In these events, the
movement claims to have helped register over 800,000 people on National Voter
Registration Day, setting an all-time record.417 According to the Miami Herald, Never
Again leader David Hogg announced on MSNBC’s show Morning Joe that the
movement would be working mayors across the nation in a bipartisan campaign to
register the newest generation of voters.418 The purpose of this kind of activism was to
get mayors help make sure students in their cities were informed and able to easily
register to vote. This type of activism resembles more traditional activism in that it
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involved more of the person-to-person interaction. However, the Never Again movement
did use both traditional and digital media to spread awareness of this event by speaking
on television, posting on social media, and even providing a form on their website for
individuals to email their mayors asking them to sign the pledge and join the movement
to educate and get young people registered to vote. 419
After the National Voter Registration Day event and the end of the Road for
Change tour, the social media for the Never Again movement (Amarch4OurLives on
Twitter, marchforourlives on Instagram, and facebook.com/marchforourlives) began
promoting their next step of activism, Vote for Our Lives. This form of activism was
targeted at the 2018 U.S. midterm elections. Historically, national voter turnout for
midterm elections is below 50%.The 2014 midterms had the lowest turnout nationally
from 1978 until today, with only 41.9% of voting-aged citizens voting.420 The Never
Again movement focused their attention at making sure young voters were not just
registering to vote, but now, taking the next step and actually getting out and voting, be it
early voting, absentee ballots, or voting on November 6.
Kicking off their Vote for Our Lives tour at the University of Minnesota, the
Never Again movement partnered with Giffords, a nonprofit organization led by former
Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords, which works to tackle the gun violence crisis in the
Unite States.421 This event was scheduled for late October and was promoted as a
“townhall and tailgate party” that included free food and giveaways.422 The following
week, the tour visited Florida International University (FIU) where they bussed people to
polls with refreshments, music, and raffles every twenty minutes for two hours, followed
by two and a half hours of “dorm storming,” where students were taken from their dorms
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to the polls to vote via golf cart, and finally ending the evening with a campus cookout. 423
Events like this continued across college campuses over the next two weeks through the
November 6 election. The movement was once again, reaching their demographic in
ways that appealed to them: they came right to college students, and provided a fun,
tailgate/party atmosphere, some events even encouraging Halloween costumes and
promoting a “haunted ride to the polls” in order to get the youth voters in colleges
involved and excited about being a part of the democratic process.424 Some of the events
that were held across the nation were attended by musicians such as DJ Roxci and DJ
Khaled.425
In addition to the Vote for Our Lives campaign, the Never Again movement
joined forces with over twenty other youth-led organizations to participate in the national
Walkout to Vote project on election day. This project encouraged students of every age,
demographic, and geographical location to walkout of their schools on election day to go
to the polls and vote on election day, or to encourage those who can vote if a student is
not eligible to vote.426 Working with other movements in a coalition like this is one of the
positive consequences that Earl discusses with online social movements. The argument
here is the benefit of using the online realm to connect with other movements because,
while each of the different movements or organizations may not have every issue in
common, they are often able to connect with one another and find common themes within
their movements to support one another on. 427
Even scholars who are skeptical of the impacts of online activism do note the
importance of utilizing the internet to build these coalitions. 428 For example, with the
Walkout and Vote project, the Never Again movement joined forces with Bridge the
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Divide, an organization for youth to bridge the divide between Republicans and
Democrats in order to participate in conversations that are collectively important for the
future.429 These two groups have different overarching goals, but through the connections
that are made possible through the internet, both the Never Again movement and Bridge
the Divide are able to come together for a common cause. This connection ultimately
brought followers of each group together which, added momentum and numbers to the
individual movements as well as the collective effort they were working toward together,
in this case, Walkout to Vote.
On November 6, the day of the 2018 midterm election, the Never Again
movement’s local chapters went to work canvassing their local communities, marching,
bussing, and even parading to the polls. Even youth activists of the movement who were
not old enough to vote yet spent the day phone-banking, calling people in their areas and
encouraging them to go out and vote. The movement posted memes and videos, shared
tweets and pictures on Instagram, included celebrities, and highlighted members of
various local March for Our Lives chapters. Just as the youth of this movement used what
Clark and Marchi term collective journalism to communicate with each other about what
was going on in their schools and neighborhoods and to expose what they viewed as
important and in need of an urgent response, the movement used this same type of model
on election day to highlight what they found to be newsworthy: youth voting.430 The
movement leaders and participants went to social media, this time not to voice their
concerns in order to mobilize their communities, but instead to highlight the impact the
youth were having as a community and to encourage more and more people to join the
movement.
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While there is no way to make a direct connection between the work the Never
Again movement did prior to the 2018 midterm elections and the results of those
elections, voter turnout was the highest for a midterm election it had ever been in the last
four decades. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, youth turnout for 18–29 year-olds
went from 20% in the 2014 midterm elections to 36% in 2018, a 79% increase, the largest
for any age group.431
Throughout their larger acts of engagement, the Never Again leaders continually
spoke to local and national media, met with Senators and Representatives, and proposed
legislation.432 The group of youth leaders sat in town hall meetings, made phone calls,
made their presence known, and, as Florida Governor Rick Scott stated, “turned tragedy
to action.”433 They coupled their face-to-face communication and more “traditional”
forms of activism with unique types of digital activism as well. Their digital activism
ranged from tweets to leaders to digital PSA videos to memes to QR codes on t-shirts.
Through every step of activism that the Never Again movement did, they were able to
engage their followers in a way that moved them from this idea of youth being
disinterested in politics to driving interest in the issues and ultimately to youth
participating in various forms of activism.
The Never Again movement created their own news. They took their concerns,
which they felt were not being addressed or addressed well enough, and made them
public concerns. These included issues that directly impacted the youth, that
disproportionately impacted people of color, and issues that were not getting solved that
were resulting in youth dying. The movement spread their messages like wildfire through
social media, reaching young people and people of color, and shared their concerns and
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plans for change. Their momentum eventually gained the attention of traditional media as
well, garnering even more publicity, reaching more individuals who could relate to their
cause. Leaders and members of the movement across the country found their place and
inserted themselves into the story. Youth across the globe related to the movement’s
cause on different levels, for various reasons, but all finding something within the
movement that spoke to them, something worth fighting for, and they began inserting
themselves in those places, making room for all of the stories and all of the connections,
all for one cause. The youth then began building the overarching story through the use of
digital media. They used the hashtag and the filters and tagged the movement and
movement leaders, each part of which contributed to creating story as a whole.
These three steps are all parts of the ladder of political engagement. 434 These
steps are how youth move from simply being interested in politics to being participants in
the political sphere in today’s social media age. It is through this work, throughout the
entirety of the Never Again movement, to date, that the youth leaders were able to engage
their followers over social and digital media without weakening their movement to mere
“clicktivism” or “slacktivism.” The ability to create their own news, to allow followers to
insert themselves into the story, and ultimately allow those followers to build their own
stories. In these ways, the Never Again movement has done that has managed to keep the
momentum around their cause going for over two years.

Activism or Slacktivism
Because the Never Again movement was so wrapped up in youth, from leadership
to involvement, and because the movement implemented digital aspects so naturally
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throughout every step of their activism, they often get criticized as being a movement of
slacktivism, rather than recognized for the activism done throughout all of their work.
Below I explore the ladder of political engagement a final time as a conversation against
the critique of slacktivism directed at this movement.
Throughout their activism, the Never Again movement used digital means to help
move their followers from interest to participation, following Clark and Marchi’s ladder
of political engagement nearly perfectly. The first step of this movement involves sharing
the story, the second step is inserting oneself into the story, and finally, the last step is
when followers of the movement take the story and make it their own through personal
connections to the content. Below I discuss how the Never Again movement made this
possible and how their movement participants went from online to offline in their attempt
to make change.

Sharing: Step One of the Ladder
The first aspect of digital activism that moves individuals from interest to
participation is their ability to share content. Specifically, this comes from the ability for
users to find, sort, and share content that they feel connected to, content that matters to
them. This is different from simply getting content from mainstream media, these users
are sharing information and content that they are explicitly connected to. For the Never
Again movement, this was an important part of their strategy. Leaders of the movement
knew that the traditional news media would disappear from their lawns and town shortly
after the shooting and move on to the next big story. But the students of MSD did not
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want their story to be forgotten that easily, so they took to social media to make sure it
was not.
The Never Again movement has created and shared many hashtags depending on
the specific event they were focusing on at that time, along with their movement’s
namesake hashtag, #NeverAgain. These hashtags provided a way to spread their message
and help others share it as well. The most popular was the #MarchForOurLives hashtag.
This specific hashtag was used in over 3.3 million tweets during the week of March 24,
2018.435 In a pull of 63,000 sample tweets that used both the hashtags #NeverAgain and
#MarchFourOurLives between March 23 and March 25, multimedia artist Erin Gallagher
made a graph that shows how many impressions these two hashtags alone made in the
span of two days: nearly three million impressions, which means those 63,000 tweets
were seen three million times. 436
In just this small example, it is clear that participants of the Never Again
movement were able to make their voices heard and were actually sharing the story and
cause to a large audience. This wide reach does not even include the days before the
march and the conversations happening online during the planning and organizing stages
of that movement, or the days after either as participants and followers continued to talk
about this one event.

Inserting Oneself into the Story: Step Two
The second step of moving from interest to participation is the ability for
followers of a movement to be able to insert themselves into the story. The Never Again
movement followers were able to engage in this step relatively easily. One way in which
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individuals could insert themselves into the story of the Never Again movement digitally
was through Snapchat. On March 14, the day of the nation-wide school walk-outs, there
was a Snapchat filter available that said “What _______’s schoolday looks like” with
various city and school names filled in the blank based on their location. 437 While this
filter was not created by the Never Again movement, it was used by the Never Again
movement participants and gave them a way to insert themselves into the story of that
day. Whether the student was able to join the walkout, or their school was prohibiting
walkouts, whether they were joined by huge crowds or if they were the lone walkout in
their location, anyone with a Snapchat account could take a picture or a selfie and share it
with others participating across the nation.
The walkout was not the only time Snapchat was used by members of the
movement. During the March 24 March for Our Lives protests, Snapchats were being
shared from all of the various locations where these events were taking place. On
Snapchat, there is a feature called Snap Maps where anyone can view the world map and
see hotspots where a lot of snaps are being posted at that time (e.g. Disney World is
usually a hotspot because there are generally a lot of people posting from Disney World).
During the March for Our Lives protests, Snap Maps was alight with hotspots worldwide
during the March for Our Lives protests. 438 This highlights the mass influx of
participants and the dominant social media presence the Never Again movement;
participants were inserting themselves into the story, and they were doing so en masse.
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Making the Story their Own: The Final Step
The final step that the Never Again movement was able to accomplish through
their digital work, which helped push followers from interest to participation, was the
ability for those people to make the story their own. It is in this step that young people
bring in their feelings toward the issue, where they make connections to their lives and
their feelings on the issue. 439 It is in these moments of involving one’s own emotions that
Zizi Papacharissi states that the affective public is formed. These are people who are
bound together for a cause through their shared feelings and emotions on an issue. As
discussed above, while statistically it may not be highly likely that most students in the
United States will be in a school shooting, their perception, and their feeling like it is
possible is a strong, and shared, emotion that brings this group together on this issue.
The fight for a safe place for kids to learn was the resounding chorus among those
movement participants. They have come together over the feeling that “enough is
enough” a chant heard throughout the protests and movement as a whole, that something
has to change to protect kids. The group has come together with a feeling of being fed up
with the NRA telling them that “nothing could have been done to prevent this” and that
“good guys with guns stop bad guys with guns.” They collectively said “we call BS,” a
quote from MSD student and Never Again leader Emma Gonzalez. 440
Emotionally connecting over an issue that they shared feelings on was never an
issue for the Never Again movement. From the rhetoric used by the leaders to help
solidify that school shootings like theirs could happen anywhere, that there was nothing
special about them or their school, to the frequent enough occurrence of mass and school
shootings that take place in the United States, followers of the movement felt a deep and

168

personal connection to the cause. Additionally, the leaders instilling in these young
people the feeling that they could make change, and that if they wanted change they had
to be the ones to do something about it, also connected the members of the movement
emotionally.
The Never Again movement did not have to go door-to-door or school-to-school
to talk to students. They did not even need to rely on traditional forms of media to cover
their movement, even though they still benefited from traditional media covering their
work. The movement leaders and their followers took to social media and flooded the
system where other students most likely already were and shared their message. They
inserted themselves into the story, and they connected on an emotional level to the cause,
and this is what has led the Never Again movement participants from interest in the
movement to participation.

Conclusion
Ultimately, it is not the accomplishment of the biggest, flashiest goal of a
movement that determines the impact of that movement. In the digital activism world, the
ability to share, to allow others to relate and connect, is what leads to impact. The ability
to build a base of followers who feel they have a stake in the cause will lead them to
participation. As the Never Again movement has shown and done, participation at the
lowest level, at the grassroots level, has the ability to lead to larger goals. Without this
first and most important step of moving from interest to involvement, the biggest goals
will never be achieved. For the Never Again movement, accomplishing the biggest goal
of gun reform at the federal level cannot be done without first tackling the smaller ones,
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informing youth voters, registering those voters, getting those voters to the polls over and
over again. This movement highlights the importance of, and provides the steps to,
achieving goals through a youth digital social movement.
As with all digital social movements today, the argument of whether the work
being done is true activism, or just slacktivism without any impact comes up. The Never
Again movement has integrated both traditional and non-traditional forms of activism
throughout its entirety, from speaking directly to news reporters, to posting on social
media, to organizing protests, to creating QR codes to put on t-shirts to register voters.
The Never Again movement has had a very specific goal to change legislation on gun
laws in the United States, and they have used, and continue to use, both traditional and
non-traditional forms of activism to work toward achieving that goal. The combination of
these two types of activism has helped the Never Again movement reach large audiences,
make traditional news, and enact real change. The movement worked to move followers
from interest to participation through their continual engagements online that encouraged
offline actions, such as marching, registering to vote, and ultimately going out to vote.
Through the use of both traditional and non-traditional forms of activism, the Never
Again movement is able to avoid falling into the slacktivism criticism.
While the Never Again movement is not a perfect movement, if a perfect
movement even exists, it does provide insight into how movements that come about and
benefit from digital technologies when leaders and members alike who are familiar with
and have access to said technology run the show. Additionally, an important aspect of
this movement is the ability to, either through digital technology or face-to-face, connect
on an emotional level with those whom the movement is trying to engage and motivate to
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act. Future research can and should continue to study the Never Again movement as their
leaders continue to age, learn, and fight for radical change in United States gun
regulation.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion

In this final chapter, I look across each of the cases for similarities and differences
as they relate to the important aspects of this dissertation including the relationship
between the movements and youth, digital, and social movement activism. I then move
into addressing the specific research questions of this project, including my findings on
how with youth in the forefront of these movements, they used affect rhetoric as a means
to promote and gain support for their movement, and how youth digital social movements
have evolved over the years. It is in these collective reflections that I discuss what
scholars and activists alike can learn from these movements and as we move forward.

Cross-Case Analyses
Youth
When looking across each of these cases and their relationship to youth, the first
striking note is that each of these movements all came about as a result of youth being the
victims of an attack. The young boys of Uganda being taken by the Lord’s Resistance
Army in the night and forced to be child soldiers spurred the Invisible Children
movement, the young girls of Nigeria being abducted from their school by Boko Haram
became the cause of the Bring Back Our Girls movement, and finally, the school shooting
and death of fourteen students at Marjory Stoneman Douglas in the United States became
the catalyst for the Never Again movement.
Youth are viewed, almost universally, as a vulnerable population, susceptible to
harm, not necessarily able to protect themselves from potentially harmful situations.
Consequently, adults often feel the need to help and/or protect them from those
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situations.441 This is seen through anti-smoking campaigns delivered at schools to help
educate and protect children and young adults from the dangers of smoking, safe-sex
education provided to teens and pre-teens to help give them the tools to be able to protect
themselves from harmful situations such as sexually transmitted infections, and in higher
education with the extra precautions one has to go through with the Institutional Review
Board when studying children, who are listed as a vulnerable subject population.442
While experiences and opportunities vary across the globe for youth,
organizations such as Save the Children argue that children in every country are at risk of
violence and that every child deserves to grow up safe from this harm. 443 It is this
overarching understanding of youth and that they deserve to be safe and protected that
seems to elicit the implementation of these movements after youth have been attacked,
where they are not safe or were not adequately protected. This common thread across
each of these cases leads to the first research question of this dissertation: with youth in
the forefront of these movements, how have they each utilized affect rhetoric as a means
to promote and gain support for their cause?
Specifically, the implications of using terms related to youth within these
movements is an important aspect to consider. The Invisible Children movement has the
word “child” in their name, signaling to those who simply hear about the movement that
youth, this vulnerable population, are the focus of the movement. Similarly, the Bring
Back Our Girls movement refers to the kidnapped Chibok girls as “girls” though many of
the girls are in their middle to late teens and could be seen as “young adults.” However,
the use of “girls” signals to those who are exposed to the movement that, again, these are
young, vulnerable, females who are in need of outside help.
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While a youth term is not in the Never Again movement’s name, the Never Again
movement does emphasize youth in all aspects of their movement; from being the ones
who speak to the media, to having young people speaking at events, to creating public
service announcement-type videos that emphasize the youth and their relationship to gun
violence, they keep youth in the forefront and as the face of their movement. This
continual reminder from the movement that youth are the ones being impacted by the
current gun violence and laws, that the youth are the ones making political waves,
highlights the vulnerability of this group, but also the power that they have, the ‘no more’
attitude they have toward the violence they are having to face at school, in a place that is
supposed to be safe.
By keeping youth in the forefront of each of these movements through their
rhetoric, each movement is tapping into the emotions people have in relation to youth and
children to evoke a more urgent response. If children are being kidnapped in the middle
of the night to be turned into child-soldiers, that elicits a more extreme response from
people than saying adults are taken and turned into soldiers. The same can be said for the
Chibok girls who were abducted, the emotional response to that is stronger than saying
even teenagers or young adults were taken from their school.
The youth who were victims of the Marjory Stoneman Douglas school shooting
were not the youngest school shooting victims, and they weren’t the oldest victims of a
school shooting in the United States either, with mass shootings happening at colleges
and universities as well. The Marjory Stoneman Douglas students fell right in between
these two groups; they were still young enough to be seen as youth, as a vulnerable group
in need of protection, but they were old enough to be their own advocates, to be the voice
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driving for change. Their voices and faces being the driving force behind the Never
Again movement reminds people that they were the victims. This has a double-impact on
those who hear their message. Their rhetoric along with their physical presence and
appearance together are what make the connection between this movement and affect
rhetoric significant.
The next similarity across the cases is the aspect of being youth-led. The two
cases that have the most similarities in this way are the Invisible Children movement and
the Never Again movement. They were both started and run by individuals who
themselves are youths. The three recent college graduates who traveled to Uganda and
created a movement around the humanitarian crisis they saw unfolding in front of them in
route to a different humanitarian crisis in Darfur and the students who survived the school
shooting in Parkland, Florida in the United States and within forty-eight hours of the
event created what has become a worldwide movement for gun reform in the United
States are the most similar in their youth-led aspect. The Bring Back Out Girls
movement, while was not originally started or run by the youth, was supported,
associated with, and partly led by youth activist Malala Yousafzai.
Cross comparison of these movements and their youth leadership shows that
having young people who are more familiar with the current digital technologies helps
movements use them in ways to connect with potential members and sustain a following
for more than their first quick flash of attention. Future research in this area could focus
on whether this adaptability from these digital natives continues on throughout their lives
and later activism, or, if technology outpaces them and the older they get the more
difficult it is to keep up with and continually adapt to.
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All three cases emphasized the youth as part of, if not their main, target
demographic for their movements. This is not to say that they expected the youth to solve
the problems, make the policy changes, or physically go rescue other young people, but
they did empower other youth to be a part of solving the problems, vote for leaders who
would make the policy changes they were looking for, and use their own voices to bring
enough attention to these issues that other youth would be saved and would be rescued.
The Invisible Children and the Never Again movements had similar patterns in their
traveling to places where young people were localized; both movements made stops at
colleges, universities, and high schools. At these stops, the youth were encouraged to
engage with each movement by contributing funds, by participating in events, and by
registering to vote. While their goals of being at the colleges, universities, and high
schools were not identical, both the Invisible Children and Never Again movements went
directly to the youth and got them involved in their movements and did not just rely on
their messages reaching them via technology.
The Bring Back Our Girls and Never Again movements were similar in their
getting youth participation via technology concerning their movement and issues. The use
of specific hashtags helped rally youth online to engage with the movement and message.
The use of social media, as will be discussed in a future chapter, was a key way to engage
the youth demographic in the movement, and it is a place where voices that are
traditionally not as listened to or valued are able to be expressed and heard.
Finally, the last connection that all three movements have in relation to youth is
how they used youth in their affective rhetoric. Specifically, all three movements drew
attention to the vulnerability of the individuals they were attempting to help. The
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Invisible Children movement and the Bring Back Our Girls movement explicitly
highlighted the youth in need of help in their movement name, strategically using
“children” and “girls.” This rhetorical move, while not necessarily nefarious in nature,
does have an affective impact on those who see and hear it, picturing young children who
need their help. While the Never Again movement did not explicitly use a term for youth
in their name, they did explicitly refer to themselves as kids and children throughout their
activism. Again, directly drawing attention to the young age of those who were attacked
worked as a plea to get listeners to forget everything else and remember their instinct to
protect children–that that should come first before everything else.
While the three movements share similarities amongst them when it comes to
their relationships with youth, they also differ in important ways as well. Specifically, the
movements engaged youth differently, stemming, in part, from when the movement
began, as well as differences due to those leading the movement. The Invisible Children
movement began in the early 2000s, during a time when the social media platforms that
are commonly used among youth today were either not around, such as YouTube (2005)
Twitter (2006), Instagram (2010), and Snapchat (2011), or they were still in their early
stages of implementation including Facebook (2004). This created a difference when it
came to the ways in which the Invisible Children reached the youth at the time compared
to the Bring Back Our Girls and Never Again movements. Both of these movements
came about after these major platforms were not only developed, but also had been used
for bringing social groups together prior to either movement’s usage of them. This
difference in how the youth were reached and engaged by the movements is significant.
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Prior to the use of these digital media platforms, connecting with youth was done
through more direct, interpersonal relationship-building connections between the
movements and the individuals they were attempting to engage. Invisible Children went
from school to school, university to university, talking with the youth there, screening
their videos and engaging those young people in a direct one-on-one manner. One of the
main points of emphasis for the Invisible Children movement is the interconnectedness of
individuals around the world, that no person, community exists in isolation, and they
place high value on the work they do on an interpersonal level. As technology developed
alongside the movement, Invisible Children was able to use new technology to reach
large masses of youth and share their videos without having to physically be in those
places, even though their roots were started on a person-to-person, face-to-face level of
communication.
The Bring Back Our Girls movement and the Never Again movement both came
about in a more developed social media era and thus had a different experience and
relationship with connecting to youth through digital means. Individuals who have grown
up with today’s technology view technology as a seamless method for interacting and
communicating with each other, and social media is a major contributor in how younger
generations manage their interpersonal relationship. 444 Because of this shift in how the
youth interact and manage relationships, it is a logical move for both the Bring Back Our
Girls movement and the Never Again movement to use digital means as their way of
connecting with and getting the youth involved with their movement. The use of digital
means to share their message with youth also helps the message extend outside of
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physical boundaries and restrictions of where the leaders of those movements are able to
travel.
The Invisible Children movement began their work by creating a movie in
Uganda, they then had to travel to schools and universities (mostly across the United
States) to share their movie and sell their merchandise to these young people in person.
However, the Bring Back Our Girls and Never Again movements were able to reach well
beyond places they could physically travel to and get youth across the globe seeing their
videos, their messages, contributing to their causes in ways in which the Invisible
Children movement was not able to do during the beginning stages of their movement.
The movements also differed in part with their engagement with youth because of
the leadership of the movements themselves. The Bring Back Our Girls movement
leaders were not themselves youth leaders, and while they did have youth activist Malala
Yousafzai as a leading voice in the movement, she and other young people around her
age were not the ones in charge of, or running the movement at its core. This impacted, in
part, the movement’s familiarity and ability to navigate the digital platforms in sustaining
ways to help lead to more lasting change. The youth demographic makes up the majority
of the users of major social media platforms worldwide, and with the leaders of the Bring
Back Our Girls movement not being youths themselves, connecting to the largest
audience on social media that is a different demographic than that of the leaders is
different from communicating to people who belong in the same age demographic and
are equally as savvy digitally such as what the Never Again movement was able to do.
Communicating across generations poses more potential interpersonal
communication barriers to overcome than communicating to individuals within one’s
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own generation.445 The added difference of the Bring Back Our Girls movement having
non-youth leaders communicating through platforms that are used in masses by the youth
adds another level of difficulty to the Bring Back Our Girls’ ability to relate and connect
with youth about their movement.
Additionally, the location of the movement creates differences when examining
the engagement that does, and that even can take place. In Central Africa, 12% of the
population uses the Internet, in Western Africa, 41% of the total population are users of
Internet, 50% of the total population in Northern Africa uses the Internet, and in North
America, 95% of the population uses the Internet.446 If a larger portion of the population
has access to and uses the Internet, connecting to the youth of a particular region is
impacted by overall Internet users in that region. The differences in Internet usage makes
a difference in engagement with these social movements through the Internet and social
media.

Digital
Each of the three cases of this dissertation have a unique relationship to the digital
sphere, including the time in which they came about, the age of those involved in the
movement, the location in which the movement took/is taking place, and ultimately the
infrastructure and means available to those who created and engaged in the movement
itself. Though unique, these cases all have similarities that are important in the discussion
of youth digital social movement activism.
Across each case, there is a relationship between the time in which the movement
came about and the digital era. The Invisible Children movement came about at the
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beginning of the digital era, but they have continued to function as a movement
throughout the last decade when both the Bring Back Our Girls and Never Again
movement have also come about. The three cases have similarly navigated through the
digital landscape by using social media to reach out to their followers, gain attention, and
share ways to act.
Through the use of hashtags, videos, and social media exposure, all three social
movements have made themselves known through their social media presence. The Kony
2012 media blitz from the Invisible Children movement that became the most viral video
of the time, the #BringBackOurGirls hashtag campaign that gathered international
attention from not only civilians, but also political leaders, and the March for Our Lives
worldwide protest for gun reform from the Never Again movement that was organized
and spread almost exclusively online. Despite the different times in which these
movements came about, they each were able to take advantage of digital means to
massively spread their specific message.
In addition to the time in which the movements came about, the age of the
creators and followers of the movements in relation to the time the movements came
about has impacted their relationship with the digital realm. Specifically, the Invisible
Children leaders, while youth, were close to, but not exactly, digital natives. However,
their youth was an advantage in their relationship to the digital realm. As the movement
moved forward and the digital era progressed, the young age of the leaders enabled them
to adapt to the changing landscape and produce content and relate to followers in the
newest digital ways.
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The leaders of the Bring Back Our Girls movement, however, were not youth or
digital natives, and thus, were not as seamless in their digital connection with the
movement and followers. BBOG did use the hashtag, a popular form of communicating
on social media, but they did not create other content to continue their presence digitally
and continue to engage followers on digital media. The age of the movement leaders will
not always mean a lesser ability to adapt and implement digital technologies, but it is an
interesting aspect that sets this movement apart from the other two in this study, and the
digital presence of the Bring Back Our Girls movement was definitely lacking in
comparison.
The Never Again movement stands out as a youth digital social movement
because of their relationship to the digital realm based on the leaders and many of their
followers being digital natives and their integrated use of various digital platforms. The
Never Again movement spread across different social media sites, utilizing them in
unique ways, all to reach and connect to as many people as possible and provide places
for others who were or wanted to be involved in the movement to gather digitally. In
addition, the Never Again movement did not remain exclusively online with their digital
work, rather, this movement used their digital reach to motivate people to act together
offline.

Evolution of Youth Digital Social Movement Activism
The activism done across the movements are strikingly similar, and yet
importantly different at the same time. To begin, each movement has utilized both
traditional and non-traditional forms of activism. They have had rallies and protests,

182

walk-outs and sit-its, letters and tweets sent to political figures. Important to note about
each of these movements is the interplay between traditional and non-traditional activism.
This is where I really explore the research question about how youth digital social
movements have evolved over the twenty-first century. The relationship between the
movements and activism leads to the findings of the research question: how have youth
digital social movements evolved throughout the twenty-first century?
As discussed throughout, as the times change, so too will social movements
change how they use digital means as a part of their movement. The Invisible Children
movement used digital technologies as a secondary aspect of their movement. They used
more traditional forms of connection and activism to move people online to watch their
Kony 2012 video, talking about it at gatherings and events, sending emails, and even
through the Kony 2012 kit filled with posters and stickers to post around town for those
who purchased the kits that encouraged others to go online and watch their video.
Moving forward in the timeline, the Bring Back Our Girls movement used digital
technologies via their hashtag campaign to reach and share their cause with people across
the globe, but there was no additional offline component for most users outside of
Nigeria to participate in, and even the ones in Nigeria were somewhat limited. The most
recent movement of this study, the Never Again movement, essentially flipped the order
of using both digital and traditional activism from that of the Invisible Children
movement. The Never Again movement used digital technologies to reach their
audiences and share their message, much like the Bring Back Our Girls movement, but
they then directed their followers offline to participate in various different forms of
traditional activism, like marches, walk-outs, and voting.
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This is an interesting insight into youth digital social movements that sometimes
get a bad reputation for one or more of the aspects that make them the focus of this study.
Young people and their use of digital technologies for activism is not minor or
dismissible forms of slacktivism; they are not all simply slacktivists who only care about
their image and appearing to support a movement. As discussed throughout this
dissertation, young people do see the work they are doing online as engaging in civic and
political activism, they do want to make change and they do want the world to be a better
place, but they each uniquely define that. What these young activists need, though, is
direction. Young people know how to use social media today, they know how to use it
effectively in various ways, but it is true that tweets do not end wars and shares do not
return missing children.
Young activists need direction, through the digital technologies that are available
and familiar for them to use, of what the next step of their activism needs to be. Youth
will share, they will post, they will tweet, they will live-stream, and, we have seen, that
youth will also show up, at least sometimes; they will walk out, they will march, they will
register, and they will vote. Having direct, explicit, communication through whatever
medium reaches them, of what their next step is, is the key to keeping youth social
movements moving and not getting stuck in the digital vortex of only liking and sharing
content.
Overall, when communication scholars study youth social movements, and social
movements as a whole, it is difficult to not look at their big, overarching, goals and say
whether or not the movement was successful or whether or not the activists did anything,
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but it is not always the big moves that contribute to social movements that are the most
significant.
As I have stated, the purpose of this dissertation is not to place a value judgement
of whether these social movements have been successful or not. I do, however, believe
the way we study and talk about social movements, especially youth social movements, is
important. I am arguing that we can be critical of social movements without deeming
them a complete failure simply because goal number one was not “achieved.” Did the
Invisible Children movement bring an end to the stronghold the LRA has in Uganda? No,
they did not. But did they accomplish other things throughout the movement, like the
Crisis Tracker and helping with getting clean water and marketable skills for women
there? Yes, and that is not something to shrug off and say “the movement was a failure.”
Similarly, did Bring Back Our Girls bring back all of the kidnapped Chibok girls? No,
but it brought back some of them and hasn’t given up the fight to find the rest. Did
Parkland end mass shootings once and for all? No, but they also made a difference by
registering young people to vote, encouraging companies to divest from the NRA, and
fighting for gun reform.
When we broadly speak about these movements, we ignore the intricacies that
have taken place that we can learn from, what has worked well for the movement, what
obstacles they have faced and how future movements can work to overcome them, and
what we can learn about potential pitfalls that come with digital movements and how
future movements can try to avoid them. Not everything the Invisible Children
movement, the Bring Back Our Girls movement, or the Never Again movement have
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done are necessarily moves all future social movements should implement, but there are
aspects from each that future social movements can learn from nonetheless.
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